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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTER ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the lower 
court was correct in holding that a shareholder of a 
professional corporation is not vicariously liable for the 
alleged malpractice of another shareholder of the 
professional corporation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This brief adapts and incorporates herein the 
Plaintiff/Appellant' s statement of fact^. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Shareholders in professional corporations generally, 
and lawyer shareholders specifically, ate vicariously 
liable for the malpractice of other professionals in their 
professional corporation. The legislative history of the 
Utah Professional Corporation Act and of professional 
corporations acts generally reveals an intent not to amend 
liability relationships historically in place. Both the 
old and new rules for the regulation of the Bar 
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court reflect an intent to 
require vicarious liability for members sf the bar. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND THE 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT TO LIMIT 
LIABILITY. 
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The Appellant and Respondent each base their arguments on 
interpretations of different sections of the Professional 
Corporation Act, U.C.A. 16-11-1 et seq. They each argue that 
one section prevails over the other. Their arguments clearly 
show that, based on the history of the legal profession and the 
Utah Corporate Code generally, the Professional Corporation Act 
is internally inconsistent. 
In analyzing professional corporation statute language 
similar to that found in the Utah Professional Corporation Act 
Smith and Ault, The Corporate Professional-United States v. 
Empey, 54 Mass.L.Q. 14 (1969), also found the provisions of the 
act to be internally inconsistent. They found the 
interpretations to be "equally reasonable", at 23. 
This inconsistency requires this court to examine the 
legislative history and intent of the Act, see Utah State Road 
Commission v.- Friberg, 687 P2d 821 (Utah, 1984). 
A. 
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT THE 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT WOULD NOT 
LIMIT LIABILITY. 
Attachment A is a transcript of the debate in the Utah 
State House of Representatives on March 19, ]963, on House 
Bill 196 entitled Incorporation of Persons Rendering 
Professional Services. The intent of the Legislature in 
enacting this statute is evident from the first line of 
discussion in the record. The Speaker of the House 
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describes the act as one, "to incorporate for tax 
benefits". The discussion of Representative Watkins, the 
primary sponsor of the bill, focuses exclusively on tax 
benefits which are available for professional 
corporations. 
After the introduction of the bill Representative 
Loverage asked the sponsor, 
"In connection with liable [sicj 
these individuals still be individuc 
case of a suit or liable [sic]. I h 
instances, corporation1s individuals 
but only the corporation. What wou.l _ __ „ 
these people?" 
Representative Watkins, the sponsor,! answers, 
"This act does not alter any law applicable to the 
relationship between a person rendering professional 
services and a person receiving such services, 
including liability arising out of such professional 
services. 
Therefore, the doctor who incorporates would not 
be given .limited liability as most corporations 
provide." 
It is obvious from the tenor of the discussion that 
Representative Loverage was referring to liability for 
professional malpractice as opposed to ,dliable". 
Representative Watkins' response was theft the liability 
aspects of professional practice would not change. Those 
liability aspects as understood by both Representatives, 
included the fact that professionals practicing together 
were individually liable for the malpraqtice of one another. 
suits, would 
lly liable in the 
now that in some 
may not be sued, 
d be* the* fitatuR of 
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The Legislature intended to pass a statute 
providing tax benefits to professionals, but did not 
intend to amend the liability aspects of professional 
practice. It did not intend to shield Ms. Coffman from 
the liability she would traditionally have faced as a 
lawyer in practice with another lawyer. 
B. 
THE GENERAL LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT WAS TO 
ALLOW TAX BENEFITS BUT NOT TO LIMIT 
LIABILITY. 
At about the same time as the Utah Legislature enacted 
the Utah Professional Corporation Act numerous other states 
also considered and enacted professional corporation statutes. 
In Petition of the Bar Association of Hawaii, 516 P.2d 1267 
(Hawaii, 1973) the Hawaii Supreme Court quoted the Hawaii 
Standing Committee Report, 
"The basic reason for the establishment of 
professional corporations is to place professional 
persons on parity with persons in other business 
corporations who are favored with tax benefits 
under the Internal Revenue Code. This bill would 
allow the professions to take advantage of the tax 
benefit resulting in doing business through a 
corporation." Id. at 1268. 
See also In re: Rhode Island Bar Association, 263 A.2d 692, 
695 (R.I., 1970) and In re; New Hampshire Bar Association, 266 
A.2d 583,584 (N.H.,1970) and In re: Florida Bar Association, 
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133 So.2d 554,555 (Fla., 1961). Notably the Hawaii Supreme 
Court refused to allow limited liability for lawyers not 
personally involved in malpractice despite the fact that the 
Hawaii Corporate Code would have otherwise immunized them. 
The same result obtained in Ohio in Sopth High Development 
Limited v. Weyner, Lippe and Cromley C<p. , L.P.A., 445 N.E. 2d 
1106 (Ohio, 1983). 
Those legal scholars who addressed the issue at the time 
Professional Corporation statutes were being enacted also 
focused on tax issues, see Smith and A^ alt, The Corporate 
Professional-United States v. Empey, 54 Mass.L.Q. 14 (1969); 
Bittker, Professional Service Organizations: A Critique of 
the Literature, 23 Tax.L.Rev. 429 (196$); and O'Neill, 
Professional Service Corporations: Coping With Operational 
Problems, 31 J.Taxation 94 (1969). 
Those writers who addressed the liability issue found it 
incongruous-that attorneys would be able to escape individual 
liability merely by converting their practice to a corporate 
format. In Jones, The Professional Corporation 27 
Fordham.L.R. 353, 360-362 (1958) the author described the 
proposed form for a professional corporation. That form 
included, 
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"The professional corporation shall afford no 
limitation from the liability of its officers, directors 
or shareholders or any errors, omissions, malpractice or 
other torts committed by its agents, employees, officers, 
directors, or shareholders in the scope of their 
employment by or professional activities on behalf of the 
corporation." Id. at 361. 
Smith and Ault, supra, at 25, also addressed the 
liability issue. Their response to the limited 
liability position, when comparing both sides of the 
argument before the Court here was, 
" . . . this limitation on traditional professional 
responsbilities may raise both ethical problems 
and problems in terms of the regulatory agencies 
overseeing the practice of the various 
professions." 
II. 
THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
INVOKE RESPONDENT'S LIABILITY. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-51-14, provides that 
rules and regulations pertaining to members of the Utah State 
Bar shall be submitted and approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Further, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-4(3), 
provides "The Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to the practice of 
law." (emphasis added). 
By the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the Supreme Court has exercised the 
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authority granted in the judicial code* The Code of 
Professional Responsibility was in effect at the time the 
incidents occurred which give rise to tjie Plaintiff's claim 
against the Defendant. The Code of Professional 
Responsibility was approved on February 19, 1971, a copy is 
attached as Attachment B. Subsequently^ the Utah Supreme 
Court approved the Rules of Professional Conduct, to become 
effective on January 1, 1988, a copy is attached as 
Attachment C. 
The introductory material to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct contains a section entitled Scope. In discussing the 
rules, the Scope section describes, "Other [of these) rules 
define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and 
others." In other words, some of the ryles establish a 
standard of care. A lawyer may be liable for the violation 
of that standard, the classic definition of negligence. 
A. 
THE RESPONDENT WOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 
FROM THIS ACTION UNDER RULE 5.1 OF 
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CQNDUCT. 
Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides, 
(a) A partner in a law firm shdll make 
reasonable efforts to insure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that 
all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
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(b) . . . A lawyer shall be responsible for 
another lawyer's violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if: . . . (2) the lawyer is a 
partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer 
practices, or has direct supervisory authority over 
the other lawyer, and know of the conduct at a time 
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated 
but fails to take reasonable remedial actions." 
The terminology section of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct defines, "'Partner1 denotes a 
member of a partnership or a shareholder in a law firm 
organized as a professional corporation." 
As a shareholder, with her husband, Ms. Coffman 
was a "partner" in the law firm of Coffman and 
Coffman. In that capacity Ms. Coffman would have had, 
under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a specific 
duty to insure reasonable measures were taken to 
insure adherence to the rules. 
This matter was disposed of, below, on a Motion 
to Dismiss. In support of that motion, Ms. Coffman 
provided an Affidavit stating that she was a member of 
the firm and that she did not know anything about the 
matter. This clearly would not meet the criteria 
established by Rule 5.1. Whether or not steps taken by 
her were sufficient to meet Rule 5.1 criteria would 
constitute an issue of fact avoiding both Motions to 
Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment in all but the 
most straight forward cases. 
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If Rule 5.1 had been in effect at toe time of the 
negligence of the firm of Coffman and Coifman, as it 
most assuredly will be at the time this case is 
decided, Ms. Coffman would not have beeiji removed from 
the lawsuit. The legislative intent of the Act and the 
other arguments set forth in this brief show that there 
is no reason to otherwise distinguish between then and 
now. 
B. 
LIMITED LIABILITY FOR A SHAREHOLDER 
OF A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
CONSTITUTES A PROSPECTIVE LIMITATION 
OF LIABILITY. 
Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides, 
"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively 
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for 
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is 
indepenndently represented in making the agreement • ." 
Arguably the limitation of liability associated with 
practicing in a professional corporation is legal. The 
legality of a prospective limitation is lonly half the test. 
The client must be independently represented. The obvious 
reason for independent representation is? so that the client 
will be aware of the effect of the limited liability. Very, 
very few clients will be aware that by qnoosing Law Firm A, 
a partnership, they will have the right :o look to each of 
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the members of the law firm as well as the law firm itself, 
as has traditionally been the case, and that by choosing Law 
Firm B, a professional corporation, they may be limited to 
pursuing the lawyer who negligently performs the work, the 
corporation, if it has any assets, and the corporation's 
Error's and Ommissions policy, if it actually has one, see 
Smith & Ault, supra at 25. 
Choosing to practice as a professional corporation 
prospectively attempts to limit a law firm's liability just 
, as assuredly as does having a provision in a retainer 
agreement providing, "We will not be liable for any 
negligent actions taken by any of our attorneys." Neither 
such limitation should be allowed. 
The relevant provision of Rule 1.8(h) is similar to the 
comparable provision of DR6-102(a) which addressed this 
issue under the code of professional responsbility which was 
in effect at the time this action arose. 
III. 
LIABILITY IMPOSED UPON A PERSON IS 
LIABILITY IMPOSED UPON THE RESPONDENT. 
The Respondent argues, at pages 3 and 4 of her brief, 
that the effected relationship is the relationship between 
a person rendering professional services and that she is 
not liable because the person was her husband. Utah Code 
Annotated § 68-3-12 is part of the general rules of 
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statutory construction. Subsection 5 of that statute 
provides, "Person includes individuals, bodies politic and 
corporate, partnerships, associations, knd companies." 
Traditionally, a client had a relationship with many 
persons when he employed a law firm. Ope was the 
individual lawyer with whom he worked, one was the 
partnership or association, and the others were those 
individuals in the association of partnership. The 
existence of these relationships with tne other attorneys 
is evident from the existence and scope of DR 5-105 and 
Rule 1.10 on disqualification, DR 5-101 and Rule 3.7 on 
lawyers as witnesses and DR 2-102 and R(jle 7.5 on implying 
association. 
Traditionally all of these were liable for the 
malpractice of the individual attorney Who represented the 
client. There is nothing in the Professional Corporation 
Act which would infer that the personal professional 
relationship referenced is an individual relationship or 
that Ms. Coffman had no imputed relationship with the 
appellant. 
IV. 
PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THE RESPONDENT'S 
LIABILITY. 
The public policy arguments for Respondent's liability 
appear to be clear. It is not inappropriate to briefly 
state them. 
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Liability of individual shareholders encourages 
involvement in and supervision of the work of others within 
the firm. 
Liability of individual shareholders encourages the use 
of malpractice insurance by those who have the power to 
require that the firm obtain it. 
Liability of individual shareholders encourages 
selective hiring and competent training by those within the 
firm who govern these actions. 
Liability of individual shareholders encourages 
adherence to Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholders in professional corporations are liable 
under the Professional Corporation Act and other relevant 
regulations for the malpractice of professionals within 
their firms. - This court should reverse the lower court and 
remand this case so that Ms. Coffman remains a party. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 1987. 
4oBEOTH. WILDE 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Utah Trial Lawyers Association 
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ATTACHMENT A 
HOUSE BILL 19|7 
INCORPORATION OF PERSONS 
RENDERING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
Sponsors: Reed A. Watkins, Eighth District 
J. Robert Bullock, Eleventh District 
George R. Aiken, (Twenty-Sixth District 
BILL SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR MARCH 19, 1963 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE, THIRD DISCUSSION 
MR. SPEAKER: To incorporate for tax 
benefits (inaudible) Representative Watkins? 
REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: I move we accept the 
Committee report. 
Seconded. 
t has been moved and 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 
SPEAKER: Thank you. Ill 
seconded we adopt the Committee report. All in favor of this 
motion, say Aye. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: Cause in all? The ayes have it. 
It is now before us for consideration and explanation by 
Representative Watkins. Will you proceed? 
REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: Mr. Speaker and members 
of the House. It is well known thait employees of 
corporations receive some definite *:ax benefits under our 
federal law. And through the years individuals who have 
operated sole proprietorships have been able to form 
ORIGINAL 
corporations and in effect become employees of their own 
corporation, so that they too may participate along with the 
rest of their employees for these benefits. 
When it comes to the area of professional services, 
there has been some questions in the ethics of the 
professions as well as some possible question as to whether 
say a doctor, could incorporation for the practice of his 
profession* 
The present House Bill 197 is a bill that would 
enable professional individuals under regulation by their 
own regulating board, as well as supervision by the 
Secretary of State under the forming of the corporation. 
But this Bill would enable professinal people to practice 
their profession by the business means of a corporation. It 
would have no effect whatsoever, upon the personal 
relationship treated between the doctor and his patient, for 
example, or the dentist and his patient or the lawyer and 
his client but would merely enable them to conduct their 
business in a corporate form rather than as most of them do 
now, as sole proprietorships or as partnerships. 
I might mention this: That this type legislation has 
received very favorable treatment throughout the United 
States. As of one year ago about 15 states had met this 
problem and had formed or have enacted enabling legislation 
of one kind of another to allow the same result. Several of 
2 
those had done it by means of a professional corporation 
|t they call an association 
about 23 or 24 states 
tng legislation and, to my 
1 
2 act. Other states by allowing wha 
3 act. As of today, one year later, 
4 have now passed this type of enabl 
5 knowledge, similar legislation is before most, if not all, 
6 of the other states. 
7 This is the basic purpose of the Act. It is, I 
8 should say, a non-controversial bill. It has the support of 
9 the medical profession. It has the support of the dental 
10 profession and other professions and I don't think that 
11 there would be any particular objections. 
12 If anyone has a question Irjll be certainly happy to 
13 do my best to answer it. 
14 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Loverage? 
15 REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAG^: Mr. Speaker, I should 
16 like to ask Representative Watkins 
17 MR. SPEAKER: Will you 
18 REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS 
19 REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAGfe: In connection with 
20 suits, liable suits, would these individuals still be 
21 individually liable in the case of 
22 that in some instances corporation^ may not be, individuals 
23 may not be sued but only the corporation. Now, what would 
24 be the status of these people? 
25 REPRESENTATIVE WATKINSfc I can read Section 10 
a question, 
respond? 
Yes. 
a suit of liable? I know 
1 of the Act which states: "This Act does not alter any law 
2 applicable to the relationship between a person rendering 
3 professional services and a person receiving such services, 
4 J including liability arising out of such professinal 
5 
6 Therefore, the doctor, for example, who 
7 incorporates, would not be given limited liability as most 
8 corporations provide. That is the—I might mention this 
9 too: The term has been coined "Professional Corporation" 
10 for this very reason, to point out that the professional 
11 ethics and the same standards that now exist between the 
12 professional person and his client or patient will remain 
13 even though he incorporates. 
14 If there are no other questions, Mr. Speaker— 
15 REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON: Mr. Speaker, I should 
16 like to ask Representative Watkins a question. Could you 
17 just briefly tell us what these tax advantages are with 
18 regards to these professional people? 
19 REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: The main tax advantage, 
20 Mr. Peterson, is the adoption of what we call profit 
21 sharing or pension plans. Under the corporation, of 
22 course, it can adopt a plan for the benefit of its 
23 employees. A partnership can do the same thing for the 
24 benefit of the employees, but in the partnership the partner 
25 is not an employee, he is an employer. Whereas, under a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
corporation, the owner-type person is both an employee as 
well as an owner of stock. So this is the main benefit, 
that of the adoption of retirement plans such as pension and 
profit sharing plans. 
MR. SPEAKER: Any further questions? The 
question has been called for. I'll ask the chief clerk to 
call the role on final passage. Representative Peterson? 
REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON: Mr. Speaker, if there 
is no opposition to this Bill I would move the rules be 
suspended, The clerk be permitted to cast the vote of the 
entire House in favor of this bill J 
MR. SPEAKER: You heard the motion. All in 
favor— 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
MR. SPEAKER: Any final direction? Any other 
objections? All right. All except Representative Anderson, 
all in favor of this motion say aye. 
UNIDENTIFIES SPEAKERS: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: All those; no? The ayes have it 
and if you'll remain in your seats I will ask the chief 
clerk to make the count. 
END OF RECORDING. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Penny C. Abbott, do hereby certify I am a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah. That on the 9th day of September, 1987 I 
transcribed into typewritten form, from tape recording, the 
record a House of Representatives hearing regarding House 
Bill 197 as herein contained in pages 1 through 5, both 
inclusive. And that said transcript is accurate to the best 
of my knowledge and ability, some parts of the recording 
being inaudible due to background noise and numerous persons 
speaking at once. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 1st day of 
September, 1987. 
Penny C^-^bbotl 
& Notary/Publi< 
A bott, C.S.R. 
My commission expires: 
September 24, 1988 
Penny C. Abbott, C.S.R, 
3241 South 4840 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Phone: 966-4862 
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Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
Adopted May 28, 1936, approved by { 
Court on March 1, 1937, and amendeq 
1982, and September 16, 1985. 
he Utah Supreme 
in 19 77, May 7, 
RULE ! 
SECTION 1. These rules of professional conduct for attorney and 
counselors of the State of Utah, adopted by the Board of Commissioners 
of the Utah State Bar and approved by the Supreme Court of Utah under 
the inherent power of the Court to control and supervise the conduct of 
members of the Utah State Bar and pursuant to tile provisions of Title 6, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, are binding upon all members of the Utah 
State Bar, and the breach of any of these rules shall be punishable by 
reprimand, suspension or disbarment, including the assessment of costs. 
SECTION 2. These rules may be cited and referred to as the Rules 
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
SECTION 3. Any false statement or failure to disclose all facts re-
quired for Admission to the Bar by an applicant, i|f calculated to deceive, 
or any violation of the Rules of Conduct for members of the Bar prescribed 
by statute or by rule, or any cause specified by statute as grounds for dis-
barment, suspension or reprimand, shall render the offending member of 
the Utah State Bar subject to disciplinary proceedings. 
SECTION 4. The enumeration of particular duties herein should not 
be construed as a denial of the existence of othirs equally imperative, 
though not specifically mentioned 
RULE 1! 
CONDUCT PRESCRIBED BY STARJTE 
SECTION 1. It is the duty of an attorney aqa counselors: 
L To support the constitution and the laws o| the United States and 
of this State; 
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial 
officers; 
3. To counsel or maintain no other actions, proceedings or defenses 
than those which appear to hi-m legal r^d just, excepting the defense of 
a person charged with a public offense; 
4* To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to 
him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to 
mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law; 
5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and, a1 every peril to himself, 
to preserve the secrets of his client; 
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact 
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a fitness unless required 
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; 
7. Not to encourage either the commencement or continuance of an 
action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest; 
8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the 
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed; 
9. To comply with all duly approved rules and regulations prescribed 
by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar and to pay the annual 
license fee provided by law. 
SECTION 2- An attorney or counselor shall not: 
1. Directly or indirectly buy, or be in any manner interested in 
buying or having assigned to him for the purpose of collection, a bond, 
promissory note, bill of exchange, book dept or other thing in action, with 
the intent and for the purpose of bringing an' action thereon; provided, 
that this section does not prohibit the receipt by an attorney or counselor 
of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in 
action, in payment for property sold, or for services actually rendered, 
or for a debt antecedently contracted, or from buying or receiving a bill 
of exchange, draft, or other thing in action for the purpose of remittance, 
and without intent to violate this section. 
2. By himself, or by or in the name of another person either before 
or after action brought promise or give, or procure to be promised or 
given, a valuable consideration to any person as an inducement to placing, 
or in consideration of having placed, in his hands, or in the hands of 
another person, a demand of any kind, for the purpose of bringing action 
thereon, or of representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy 
for the recovery thereof; but this subdivision does not apply to any agree-
ment between attorneys and counselors, or either, to divide between them-
selves the compensation to be received. 
3. Knowingly permit any person, not being his general law partner 
or a clerk in his office, to sue out any process or to prosecute or defend any 
action in his name, as counsel or attorney for another. 
4. Directly or indirectly advise in relation to, or aid or promote the 
defense of any action or proceeding in any court the prosecution of which 
is carried on, aided or promoted by a person as district attorney or other 
public prosecutor with whom such attorney is directly or indirectly con-
nected as a partner; or, having himself prosecuted or in any manner aided 
or promoted any action or proceeding in any court, as district attorney or 
other public prosecutor, afterwards directly or indirectly advise in relations 
thereto, or take any part in, the defense thereof, as an attorney or other-
wise; or take or receive any valuable consideration from or on behalf of 
any defendent in any such action, upon any understanding or agreement 
whatever, express or implied, having relation to the defense thereof; pro-
vided that this section does not prohibit an attorney from defending him-
self in person, as attorney or as counsel, when a party to a civil or criminal 
action. 
5. Take part in deceit or collusion, or consent thereto with intent 
to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding. 
6. Knowingly without authority appear as an attorney for a party 
to an action or proceeding. 
7. Become a surety in any civil or criminal action, suit, or proceeding 
which may be instituted in any of the courts of this state, in which he is 
engaged as attorney. 
SECTION 3. An attorney and counselor receiving money or property 
of his client in the course of his orofessional business, shall pay or deliver 
the same to the person entitled thereto within a (reasonable time, unless 
he has just cause for retaining i t 
SECTION 4. An attorney and counselor may tte disbarred, suspended, 
or reprimanded for violation of any of the foregoing rules, or for any of 
the following causes, arising after his admission to practice: 
1. His conviction of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral 
turpitude, in which case the record of conviction shall be conclusive 
evidence; 
2. Willful disobedience or violation of a valid and final order of the 
court requiring hi™ to do or forebear an act connected with or in the course 
of his profession, a violation of the oath taken by him, or any corrupt or 
willful violation of his duties as an attorney or counselor; 
3. For any other act to which such a consequence is by law attached. 
RULE III 
OATH OF THE ATTORNEY 
The oath of an attorney, to be taken upon Adimission to the Bar and 
to be followed in practice by each member of the Ut^h State Bar, is promul-
gated and prescribed as follows: 
I Do SOLEMNLY SWEAR: 
I wUI support the Constitution of the United Spates and the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah, and that I wUI discharge the duties of 
Attorney and Counselor at Law with fidelity; 
I will maintain the respect due to Courts oj Justice and judicial 
officers; 
I wtZZ not counsel or maintain arty suit or proceeding which shall 
appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except si^ch as I believe to be 
honestly debatable under the law of the land; 
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes cortfided to 
me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will 
never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or false statement 
of fact or law; 
I will maintain the confidence and preserve the secrets of my client, 
and will accept no compensation in connection witty his business except 
from him or with his knowledge and approval; 
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact 
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required 
by the justice of the cause with which I am charge^; 
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the 
cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any i\iaris cause for lucre 
or malice. So HELP ME GOD. 
RULE IV 
CONDUCT PRESCRIBED BY RULE 
Code of Professional Responsibility 
Adopted by Utah State Bar, May 7,1970 
(Approved by Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971) 
CANON 1 
A Lawyer Should Assist in 
Maintaining the Integrity and 
Competence of the Legal 
Profession 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
EC 1-1 A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person 
in our society should have ready access to the independent professional services of a 
lawyer of integrity and competence. Maintaining the integrity and improving the com-
petence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical responsibility of every' 
lawyer. 
EC 1-2 The public should be protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers 
by reason of a deficiency in education or moral standards or of other relevant factors 
but who nevertheless seek to practice law. To assure the maintenance of high moral 
and educational standards of the legal profession, lawyers should affirmatively assist 
courts and other appropriate bodies in promulgating, enforcing, and improving require-
ments for admission to the bar.. In like manner, the bar has a positive obligation to aid 
in the continued improvement of all phases of pre-admission and post-admission legal 
education. 
EC 1-3 Before recommending an applicant for admission, a lawyer should satisfy him-
self that the applicant is of good moral character. Although a lawyer should not become 
a self-appointed investigator or judge of applicants for admission, he should report to 
proper officials all unfavorable information be possesses relating to the character or 
other qualifications of an applicant 
EC 14 The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in 
violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the attention of the proper officials. 
A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials ail unprivileged knowledge of con-
duct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules. 
A lawyer should, upon request, serve on and assist committees and boards having re-
sponsibility for the administration of the Disciplinary Rules. 
EC 1-5 A lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct and should 
encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. He should be temperate and dignified, and he 
should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position 
in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confi-
dence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers 
especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude. 
EC 1-6 An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be unqualified, tempo-
rarily or permanently, for other than moral and educational reasons, such as mental 
or emotional instability. Lawyers should be diligent in taking steps to see that during 
a period of disqualification such person is not granted a license or, if licensed, is not 
permitted to practice. In like mannert when the disqualification has terminated, mem-
bers of the bar should assist such person in being licensed, or, if licensed, in being 
restored to his full right to practice. 
DISCIPLINARY RUL£S 
DR 1-101 Maintaining Integrity and Competence ofl the Legal Profession. 
(A) A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a materially false state-
ment in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact 
requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar. 
(B) A lawyer shall not further the application for admission to the bar of 
another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, 
education, or other relevant attribute. 
DR 1-102 Misconduct 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. 
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another. 
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. 
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrep-
resentation. 
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to ±e administration of 
justice. 
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adverselv reflects on his fitness 
to practice law. 
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities. 
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of * viuiauon of DR 1-102 
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or othe^ authority empowered 
to investigate or act upon such violation. 
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning 
another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such | knowledge or evidence 
upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to 
investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges. 
CANON 2 
A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession 
in Fulfilling Its Duty 
to Make Legal Counsel Available; 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
EC 2-1 The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if 
they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking 
assistance, and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. 
Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate laypersons, 
to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process ofl intelligent selection of 
lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available. 
Recognition of Legal Problems 
EC 2-2 The legal profession should assist laypersyiiS to recognize legal 
problems because such problems may not be self-re veiling and often are not 
timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers should encourage and participate in 
particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. Preparation of 
advertisements and professional articles for lay publications and participation 
in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be motivated by a desire to 
educate the public to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information 
relevant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel rather than to 
obtain publicity for particular lawyers. The problems of advertising on tele-
vision and radio require special consideration, due to the style, cost, and 
transitory nature of such media. If the interests of laypersons in receiving 
relevant lawyer advertising are not adequately served by print media, and if 
adequate safeguards to protect the public can reasonably be formulated, 
television and radio advertising may serve a public interest, 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-3 Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering in-person advice to 
a layperson to seek legal services depends upon the circumstances. The 
giving of advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfill-
ment of the duty of the legal profession to assist laypersons in recognizing 
legal problems. The advice is proper only if motivated by a desire to protect 
one who does not recognize that he may have legal problems or who is ignor-
ant of his legal rights or obligations. It is improper if motivated by a desire 
to obtain personal benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause legal action to 
be taken merely to harass or'injure another. A lawyer should not initiate an 
in-person contact with a non-client, personally or through a representative, 
for the purpose of being retained to represent him for compensation. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-4 Since motivation is subjective and often difficult to judge, the 
motives of a lawyer who volunteers in-person advice likely to produce legal 
controversy may well be suspect if he receives professional employment or 
other benefits as a result. A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that 
-itie should obtain the services of a lawyer generally -should not himself accept 
-nployment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter. 
'owever, it is not improper for a lawyer to volunteer such advice and render 
suiting legal services to close friends, relatives, former clients (in regard 
.o matters germane to former employment), and regular clients. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-5 A lawyer who writes or speaks for the pupose of educating members 
of the public to recognize their legal problems should carefully refrain from 
giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently 
similar individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may 
require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public 
may be misled and misadvised. Talks and writings by lawyers for laypersons 
should caution them not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the 
basis of the infonnation contained therein. (approved 12-5-77) 
Selection of a Lawyer: Generally 
EC 2-6 Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local 
lawyers for competency and integrity and therefore could select a practitioner 
in whom he had confidence. This traditional selection process worked well 
because it was initiated by the client and the choice was an informed one. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effective-
ness of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations of lawyers 
are not sufficiently known to enable laypersons to make intelligent choices. 
The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few lawyers are 
willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, and many 
laypersons have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to render 
different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel is particularly 
difficult for transients, persons moving into new areas, persons of limited 
education or means, and others who have little or no contact with lawyers. 
Lack of information about the availability of lawyers, the qualifications of 
particular lawyers, and the expense of legal representation leads laypersons 
in avoid seeking legal advice. (approved 12-5-77) 
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basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties — relatives, friends, 
acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers L— and disclosure of rele-
vant information about the lawyer and his practici may be helpful. A lay-
person is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed. 
In order that the recommendation be disinterested, la lawyer should not seek 
to influence another to recommend his employment A lawyer should not 
compensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospec-
tive client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations. Advertise-
ment and public communications, whether in law lists, telephone directories 
newspapers or other forms of print media should be formulated to convey 
only information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection. Such 
information includes: (1) office information, such as, name, including name of 
law firm and names of professional associates; addresses; telephone numbers; 
credit card acceptability; fluency in foreign languages; and office hours; (2) 
relevant biographical information; (3) description of the practice, but only 
by using designations and definitions authorized by tne Utah Supreme Court, 
for example, one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm prac-
tices; a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law; or a 
statement that the lawyer or law firm concentrates in a particular field of 
law practice, but only using designations, definitions and standards author-
ized by the Utah Supreme Court; and (4) permitted fee information. Self-
laudation should be avoided (approved 12-5-77) 
Selection oi o Lflwyen Lawyer Advertising 
EC 2-9 The lack of sophistication on the part oil many members of the 
public concerning legal services, the importance of tpe interests affected by 
the choice of a lawyer and prior experience with unrestricted lawyer adver-
tising, require that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the 
public and to assure that the information set forth in any advertising is 
relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the 
benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy. 
Examples of information in lawyer advertising that would be deceptive 
include misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record 
of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely 
to determine the result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a 
lawyer, and representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot 
be measured or verified. Since lawyer advertising is calculated and not spon-
taneous, reasonable regulation of lawyer advertising 
pliance with appropriate standards serves the public 
ing the flow of useful, meaningful, and relevant infor 
Resigned to foster com-
iterest without imped-
ition to the public, 
(approved 12-5-77) 
ion, and would facil-
qualifications of the 
strive to communicate 
id advertising strata-
iteiligent selection of 
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure that the infonnation contained in any 
advertising which the lawyer publishes or causes to b^ published is relevant, 
is disseminated in an objective and understandable 
itate the prospective client's ability to compare the 
lawyers available to represent him. A lawyer should 
such information without undue emphasis upon style 
gems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate 
counsel. Because technological change is a recurrent feature in communica-
tions forms, and because perceptions of what is relevant in lawyer selection 
may change, lawyer advertising regulations should not be cast in rigid, 
unchangeable terms. Machinery is therefore available to advertisers and 
consumers for prompt consideration of proposals to change the rules govern-
ing lawyer advertising. The determination of any request for such change 
should depend upon whether the proposal accords with standards of accu-
racy, reliability and truthfulness, and whether the proposal would facilitate 
informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services. Repre-
sentatives of lawyers and consumers should be heara in addition to the 
applicant concerning any proposed change. Any change which is approved 
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basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties — relatives, friends, 
acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers — and disclosure of rele-
vant information about the lawyer and his practice may be helpful. A lay-
person is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed. 
In order that the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek 
to influence another to recommend his employment A lawyer should not 
compensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospec-
tive client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations. Advertise 
ment and public communications, whether in law lists, telephone directories 
newspapers or other forms of print media should be formulated to convey 
only information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection. Such 
information includes: (1) office information, such as, name, including name of 
law firm and names of professional associates; addresses; telephone numbers; 
credit card acceptability; fluency in foreign languages; and office hours; (2) 
relevant biographical information; (3) description of the practice, but only 
by using designations and definitions authorized by the Utah Supreme Court, 
for example, one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm prac-
tices; a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law; or a 
statement that the lawyer or law firm concentrates in a particular field of 
law practice, but only using designations, definitions and standards author-
ized by the Utah Supreme Court; and (4) permitted fee information. Self-
laudation should be avoided. (approved 12-5-77) 
Selection oi a Lawyer. lowyeT Advertising 
EC 2-9 The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the 
public concerning legal services, the importance of the interests affected by 
the choice of a lawyer and prior experience with unrestricted lawyer adver-
tising, require that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the 
public and to assure that the information set forth in any advertising is 
relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the 
benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy. 
Examples of information in lawyer advertising that would be deceptive 
include misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record 
of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely 
to determine the result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a 
lawyer, and representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot 
be measured or verified. Since lawyer advertising is calculated and not spon-
taneous, reasonable regulation of lawyer advertising designed to foster com-
pliance with appropriate standards serves the public interest without imped-
ing the flow of useful, meaningful, and relevant information to the public, 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure that the information contained in any 
advertising which the lawyer publishes or causes to be published is relevant, 
is disseminated in an objective and understandable fashion, and would facil-
itate the prospective client's ability to compare the qualifications of the 
lawyers available to represent him. A lawyer should strive to communicate 
such information without undue emphasis upon style and advertising strata-
gems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate intelligent selection of 
counsel. Because technological change is a recurrent feature in communica-
tions forms, and because perceptions of what is relevant in lawyer selection 
may change, lawyer advertising regulations should not be- cast in rigid, 
unchangeable terms. Machinery is therefore available to advertisers and 
consumers for prompt consideration of proposals to change the rules govern-
ing lawyer advertising. The determination of any request for such change 
should depend upon whether the proposal accords with standards of accu-
racy, reliability and truthfulness, and whether the proposal would facilitate 
informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services. Repre-
sentatives of lawyers and consumers should be heard in addition to the 
applicant concerning any proposed change. Any change which is approved 
lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction may avail theiaselves to its provisions. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-11 The name under which a lawyer conducts his practice may be a 
factor in the selection process. The use of a trade name or an assumed name 
could mislead laypersons concerning the identity, responsibility, and status 
of those practicing thereunder. Accordingly, a ^  lawyer in private practice 
should practice only under a designation containing his own name, the name 
of a lawyer employing him, the name of one or more of the lawyers practicing 
in partnership, or, the name of a professional legal corporation, which should 
be clearly designated as such. For many years some law firms have used 
a firm name retaining one or more names of deceased or retired partners and 
such practice is not improper if the firm is a bona fide successor of a firm in 
which the deceased or retired person was a member, if the use of the name is 
authorized by law or by contract, and if the public is not misled thereby. 
However, the name of a partner who withdraws from a firm but continues to 
practice law should be omitted from the firm name ig order to avoid mislead-
ing the public. (approved 12-5-77) 
EC 2-12 A lawyer occupyipg a judicial, legislative, or public executive or 
administrative position who has the right to practice law concurrently may 
allow his name to remain in the name of the firm if he actively continues to 
practice law as a member thereof. Otherwise, his name should be removed 
from the firm name, and he should not be identified as a past or present 
member of the firm; and he should not hold himself $ut as being a practicing 
lawyer. 
EC 2-13 In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom 
he deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous in the representation of his profes-
sional status. He should not hold himself out as being a partner or associate 
of a law firm, if he is not one in fact; and thus shouia not hold himself out as 
a partner or associate if he only shares offices with another lawyer. 
EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer confines his practice to a particular 
field of law. In the absence of state controls to insure the existence of special 
competence, a lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself out as a 
specialist or as having official recognition as a specialist, other than in the 
fields of admiralty, trademark, and patent law where a holding out as a 
specialist historically has been permitted A lawyer may, however, indicate 
in permitted advertising if it is factual, a limitation of his practice to one or 
more particular areas or fields of law in which he practices using designations 
and definitions for that purpose by the Utah Supreme Court, 
(approved 12-5-77) 
EC. 2-15 The legal profession has developed lawyfer referral systems de-
signed to aid individuals who are able to pay fees 
locating lawyers competent to handle their particui| 
lawyer referral system enables a layman to avoid an 
but need assistance m 
kr problems. Use of a 
uninformed selection of 
a lawyer because such a system makes possible the employment of competent 
lawyers who have indicated an interest in the subject 
yers should support the principle of lawyer referral systems and should 
matter involved. Law-
encourage the evolution of other ethical plans whichl 
qualified counsel 
aid in the selection of 
EC 2-16 The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling its 
role in our society unless its members receive adequate compensation for 
services rendered, and reasonable fees should be charged in appropriate cases 
to clients able to pay them. Nevertheless, persons junable to pay ail or a 
portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services, 
and lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities designed to 
achieve that objective. 
8 
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: 
Persons Able to Pay Reasonable Fees 
EC 2-17 The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the 
interests of both client and lawyer. A lawyer should not charge more than 
a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of legal services would deter laymen from 
utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights. Furthermore, an 
excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between lawyer and 
client. On the other hand, adequate compensation is necessary in order to 
enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity 
and independence of the profession. 
EC 2-18 The determination of the reasonableness of a fee requires consider-
ation of all relevant circumstances, including those stated in the Disciplinary 
Rules. The fees of a lawyer will vary according to many factors, including 
the time required, his experience, ability, and reputation, the nature of the 
employment, the responsibility involved, and the results obtained. Suggested 
fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations provide 
some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees. It is a commendable and 
long-standing tradition of the bar that special consideration is given in the 
fixing of any fee for services^ rendered a brother lawyer or a member of his 
immediate family. 
EC 2-19 As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desir-
able that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee 
charges to be made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunder-
standing but will also work for good relations between the lawyer and the 
client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the 
parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. A lawyer should 
be mindful that many persons who desire to employ him may have had little 
or no experience with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should 
explain fully to such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement 
he proposes. 
EC 2-20 Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been com-
monly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The 
historical bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety 
of circumstances, provide the only practical means by which one having a 
claim against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the serv-
ices of a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prose-
cution of the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid. Although 
a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee 
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily 
improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a 
case to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client 
who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrange-
ment Because of the human relationships involved and the unique char-
acter of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation 
ca«*«* are rarely justified. In administrative agency proceedings contingent 
fee contracts should be governed by the same consideration as in other civil 
cases. Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in crim-
inal cases, largelv on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not 
produce a res with which to pay the fee. 
EC 2-21 A lawyer should not accept compensation or any thing of value 
incident to his employment or services from one other than his client without 
the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure. 
EC 2-22 Without the consent of his client, a lawyer should not associate 
u: d particular matter another lawyer outside his firm. A fee may properly 
be divided between lawyers properly associated if the division is in proportion 
to the services performed and the responsibility assumed by each lawyer and 
if tH« total fee is reasonable. 
over fees with clients and should attempt to resolvd amicablye any differ-
ences on the subject He should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary 
to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client 
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: 
Persons Unable to Pay Reasonable Fees 
EC 2-24 A layman whose financial ability is not sufficient to permit pay-
ment of any fee cannot obtain legal services, other than in cases where a 
contingent fee is appropriate, unless the services are provided for him. Even 
a person of moderate means may be unable to pay a reasonable fee which is 
large because of the complexity, novelty, or difficulty of the problem or 
similar factors. 
df those unable to pay 
donated their services or 
pals. The basic respon-
o^ pay ultimately rests 
in the problems of the 
in the life of a 
proi^ unence or professional 
disadvantaged. The 
reasonable fees con-
of individual lawyers 
been necessary for the 
legal services. Accord-
^ther related programs 
the profession. Every 
need for legal services. 
E C 2-25 Historically, the need for legal services 
reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who 
accepted court appointments on behalf of such individ 
sibility for providing legal services for those unable 
upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvementj 
disadvantaged can be one of-the most rewarding 
lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional 
workload, should find time to participate in serving 
rendition of free legal services to those unable to 
tinues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the 
are often -not enough to meet the need. Thus it has 
profession to institute additional programs to provide 
ingiy, legal aid offices, lawyer referral services, and 
have been developed, and others will be developed by| 
lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this 
efforb 
experiences 
the 
Acceptance and Retention of Employment 
EC 2-26 A lawyer is under no obligation to act as kdviser or advocate for 
for every person who may wish to become his client! but in furtherance of 
the objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should 
not lightly decline proffered employment. The fulfillment of this objective 
requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which 
may be unattractive both to him and the bar generally, 
EC 2-27 History is replete with instances of distinguished and sacrificial 
services by lawyers who have represented unpopular clients and causes. 
Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should noi decline representation 
because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse. 
avoid EC 2-28 The personal preference of a lawyer to 
against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential 
community does not justify his rejection of tendered 
EC 2-29 When a lawyer is appointed by a court 
association to undertake representation of a person uriable 
whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek 
undertaking the representation except for compelling 
reasons do not include such factors as the repugnancl 
of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person 
the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal 
or the belief of the Lawyer regarding the merits of the 
EC 2-30 Employment should not be accepted by 
unable to render competent service or when he kno^s 
the person seeking to employ him desires to institute 
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously in' 
a lawyer should decline employment if the intensity oi 
adversary alignment 
members of the 
employment. 
pr requested by a bar 
to obtain counsel, 
to be excused from 
reasons. Compelling 
of the subject matter 
involved in the case, 
proceeding is guilty, 
civil case. 
a lawyer when he is 
or it is obvious that 
or maintain an action 
i juring another. Likewise, 
his personal feeling as 
10 
distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective represen-
tation of a prospective dent. If a lawyer knows a client has previously 
obtained counsel, he should not accept employment in the matter unless 
the other counsel approves or withdraws, or the client terminates the prior 
employment. 
EC 2-31 Full availability of legal counsel requires both that persons be able 
to obtain counsel and that lawyers who undertake representation complete 
the work involved. Trial counsei for a convicted defendant should continue 
to represent his client by adv;sing whether to take an appeal and, if the 
appeal is prosecuted, by representing him through the appeal unless new 
counsel is substituted or withdrawal is permitted by the appropriate court. 
EC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the 
basis of compelling circumstances, and in a matter pending before a tribunal 
he must comply with the rules of the tribunal regarding withdrawal. A law-
yer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to 
mirrinine the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the pos-
sibility of prejudice to his client as a resuit of his withdrawal Even when he 
justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by 
giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting emplovment of other counsei, 
delivering to the client ail papers and property to which the client is entitled. 
cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring 
to minimizp the poss'biiity of harm. Further, he should refund to the client 
any compensation not earned during the employment. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
DR 2-l01(A) : 
(1) Subject to the requirements of this rule, 
a lawyer may advertise services through public media, 
such as a telephone directory, legal directory, news-
paper or other periodical, outdoor, radio or television, 
or through written communication noij involving solici-
tation as defined in DR 2-lO^(H). 
(2) A copy or recording of an advertisement or 
written communication shall be kept for two years after 
its last dissemination along with a record of-when 
and where it was used. 
(3) A lawyer shall not give anything of value 
to- a person for recommending the lawyer's services, 
except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of 
advertising or written communication 
this rule and may pay the usual char 
for-profit lawyer referral service op other legal 
service organization, 
(4) Any communication made pursuant to this rule 
shall include the name of at least ope lawyer responsible 
for its content, 
(5) A lawyer shall not make a false, fraudulent 
or misleading statement about the lawyer or the lawyer's 
services to a client or prospective client. 
permittee oy 
fees of a not-
DR 2-102(3): 
A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or 
other professional designation that violates DR 2-10KA). 
A trade name may be used by a lawyer 
if it does not imply a connection with 
agency or with a public or charitabld legal services 
m private practice 
h a government 
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction 
may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but 
identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall 
indicate the jurisdiction limitations on those not licensed 
to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located. 
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not 
be used in the name of the law firm, or in communications on 
its behalf, during any substantial period in which the 
lawyer is not actively practicing with the firm. 
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a 
partnership or other organization only' when that is the 
fact. 
DR 2-102(0 Deleted. 
DR 2-102(D) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything 
of value to a:representative of the press, radio, 
television, or other communication medium in anticipation of 
or in return for professional publicity in a news item. A 
paid advertisement must be identified as such unless it is 
apparent from the context that it is a paid advertisement. 
If the paid advertisement is communicated to the public by 
use of electronic broadcast media, a recording of the actual 
transmission in the form in which the advertisement is to be 
broadcast shall be first approved by the lawyer(s) 
authorizing it and a recording thereof retained by the 
lawyer(s). 
In addition to the further provisions of this DR 2-101 and 
the provisions of DR 2-102 through DR 2-105, fee 
advertisements and other publication of information as to 
fees, shall be subject to the following: 
(1) If a Lawyer advertises a fee for a service, the 
Lawyer must render that service tor no more than the 
fee advertised. 
(2) Unless otherwise specified in thfc advertisement, if a 
lawyer publishes any fee information in a publication 
that is published more frequently than one time per 
month, the lawyer shall be bound]by any 
representation made therein for a period of not less 
than 30 days after such publication. If a lawyer 
publishes any fee information in a publication that 
is published once a month or less frequently, he 
shall be bound 'by any representation made therein 
until the publication of the succeeding issue.- If a 
lawyer publishes any fee information in a publication 
which has no fixed date for publication of a 
succeeding issue, the Lawyer shall be bound by any 
representation made therein for 4 reasonable period 
of time after publication but in no event less than 
one year. 
(3) Unless otherwise specified in th* 
advertisement, if a Lawyer broadc 
information, the Lawyer shall be 
representation made therein for al 
less than 30 days after such broadcast. 
A copy or record of an advertisement in 
be kept for one year after its dissemiqat 
Every advertisement for legal services 
name of the Lawyer or law firm whose se| 
advertised. 
asts any fee 
bound by any 
period of not 
its entirety shall 
:ion. 
shall identify the 
rvices are 
Solicitation. 
(1) Except as permitted under DR 2—10[3 and 2-104, and 
subparagraph (2) of this DR 2-10*(H), in-person, and 
similar direct forms of contact with a prospective 
client by a lawyer for the purpose of soliciting 
business, are prohibited. 
(2) A lawyer may inititiate written cbntact with 
prospective clients in the following circumstances: 
(a) By a general mailing, not concerning a 
specific case, cause of action, transaction, 
or other such event. 
(b) By direct mail under the auspices of a public 
or charitable legal services organization or a 
bona fide political, social, civic, 
fraternal, employee, or trade organization 
whose purposes include, but are not limited to 
providing or recommending legal services• 
(3) A lawyer may not initiate written contact with 
prospective clients, as set forth in subparagraph (2; 
of this DR 2-10X(H) if: 
(a) The Lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
the physical, emotional or mental state of any 
person so contacted is such that the person 
could not exercise reasonable judgment in 
employing a lawyer. 
(b) The communication involves coercion, duress, 
harassment, or overreaching. 
(4) A copy or record, in its entirety, of a written 
contact with prospective clients pursuant to the 
provisions of DR 2-10X(H) (2) , above, shall be kept 
for one year after its dissemination, and a copy of 
such written communication shall be mailed to the 
office of the Utah State Bar simultaneously with its 
dissemination to prospective clients; provided, 
however, that receipt of such copy by the Utah State 
Bar and subsequent failure to act with respect 
thereto, whether on one or more occasions, shall not 
be dee.med to constitute approval by the Utah State 
Bar of* the contents thereof, and shall not constitute 
the basis for a defense of waiver, estoppel, 
laches, or other such defense by the lawyer sending 
such communication in the event of any subsequent 
disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer. 
(I) Any form of communication by a lawyer referred to in 
this DR 2-101, by any medium of communication, for the 
purpose of advertising, publicizing, or promoting the 
services of a lawyer or of an affiliated lawyer shall 
comply with the Limitations contained in paragraphs DR 
2-101 (A) and (B), as well as, where applicable, the 
provisions contained in DR 2-102 through DR 2-105. 
DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment 
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DEI 2-101 (B), recommend 
employment as a private practitioner, of himseli his partner, or associ-
ate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment 
of a lawyer. (approved 12-5-77) 
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything! of value to a person or 
organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as 
a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employ-
ment by a client, except that he may pay the usual and reasonable fees 
or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D). 
(approved 12-5-77) 
(C.) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend or 
promote the use of his services or those of his bartner or associate, or 
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his Sim, as a private practi-
tioner, except as authorized in DR 2-101, and except that: 
(1) He may request referrals from a lawyer repeirai service operated, 
sponsored, or approved by a bar association and may pay its fees 
incident thereto- (approved 12-5-77) 
(4) and may perform legal services for those to whom he was 
recommended by it to do such work if: 
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a member 
or beneficiary of such office or organization; and 
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of his client (approved 12-5-77) 
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with 
him or his firm may be recommended, employed or paid by, may coop-
erate with, one of the following offices or organizations that promote 
the use of his services or those of his partner or associate or any other 
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there is not interference with 
the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of his 
client: 
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office: 
(a) Operated or sponsored by a doily accredited law schooL 
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community 
organization. 
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency. 
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
(2) A military legal assistance office. (approved 12-5-77) 
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a 
bar association. (approved 12-5-77) 
(4) Any Dona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for 
legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the following 
conditions are satisfied: (approved 12-5-77) 
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and 
operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of 
legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is 
organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by 
lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected by it except 
in connection with matters where such organization bears ulti-
mate liability of its members or beneficiary. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any 
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-
lawyer, shaJl have initiated or promoted such organization for 
the primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to 
such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring 
legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private 
practitioner outside of the legal services program of the 
organization. (approved 12-5-77) 
13-c 
furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the 
client ox the lawyer in the matter- (approved 12-5-77) 
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal serv* 
ices furnished or paid for by the organization may, if such 
member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other than 
that furnished, selected or approved by the organization for 
the particular matter involved; and the legal service plan of 
such organization provides approprintel relief for any member 
or beneficiary who asserts a claim tpat representation by 
counsel furnished, selected or approved would be unethical, 
improper or inadequate under the circumstances of the matter 
involved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for 
seeking such relief. (approved 12-5-77) 
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such 
organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court 
and other legal requirements that govern its legal service 
operation, (approved 12-5-77) 
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary 
authority at least annually a report with respect to its legal 
service plan, if any, showing its terms, its schedule of benefits, 
its subscriptions charges, agreements with counsel, and finan-
cial results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to 
do so, the lawyer does not know or hpve cause to know of 
such failure. (approved 12-5-77) 
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious 
that the person who seeks his services does so as a result ox conduct 
prohibited under this Disciplinary Rule, (approved 12-5-77) 
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services. 
(A) A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that 
he should obtain counsel or take legal action snail not accept employ-
ment resulting from that advice, except that: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
A lawyer may accept employment by a l^ose friend, relative, 
former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment), 
or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
A lawyer may accept employment that resulb from his participa-
tion in activities designated to educate laypersons to recognize 
legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize 
available legal services if such activities are conducted or sponsored 
by a qualified legal assistance organization. (approved 12-5-77) 
A lawyer who is recommended, furnished o; 
legal assistance organization enumerated 
through (4) may represent a member or b 
the extent and under the conditions prescribe 
paid by a Qualified 
DR 2-103(D)(l) 
eticary thereof, to 
therein. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
ent, a lawyer may 
topics so long as he 
Without affecting his right to accept emplo 
speak publicly or write for publication on leg; 
does not emphasize his own professional experience or reputation 
and does not undertake to give individual advice. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation 
in the nature of a class action is dependent I upon the joinder of 
others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from 
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder. 
(approved 12-5-77) 
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, as practicing 
in certain areas of law or as limiting his practice except as permitted 
under DR 2-101 (3) and except as follows: 
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and-
Trademark Office may use the designation "Patent Lawyer," or 
"Registered Patent Attorney" or any combination of those terms, 
on his letterhead and oince sign. (approved 12-0-77) 
(2) A lawyer available to act as a consultant to or as an associate ox 
other lawyers in a particular branch of law or legal service may 
distribute to other lawyers and publish in legal journals a dignified 
announcement of such availability, but the announcement shail 
not contain a representation of special competence or experience-
The announcement"shail not be distributee to lawyers core fre^  
quently than once in a calendar year, but it may be published 
periodically in legal journals. 
D* 2-106 Fees for Legal Services 
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee. 
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review olf the facts, a lawyer of 
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that 
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as 
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty an4 difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services 
properly, 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the 
lawyer, 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client oif by the circumstances. 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services. 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a tpr, ( 
alcrii contingent fee for representing a defendant in a [criminal case. 
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers. 
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer 
who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless: 
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full 
disclosure that a division of fees will be made. 
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and re-
sponsibility assumed by each. 
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly etsceed reasonable com-
pensation for all legal services they rendered the client 
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner 
or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement 
DR 2-108 Agreements Restricting the Practice of s Lawyer. 
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate ill a partnership or em-
ployment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a 
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by 
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits. 
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall 
not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice law. 
DR 2-109 Acceptance of Employment 
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he knows 
or it is obvious that such person wishes to: 
(1) Bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assort a position in litiga-
tion, or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of 
harassing or maliciously injuring any person. 
(2) Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under 
existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for 
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment. 
(A) In general. 
(1) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the 
rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in 
a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission, 
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until 
he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the 
rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing 
time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all 
papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying 
with applicable laws and rules. 
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly 
any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned. 
(B) Mandatory withdrawal, 
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission 
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment and a lawyer 
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment 
if: 
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, 
conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or 
is otherwise having steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of 
harassing or maliciously injuring any person, 
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result 
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule. 
(3) His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult 
for him to carry out the employment effectively. 
(4) He is discharged by his client. 
(C) Permissive withdrawal. 
If DR 2-110 (B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permis-
sion to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not with-
draw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is be-
cause: 
(1) His client: 
(a) Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted 
under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argu-
ment for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
(b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct. 
(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or 
that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules. 
(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer 
to carry out his employment effectively. 
(e) Insists, in a matter not pending befote a tribunal, that the 
lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and 
advice of the lawyer but not prohibiten under the Disciplinary 
Rules. 
(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer 
as to expenses or fees. 
(2) His continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a 
Disciplinary Rule. 
(3) His inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests 
of the client likely will be served by withdrawal. 
(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry 
out the employment effectively. 
(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to termination of his employ-
ment 
(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, 
that the tribunal will find the existence of otper good cause for with-
drawal. 
CANON 3 
A Lawyer Should Assist iri 
Preventing the Unauthoriz2\d 
Practice of Law 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION? 
EC 3-1 The prohibition against the practice of law by a la? 
of the public for-integrity and competence of those who undi 
ices. Because of the fiduciary and personal charaaer of t 
and the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the 
of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practii 
who are subject to the requirements and regulations 
profession. 
is grounded in the need 
ce to render legal serv^ 
lawyer-client relationship 
public can berter be assured 
of law is confined to those 
upon members of the legal 
EC 3-2 The sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on legal determinations 
often make it difficult even for a lawyer to exercise appropriate professional judgment, 
and it is therefore essential that the personal nature of the relationship of client and 
lawyer be preserved. Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained 
familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analytical approach to legal 
problems, and a firm ethical commitment. 
EC 3-3 A non-lawyer who undertakes to handle legal matters is not governed as to 
integrity or legal competence by the same rules that govern the conduct of a lawyer. 
A lawyer is not only subject to that regulation but also is committed to high standards 
of ethical conduct. The public interest is best served in legal matters by a regulated 
profession committed to such standards. The Disciplinary Rules protect the public in 
that they prohibit a lawyer from seeking employment by improper overtures, from act-
ing in cases of divided loyalties, and from submitting to tne control of others in the 
exercise of his judgment. Moreover, a person who entrusts legal matters to a lawyer is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the duty of the lawyer to hold inviolate 
the confidences and secrets of his client. 
EC 3-4 A layman who seeks legal services often is not in a position to judge whether 
he will receive proper professional attention. The entnistment of a legal matter may 
well involve the confidences, the reputation, the property, tht^freedom, or even the life 
of the client. Proper protection of members of the public qemands that no person be 
permitted to act in tfie connaennai ana aemanaing capacity ox a lawyer ume^ ae ia 
subject to the regulations of the legal profession, 
EC 3-5 It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, 
specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law. Functionally, the practice of 
law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment 
of a lawyer. The essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated 
ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a 
client; and thus, the public interest will be better served if only lawyers are permitted 
to act in matters involving professional judgment. Where this professional judgment is 
not involved, non-lawyers, such as court clerks, police officers, abstractors, and many 
governmental employees, may engage in occupations that require a special knowledge 
of law in certain areas. But the services of a lawyer are essential in the public interest 
whenever the exercise of professional legal judgment is required. 
EC 3-6 A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. 
Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, 
supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work 
product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal service more economically 
and efficiently. 
EC 3-7 The prohibition against a non-lawyer practicing law does not prevent a layman 
from representing himself, for then he is ordinarily exposing only himself to possible 
injury. The purpose of the legal profession is to make educated legal representation 
available to the public; but anyone who does not wish to avail nimseif of such represen-
tation is not required to do so. Even so, the legal profession should help members- of the 
public to recognize legal problems and to understand why it may be unwise for them to 
act for themselves in matters having legal consequences. 
EC 3-8 Since a lawyer should not aid or encourage a layman to practice law, he should 
not practice law in association with a layman or otherwise share legal fees with a lay-
man. This does not mean, however, that the pecuniary value of the interest of a deceased 
lawyer in his firm or practice may not be paid to his estate or specified persons such as 
his widow or heirs. In like manner, profit-sharing retirement plans of a lawyer or law 
firm which include non-lawyer office employees are not improper. These limited excep-
tions to the rule against sharing legal fees with laymen are permissible since they do 
not aid or encourage laymen to practice law. 
EC 3-9 Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the respective 
states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not per 
se a grant of the right to practice elsewhere, and it is improper for a lawyer to engage 
in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so. However, the 
demands of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the regula-
tion of the practice of law by the states. In furtherance of the public interest, the legal 
profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations 
upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the Opportunity 
of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in all matters induding the 
presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not perm-
anently admitted to practice. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law. 
(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. 
(B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where- to do so would be 
in violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction. 
DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Non-Lawyer. 
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except 
that: 
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may 
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time 
after his death, to his estate or to one or more specified persons. 
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a 
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that 
proportion of the total compensation whith fairly represents the 
services rendered by the deceased lawyer. 
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyler employees in a retire-
ment plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a 
profit-sharing arrangement 
DR 3-103 Forming a partnership with a Non-Lawfyer 
(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a 
activities of the partnership consist of the practice 
pon-lawyer if any of the 
of law. 
CANON 4 
A Lawyer Should Preserve the 
Confidences and Secrets of a 
Client 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION^ 
EC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the 
proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confi-
dences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to impioy him. A client must 
feci free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer ana a lawyer must be equally 
free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully 
informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in orper for his client to obtain 
the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer 
pendent professional judgment to separate the relevant and 
vant and unimportant The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold 
inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development 
of facts essential to proper representation of the client but 
seek early legal assistance. 
in the exercise of his inde-
important from the irrele-
also encourages laymen to 
EC 4-2 The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously does not preclude 
a lawyer from revealing information when his client consents after full disclosure, when 
necessary to perform his professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary 
Rule, or when required by law. Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may dis-
close the affairs of his client to partners or associates of m firm. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that the normal operation of a law office exposes confidential profes-
sional information to non-lawyer employees of the office, particularly secretaries and 
those having access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise care in seiecdng 
and training his employees so that the sanctity of all confidences and secrets of his 
clients may be preserved. If the obligation extends to two or more clients as to the 
same information, a lawyer should obtain the permission of all before revealing the 
information. A lawyer must always be sensitive to the rights and wishes of his client 
and act scrupulously in the making of decisions which may involve the disclosure of 
information obtained in his professional relationship. Thus, in the absence of consent 
of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer should not associate another lawyer in the 
handling of a matter; nor should he, in the absence of consent, seek counsel from another 
lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility that the identity of the client or his confidences 
or secrets would be revealed to such lawyer. Both social amenities and professional 
duty should cause a lawyer to shun indiscreet conversation^ concerning his clients. 
EC 4-3 Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not impi 
limited information from his files to an outside agency n« 
keeping, accounting, data processing, banking, printing, ._ 
provided he exercises due care in the selection of the agent 
that the information must h* \e**st fwif^own*! 
for a lawyer to give 
for statistical, book-
legitimate purposes, 
and warns the agency 
EC 4-4 The attorney-dient privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation or a 
lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike 
the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information 
or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a 
manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid profes-
sional -discissions in the presence of persons to whom the privileges does not extend. 
A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and 
timely to assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client. 
EC 4-5 A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representation 
of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer should not use, except with 
the consent of his client after full disdosure, such information for his own purposes. 
Likewise, a lawyer should be diligent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such infor-
mation by his employees and associates. Care should be exercised by a lawyer to pre-
vent the disdosure of the confidences and secrets of one client to another, .and no 
employment should be accepted that might require such disdosure. 
EC 4-6 The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client 
continues after the termination of his employment. Thus a lawyer should not attempt to 
sell a law practice as a going business because, among other reasons, to do so would 
involve the disdosure of confidences and secrets. A lawyer should also provide for the 
protection of the confidences and secrets of his client following the termination of the 
practice of the lawyer, whether termination is due to death, disability, or retirement. 
For erample, a lawyer might provide,for the personal papers of the client to be re-
turned to him and for the papers of the 'lawyer to be delivered to another lawyer or to 
be destroyed. In determining the method of disposition, the instructions and wishes of the 
client should be a dominant consideration. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client. 
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client priv-
ilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information 
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disdosure of which would be embarrassing or would 
be likely to be detrimental to the client. 
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (Q, a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the 
client 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself 
or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. 
(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affect-
ed, but only after a full disdosure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disdplinary Rules or 
required by law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information 
necessary to prevent the crime. 
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to 
to defend himself or his employees or assodates against an accusation 
of wrongful conduct 
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, asso-
ciates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disdosing or 
using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal 
the information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) through an employee. 
CANON 5 
A Lawyer Should Exercise 
Independent Professional 
Judgment on Behalf of a Client 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION^ 
EC 5-1 The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds 
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and 
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires 
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty tp his client. 
Interests of a Lawyer That May Affect His Judgment 
EC 3-2 A lawyer should not accept proffered employment U his personal interests or 
desires will, or there is a reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely the 
advice to be given or services to be rendered the prospective client. After accepting 
employment, a lawyer carefully should refrain from acquiring a property right or assum-
ing a position that would tend to ma^n his judgment less protective of the interests of 
his client 
EC 3-3 The self-interest of a lawyer resulting from his ownership of property in which 
his client also has air interest or which may affect property of his client may interfere 
with the exercise of free judgment on behalf of his client. If such interference would 
occur with respect to a prospective client, a lawyer should decline employment proffered 
by him. After accepting employment, a lawyer should not acquire property rights that 
would adversely affect his professional judgment in the representation of his client. Even 
if the property interests of a lawyer do not presently interfere with the exercise of his 
independent judgment, but the likelihood of interference can reasonably be foreseen by 
him, a lawyer should explain the situation to his client and should decline employment 
or withdraw unless the client consents to the continuance o< the relationship after full 
disclosure. A lawyer should not seek to persuade his client to 
undertaking of his client nor make improper use of his professional relationship to 
influence his client to invest in an enterprise in which the lawyer is interested. 
EC 5-4 If, in the course of his representation of a dient,] a lawyer is permitted to 
receive from his dient a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject 
matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client 
to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who 
obtains from his dient television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or 
other publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or un-
consciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights 
to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these potentially differing interests, such ar-
rangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of 
the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment has previously 
aided. 
permit him to invest in an 
EC 5-3 A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift 
his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client, he is pi 
charge that he unduly influenced or over-reached the client, 
to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the 
should urge that his client secure disinterested advice from 
person who is cognizant of all the circumstances. Other 
stances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which 
him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected b^ 
be made to himself or for 
^cuiiariy susceptible to the 
a client voluntarily offers 
but before doing so, he 
n^ independent, competent 
in exceptional circum-
|his client desires to name 
the client. 
If 
£tft 
than 
EC 5-6 A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, 
trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his 
lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avo^ d even the appearance of 
impropriety. 
EC 5-7 The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a 
lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally m^kes it undesirable for the 
lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his dilsnz or otherwise to become 
financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. However, it is not improper for a 
lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his services by the assertion of legally 
permissible liens, even though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome 
of litigation. Although a contingent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest 
in the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases 
because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer 
of his choice. But a lawyer, because he is in a better position to evaluate a cause of ac-
tion, should enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the 
arrangement will be beneficial to the client. 
EC 5-8 A financial interest in the outcome of litigation also results if monetary advances 
are made by the lawyer to his client. Although this assistance generally is not encour-
aged, there are instances when it is not improper to make loans to a client. For example, 
the advancing or guaranteeing of payment of the costs and expenses of litigation by a 
lawyer may be the only way a client can enforce his cause of action, but the ultimate 
liability for such costs and expenses must be that of the client. 
EC 3-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular case whether he 
will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes 
more easily impeachable for interest and thus may be a less effective witness. Con-
versely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of the 
lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case. An advocate who 
becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own credi-
bility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an 
advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state 
facts objectively. 
EC 5-10 Problems incident to the lawyer-witness relationship arise at different stages; 
they relate either to whether a lawyer should accept employment or should withdraw 
from employment* Regardless of when the problem arises, his decision is to be governed 
by the same basic considerations. It is not objectionable for a lawyer who is a potential 
witness to be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called as a witness because his 
testimony would be merely cumulative or if his testimony will relate only to an uncon-
tested issue. In the exceptional situation where it will be manifestly unfair to the client 
for the lawyer to refuse employment or to withdraw when he will likely be a witness on 
a contested issue, he may serve as adyocate even though he may be a witness. In 
making such decision, he should determine the personal or financial sacrifice of the 
client that may result from his refusal of employment or withdrawal therefrom, the 
materiality of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view of his 
personal involvement. In weighing these factors, it should be dear that refusal or with-
drawal will impose an unreasonable hardship upon the client before the lawyer accepts 
or continues the" employment. Where the question arises, doubts should be resolved in 
favor of the lawyer testifying and against his becoming or continuing as an advocate. 
EC 5-U A Lawyer should not permit his personal interests to influence his advice rela-
tive to a suggestion by his client that additional counsel be employed. In like manner, his 
personal interests should not deter him from suggesting that additional counsel be em-
ployed; on the contrary, he should be alert to the desirability of recommending additional 
counsel when, in his judgment, the proper representation of his client requires it. How-
ever, a lawyer should advise his client not to employ additional counsel suggested by 
the client if the lawyer believes that such employment would be a disservice to the client, 
and he should disclose the reasons for his belief. 
EC 5-12 Inability of co-counsel to agree on a matter vital to the representation of their 
client requires that their disagreement be submitted by them jointly to their client for 
his resolution, and the decision of the client shall control the action to be taken. 
EC 5-13 A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by any organiza-
tion of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how he should 
fulfill his professional obligations to a person or organization that employs him as a 
lawyer. Although it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation 
or ^milar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he should be vigilant 
to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free from outside influences. 
Interests of Multiple Clients 
EC 5-14 Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer 
precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his 
judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever a 
lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, 
whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant 
EC 3-15 If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continiie representation of multiple 
clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that 
his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the 
employment He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation. 
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests; 
and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in litigation 
multiple clients with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted such employ-
ment and the interests did become actually differing, he wiuld have to withdraw from 
employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on the clients; and for this reason it 
is preferable that he refuse the employment initially. On the other hand, there are many 
instances in which a lawyer may properly serve multiple clents having potentially dif-
fering interests in matters not involving litigation. If the interest vary only slightly, 
it is generally likely that the lawyer will not be subjected to an adverse influence and 
that he can retain his independent judgment on behalf of eacp client; and if the interests 
become differing, withdrawal is less likely to have a disruptive effect upon the causes 
of his clients. 
EC 5-16 In those instances in which a lawyer is justified ih representing two or more 
clients having differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the 
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and to 
obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawytr may represent multiple 
clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common representa-
tion and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent. If there are 
present other circumstances that might cause any of the multiple clients to question the 
undivided loyalty of the lawyer, he should also advise all of the clients of those circum-
stances. 
EC 5-17 Typically recurring situations involving potentially 
in which a lawyer is asked to represent co-defendants in a 
in a personal injury case, an insured and his insurer, and 
a decedent Whether a lawyer can fairiy and adequately prottect 
clients in these and similar situations depends upon an analysis 
circumstances, there may exist little chance of the judgment 
versely affected by the slight possibility that the interests wiU| 
in other circumstances, the chance of adverse effect upon 
differing interests are those 
criminal case, co-plaintiffs 
beneficiaries of the estate of 
the interests of multiple 
of each case. In certain 
of the lawyer being ad-
become actually differing; 
judgment is not unlikely. his 
EC 5-18 A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his 
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representa-
tive, or other person connected with the entity. In advising me entity, a lawyer should 
keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by 
the personal desires of any person or organization. Occasionally a lawyer for an entity is 
requested by a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person 
connected with the entity to represent him in an individual capacity; in such case the 
lawyer may serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced that differing interests 
are not present. 
EC 5-19 A lawyer may represent several clients whose 
potentially differing. Nevertheless, he should explain any 
cause a client to question his undivided loyalty. Regardless o^  
he may properly represent multiple clients, he must drier 
contrary belief and withdraw from representation of thar 
interests are not actually or 
circumstances that might 
the belief of a lawyer that 
to a client who holds the 
client 
EC 5-20 A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in 
matters which involve present or former clients. He may serve in either capacity if he 
first discloses such present or former relationships. After a]lawyer has undertaken to 
act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the 
dispute any of the parties involved. 
Desires of Third Persons 
EC 5-21 The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional jjurigment solely on behalf 
of his client requires that he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free 
judgment The desires of a third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer vn\*t* that 
person is in a position to exert strong economic, political, or social pressures upon the 
lawyer. These influences are often subtle, and a lawyer must pe alert to their existence. 
A lawyer subjected to outside pressures should make full disclosure of them to his 
client; and if he or his client believes that the effectiveness of his representation has been 
or will be impaired thereby, the lawyer should take proper steps to withdraw from repre-
sentation of his client 
EC 5-22 Economic, political, or social pressures by third persons are less likely to 
impinge upon the independent judgment of a lawyer in a matter in which he is com-
pensated directly by his client and his professional work is exclusively with his client. 
On the other hand, if a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client, he 
may feel a sense of responsibility to someone other than his client. 
EC 5-23 A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others 
possesses a potential power to exen strong pressures against the independent judgment 
of those lawyers. Some employers may be interested in furthering their own economic, 
political, or social goals without regard.to the professional responsibility of the lawyer 
to his individual client. Others may be far more concerned with establishment or exten-
sion of legal principles than in the immediate protection of the rights of the lawyer's in-
dividual client. On some occasions, decisions on priority of work may be made by the 
employer rather than the lawyer with the result that prosecution of work already under-
taken for clients is postponed to their detriment. Similarly, an employer may seek, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to further its own economic interests through the actions of 
the lawyers employed by it. Since a lawyer must always be free to exercise his pro-
fessional judgment withoui refard to the interests or motives of a third person, the law-
yer who is employed by one to represent another must constantly guard against erosion 
of his professional freedom. 
EC 5-24 To assist a lawyer in preserving his professional independence, a number of 
courses are available to him. For example, a lawyer should not practice with or in the 
form of a professional legal corporation, even though the corporate form is permitted 
by law, if any director, officer, or stockholder of it is a non-lawyer. Although a lawyer 
may be employed by a business corporation with non-lawyers serving as directors or 
officers, and they necessarily have the right to make decisions of business policy, a law-
yer must decline to accept direction of his professional judgment from any layman. 
Various types of legal aid offices are administered by boards of directors composed of 
lawyers and laymen. A lawyer should not accept employment from such an organization 
unless the board sets only broad policies and there is no interference in the relationship 
of the lawyer and the individual client he serves. Where a lawyer is employed by an 
organization, a written agreement that defines the relationship between him and the 
organization and provides for his independence is desirable since it may serve to prevent 
misunderstanding as to their respective roles. Although other innovations in the means of 
supplying legal counsel may develop, the responsibility of the lawyer to maintain his 
professional independence remains constant, and the legal profession must insure that 
changing circumstances do not result in loss of the professional independence of the 
lawyer. 
DISCIPLINARY RULiS 
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May 
Impair His Independent Professional Judgment. 
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall 
not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on 
behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own 
financial, business, property, or personal interests. 
(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pending litiga-
tion if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to 
be called as a witness, except that he may undertake the employment 
and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify: 
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter. 
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there 
is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in 
opposition to the testimony. 
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal ser-
vices rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client. 
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the 
client because of the distinctive value of tl^ e lawyer or his firm as 
counsel in the particular case. 
DR 5-102 Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a Witness. 
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, 
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to 
be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the 
conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation 
in the trial, except that he may continue the representation and he or a 
lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated in 
DR 5-101(B) (1) through (4). 
(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, 
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be 
called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the 
representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be preju-
dicial to his client 
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation. 
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action 
or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that 
he may: 
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his f ep or expenses.. 
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. 
(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending 
litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to 
his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses 
of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of 
medical examination, and costs of obtaining add presenting evidence, 
provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. 
DR 5-104 Limiting Business Relations with a Client. 
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they 
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to 
exercise his professional judgment therein fori the protection of the 
client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure. 
(B) Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employ-
ment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding 
with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in 
publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment 
or proposed employment 
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of 
Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judg-
ment of the Lawyer. 
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a clieht will be or is likely to 
be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, 
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)l 
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his 
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is 
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, 
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may represent 
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the in-
terest of each and if each consents to the representation after full dis-
closure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of 
his independent professional judgment on behalf of each. 
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from em-
ployment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may 
accept or continue such employment 
DR 5-106 Settling Similar Claims of Clients. 
(A) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or partici-
pate in the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against 
his clients, unless each client has consented to the settlement after being 
advised of the existence and nature of all the claims involved in the pro-
posed settlement, of the total amount of the settlement, and of the par-
ticipation of each person in the settlement. 
DR 5-107 Avoiding Influence by Others Than the Client 
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer 
shall not: 
(1) Accept compensation for his legal services from one other than his 
client 
(2) Accept from one other than his client any thing of value related to 
his representation of or his employment by his client 
(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays 
him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his profes-
sional judgment in rendering such legal services. 
(C) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corpora-
tion or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: 
(1) A non-lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary repre-
sentative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest 
of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration; 
(2) A non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or 
(3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer. 
CANON 6 
A Lawyer Should Represent a 
Client Competently 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
EC 6-1 Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with compe-
tence and proper care in representing clients. He should strive to become and remain 
proficient in his practice and should accept employment only in matters which he is or 
intends to become competent to handle. 
EC 6-2 A lawyer is aided in attaining and maintaining his competence by keeping 
abreast of current legal literature and developments, participating in continuing legal 
education programs, concentrating in particular areas of the law, and by utilizing other 
available means. He has the additional ethical obligation to assist in improving the legal 
profession, and he may do so by participating in bar activities intended to advance the 
quality and standards of members of the profession. Of particular importance is the 
careful training of his younger associates and the giving of sound guidance to all lawyers 
who consult him. In short, a lawyer should strive at all levels to aid the legal profession 
in advancing the highest possible standards of integrity anp competence and tc meet 
those standards himself. 
EC 5-3 While the licensing of a lawyer is evidence that he |ias met the standards then 
prevailing for admission to the bar, a lawyer generally shoiiid not accept*employment 
in any area of the law in which he is not qualified. Howeveh he may accept such em-
ployment if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation, 
as long as such preparation would not result in unreasonable delay or expense to his 
client. Proper preparation and representation may require the association by the lawyer 
of professionals in other disciplines. A lawyer offered employment in a matter in 
which he is not and does not expect to become so qualified should either decline the 
employment or, with the consent of his client, accept the employment and associate a 
lawyer who is competent in the matter. 
EC S4 Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper care to safe-
guard the interests of his client If a lawyer has accepted employment in a matter 
beyond his competence but in which he expected to become competent, he should dili-
gently undertake the work and study necessary to qualify himself. In addition to being 
qualified to handle a particular matter, his obligation to his 
pare adequately for and give appropriate attention to his legal 
client requires him to pre-
work. 
EC 6-3 A lawyer should have pride in his professional endeavors. His obligation to act 
competently calls for higher motivation than that arising frpm fear of civil liability or 
disciplinary penalty. 
EC 6-6 A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other mdans, to limit his individual 
liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client 
properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and 
one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do 
so. A lawyer who is a stockholder in or is associated with a professional legal corpora-
tion may, however, limit his liability for malpractice of his associates in the corporation, 
but only to the extent permitted by law. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
DR 6-101 Failing to Act Competently. 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
/ l) Handle a legal matter which he knows or shbuld know that he is not 
competent to handle, without associating w i p him a lawyer who is 
competent to handle it. 
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances. 
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. 
DR 6-102 Limiting Liability to Client. 
(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself tttrom or limit his liability 
to his client for his personal malpractice. 
CANON 7 
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client 
Zealously Within the Bounds 
of the Law 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
EC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent 
his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and 
enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives 
from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the 
public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of 
laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged 
and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally 
permissible means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense. 
EC 7-2 The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain. The lan-
guage of legislative enactments and judicial opinions may be uncertain as applied to 
varying factual situations. The limits and specific meaning of apparently relevant law 
may be made doubtful by changing or developing constitutional interpretations, inade-
quately expressed statutes or judicial opinions, and changing public and judicial atti-
tudes. Certainty of law ranges from well-settled rules through areas of conflicting 
authority to areas without precedent, 
EC 7-3 Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on 
whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer may serve simultaneously as 
both advocate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting a 
position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most pan deals with past conduct 
and must take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser pri-
marily accicr* his client in determining the course of future conduct and relationships. 
While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to 
the bounds of the law. In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in appropriate circum-
stances should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the 
courts would likely be as to the applicable law. 
Doty of the Lawyer to a Client 
EC 7-4 The advocate may urge-any permissible construction of the law favorable to 
his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the con-
struction will ultimately prevail. His conduct is within the bounds of the law, and there-
fore permissible, if the position taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law. However, a lawyer 
is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous. 
EC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional 
opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the 
matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He 
may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to 
pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not 
thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous 
legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal 
acts and avoid punishment therefor. 
EC 7-6 Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is within the bounds of the law may 
be a perplexing question when his client is contemplating a course of conduct having 
legal consequences that vary according to the client's intent, motive, or desires at the 
time of the action. Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client in developing evidence 
relevant to the state of mind of the client at a particular time. He may properly assist 
his client in the development and preservation of evidence of existing motive, intent, or 
desire; obviously, he may not do anything furthering the creation or preservation of 
false evidence. In many cases a lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of 
his client, and in those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his 
client. 
EC 7-7 In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or 
substantially prejudicing the rights of a. client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on 
his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is fexdusiveiy that of the dient 
and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer. 
As typical examples in civil .cases, it is for the client to dedde whether he will accept 
a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right to plejad an affirmative defense. A 
defense lawyer in a criminal case has the dury to advise 
particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable and 
on appeal, but it is for the client to decide what plea shouli 
appeal should be taken. 
client fully on whether a 
to the prospects of success 
be entered and whether an 
EC 7-8 A lawyer should exen his best efforts to insure tfakt decisions of his client are 
made only after the dient has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought 
to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so. Advice of a lawyer to 
his client need not be confined to purely leral considerations. A lawyer should advise his 
client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer should bring to bear upon 
this decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective view-
point. In 3S-si-?ing his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer 
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as weil 
as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that 
might result from assertion of legally permissible positions! In the final analysis, how-
ever, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally 
available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client 
and not for himself. In the event that the client in a nonjadjudicatory matter insists 
upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment abd advice of the lawyer but 
not prohibited by Disdplinary Rules, the lawyer may witfaaraw from the employment. 
EC 7-9 In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for 
his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a 
manner consistent with the best interests of his client. However, when an acrion in the 
best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he ma^ ask his client for permis-
sion to forego such action. 
EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zefed does not militate against 
his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal 
process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm. 
EC 7-11 The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, 
experience, mental condition or age of a client, the obligation of a public officer, or the 
nature of a particular proceeding. Examples indude the representation of an illiterate 
or an incompetent, service as a public prosecutor or other government lawyer, and 
appearances before administrative and legislative bodies. 
EC 7-12 Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of 
making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon 
his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal represen-
tative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those dejcisions which are normally 
the prerogative of the client to make; If a client under disability has no legal representa-
tive, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf 
of the client. If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of con-
tributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally dis-
qualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible 
aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer 
to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then 
prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. But 
obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any decision which the law requires 
his client to perform or make, either acting for himself if I competent, or by a duly 
constituted representative if legally incompetent. 
EC 7-13 The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs frokn that of the "<»ai advo-
cate; his dury is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because: 
(1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore mould use restraint in the 
discretionary exercises of governmental powers, such as in) the selection of cases to 
prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may 
make decisions normally made by an individual dient, and those affecting the public 
interest should be fair to ail; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the accused is 
to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. With respect (o evidence and witnesses, 
the prosecutor has responsibilities different from these of a lawyer in private practice; 
the prosecutor should make timely disdosure to the defense ofavailable evidence, known 
to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate (the degree of the offense, 
or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid uursuit 
of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid me 
accused 
EC 7-14 A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should 
refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government 
lawyer not having such discretionary power who believes there is lade of merit in a 
controversy submitted to him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoid-
ance of unfair litigation. A government lawyer in a cril action or administrative pro-
ceeding has the responsibiity to seek justice and to de eiop a full and fair record, and 
he should not use his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties 
or to bring about unjust settlements or results. 
EC 7-15 The nature and purpose of proceedings before administrative agencies vary 
widely. The proceedings may be legislative or quasi-judicial, or a combination of both. 
They may be ex parte in character, in which event they may originate either at the 
instance of the agency or upon motion of an interested party. The scope of an inquiry 
may be purely investigative or it may be truly adversary looking toward the adjudica-
tion of specific rights of a party or of classes of parties. The foregoing are but examples 
of some of the types of proceedings conducted by administrative agencies. A lawyer ap-
pearing before an administrative agency, regardless of the nature of the proceeding it 
is conducting, has the continuing duty to advance the cause of his client within the 
bounds of the law. Where the applicable rules of the agency impose specific obligations 
upon a lawyer, it is his duty to comply therewith, unless the lawyer has a legitimate 
basis for challenging the validity thereof. In all appearances before administrative 
agencies, a lawyer should identify himself, his client if identity of his client is not 
privileged, and the representative nature of his appearance. It is not improper, however, 
for a lawyer to seek from an agency information available to the public without identify-
ing his client. 
EC 7-16 H e primary business of a legislative body is to enact laws rather than to 
adjudicate controversies, although on occasion the activities of a legislative" body may 
take on the characteristics of an adversary proceeding, particularly in investigative and 
impeachment matters. The role of a lawyer supporting or opposing proposed legisla-
tion nomally is quite different from his role in representing a person under investigation 
or on trial by a legislative body. When a lawyer appears in connection with proposed 
legislation, he seeks to affect the lawmaking process, but when he appears on behalf 
of a client in investigatory or impeachment proceedings, he is concerned with the pro-
tection of the nghts of his client. In either event, he should identify himself and his 
client, if identity of his client is not privileged, and should comply wth applicable laws 
and legislative rules. 
EC 7-17 The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge 
of his professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favor-
able to the interests or desires of his client. While a- lawyer must act always with cir-
cumspection in order that his conduct will not adversely affect the rights of a client in a 
matter he is then handling, he may take positions on public issues and espouse legal 
reforms he favors without regard to the individual views of any client. 
EC 7-18 The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of 
legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this reason a lawyer 
should not communicate on the subject matter of the representation of his client with a 
person he knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer, unless pursuant to law or 
rule of court or unless he has the consent of the lawyer for that person. If one is not 
represented by counsel, a lawyer representing another may have to deal directly with 
the unrepresented person; in such an instance, a lawyer should not undertake to give 
advice to the person who is attempting to represent himself, except that he may advise 
him to obtain a lawyer. 
Doty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice 
EC 7-19 Our legal system provides for the adjudication of disputes governed by the 
rules of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law. An adversary presentation coun-
ters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which 
is not yet fully known, the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts 
and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and 
to render impartial judgments. The dury of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the 
legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the 
law. 
EC 7-20 In order to function properly, our adjudicative process requires an informed, 
impartial tribunal capable of administering justice promptly and effidentiy according 
to procedures that command public confidence and respect. Not only must there be 
competent, adverse presentation of evidence and issues, but a tribunal must be aided 
by rules appropriate to an effective and dignified process. The procedures under which 
tribunals operate in our adversary system have been prescribed largely by legislanve 
enactments, court rules and decisions, and administrative rules. Through the years cer-
tain concepts of proper professional conduct have become rules of law applicable to the 
adversary adjudicative process. Many of these concepts are the bases for standards of 
professional conduct set forth in the Disdplinary Rules. 
EC 7-21 The dvil adjudicative process is primarily designee ior uie settlement of 
disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of 
sodety as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjust-
ment of private dvil claims or controversies is a subversioiji of that process, further, the 
person against whom the criminal process is so misused mdy be deterred from asserting 
his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the dvil process in settling private disputes 
is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, tne improper use of criminal 
process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system. 
EC 7-22 Respect for judicial rulings is essential to the proper administration of justice; 
however, a litigant or his lawyer may, in good faith and within the framework of the 
law, take steps to test the correctness of a ruling of a tribunal 
EC 7-23 The complexity of law often makes it difficult fcfr a tribunal to be fully in-
formed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal 
that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate 
determination of the matter before it The adversary system contemplates that each 
lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client. 
Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse 
to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal) of its existence unless his 
adversary has done so; but, having marie such disdosure, $e may challenge its sound-
ness in whole or in part 
EC 7-24 In order to bring about just and informed decisionsj evidentiary and procedural 
rules have been established by tribunals to permit the inclusion of relevant evidence 
and argument and the exdusion of ail other considerations. The expression by a lawyer 
of his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as 
to the culpability of a dvil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not 
a proper subject-for argument to the trier of fact It is improper as to factual matters 
because admissible evidence possessed by a lawyer should pe presented only as sworn 
testimony. It is improper as to all other matters because, were the rule otherwise, the 
silence of a lawyer on a given occasion could be construed unfavorably to his client 
However, a lawyer may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or con-
dusion with respect to any of the foregoing matters. 
EC 7-2S Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to just decisions and are 
part of the framework of the law. Thus while a lawyer may take steps in good faith 
and within the framework of the law to test the validity of pies, he is not justified in 
consdousiy violating such rules and he should be diligent in jiis efforts to guard against 
his unintentional violation of them. As examples, a lawyer should subscribe to or verify 
only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with applicable law and rules; 
a lawyer should not make any prefatory statement before a tribunal in regard to the 
purported facts of the case on trial unless he believes that [his statement will be sup-
ported by admissible evidence; a lawyer should not ask a witness a question solely for 
the purpose of harassing or embarrassing him; and a lawyer should not by subterfuge 
put before a jury matters which it cannot properly consider. 
EC 7-26 The law and Disdplinary Rules prohibit the use o^  fraudulent, false, or per-
jured testimony or evidence. A lawyer who knowingly partidpktes in introduction of such 
testimony or evidence is subject to disdpline. A lawyer should, however, present any 
admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he knows, or from facts 
within his knowledge should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, 
or perjured. 
EC 7-27 Because it interferes with the proper administration bf justice, a lawyer should 
not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce. 
In like manner, a lawyer should not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to 
leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavailable as a 
witness therein. 
EC 7-28 Witnesses should always testify truthfully and should be free from any financial 
inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise. A lawyer should not pay or agree 
to pay a non-expert witness an amount in excess of reimbursement for expenses and 
financial loss incident to his being a witness; however, a lawyer may pay or agree to 
pay an expen witness a reasonable fee for his services as m expen. But in no event 
should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any witness. A lawyer should 
exercise reasonable diligence to see that his client and lay associates conform to these 
standards, 
EC 7-29 To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial process, venire-
men and jurors should be protected against extraneous influences. When impartiality is 
present, public confidence in the judicial system is enhanced. There should be no extra-
judicial communication with veniremen prior to trial or with jurors during trial by or 
on behalf of a lawyer connected with the case. Furthermore, a lawyer who is not con-
nected with the case should not communicate with or cause another to communicate 
with a venireman or a juror about the case. After the trial, communication by a lawyer 
with jurors is permitted so long as he refrains from asking questions or making com-
ments that tend to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence actions of the juror in 
future cases Were a lawyer to be prohibited from communicating after trial with a 
juror, he could not ascenain if the verdict might be subject to legal challenge, in 
which event the invalidity of a verdict might go undetected. When an extrajudicial 
communication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted by law, it should be made con-
siderately and with deference to the personal feelings of the juror. 
EC 7-30 Vexatious or harassing investigations of veniremen or jurors seriously impair 
the effectiveness of our jury system. For this reason, a lawyer or anyone on his behalf 
who conducts an investigation of veniremen or jurors should act with circumspection 
and restraint. 
EC 7-31 Communications with or investigations of members of families of veniremen or 
jurors by a lawyer or by anyone on his behalf are subject to the restrictions imposed 
upon, the lawyer with respect to his communications with or investigations of veniremen 
and jurors. 
EC 7-32 Because of his duty to aid in preserving the integrity of the jury system, a 
lawyer who learns of improper conduct by or towards a venireman, a juror, or a mem-
ber of the family of either should make a prompt repon to the court regarding such 
conduct. 
EC 7-33 A goal of our legal system is that each party shall have his case, criminal 
or civil, adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. The attainment of this goal may be defeat-
ed by dissemination of news or comments which tend to influence judge or jury. Such 
news or comments may prevent propective jurors from being impartial at the outset 
of the trial and may also interefere with the obligation of jurors to base their verdict 
soieiy upon the evidence admitted in the trial. The release by a lawyer of out-of-court 
statements regarding an anticipated or pending trial may improperly affect the impar-
tiality of the tribunal. For these reasons, standards for permissible and prohibited con-
duct of a lawyer with respect to trial publicity have been established. 
EC 7-34 The impartiality of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired by 
the receipt of gifts or loans. A lawyer, therefore, is never, justified in making a gift or a 
loan to a judge, a hearing officer, or an official or employee of a tribunal. 
EC 7-35 All litigants and lawyers should have access to tribunals on an equal basis. 
Generally, in adversary proceedings a lawyer should not communicate with a judge 
relative to a matter pending before, or which is to be brought before, a tribunal over 
which he presides in circumstances which might have the effect or give the appearance 
of granting undue advantage to one party. For example, a lawyer should not communi-
cate with a tribunal by a writing unless a copy thereof is promptly delivered to opposing 
counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer. Ordinarily an oral 
communication by a lawyer with a judge or hearing officer should be made only upon 
adequate notice to opposing counsel, or, if there is none, to the opposing party. A lawyer 
should not condone or lend himself to private importunities by another with a judge or 
hearing officer on behalf of himself or his client. 
EC 7-36 Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly pro-
cedures designed to protect the rights of all parties. Although a lawyer has the dury 
to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that offends the 
dignity and decorum of proceedings. While maintaining his independence, a lawyer 
should be respectful, courteous, and above-board in his relations with a judge or hearing 
officer before whom he appears. He should avoid undue solicitude for the comfort or 
convenience of judge or jury and should avoid any oth r^ conduct calculated to gain 
special consideration, 
EC 7-37 In adversary proceedings, clients are Utigants ana though ill feelings may exist 
between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, anirude, 
and demeanor towards opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or deroga-
tory personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers 
interfere with the orderly administration of justice and nave no proper place in our 
legal system. 
EC 7-38 A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reason-
able requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural 
formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client. He should 
follow local customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing 
counsel of his intention not to do so. A lawyer should be punctual in fulfilling all profes-
sional commitments. 
EC 7-39 In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary system depends upon 
cooperation between lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve 
the impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional processes prompt and just, with-
out impinging upon the obligation of lawyers to represent jtheir clients zealously within 
the framework of the law. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
DE 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously. 
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally: 
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably 
available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except 
as provided by DR 7-101 (B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplin-
ary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing 
counsel-which do not prejudice the rights of nis client, by being punc-
tual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive 
tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons 
involved in the legal process. j 
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client 
for professional services, but he may withdraw as permitted under 
DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105. 
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional 
relationship, except as required under DR 74102 (B). 
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may: 
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or 
fail to assert a right of position of his client. 
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlaw-
ful, even though there is some support fo^ an argument that the 
conduct is legal. 
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds 0f the Law. 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defence, delay a trial, or take 
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is 
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously 
injure another. 
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under 
existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it 
can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal .of existing law. 
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by 
law to reveal. 
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. 
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact. 
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when Ee 
knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false. 
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be 
illegal or fraudulent. 
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a 
Disciplinary Rule. 
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: 
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a 
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to 
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he 
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal. 
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a trib-
unal sb^il promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal 
DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Prosecutor or Other Government 
Lawyer. 
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or 
cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious 
that the charges are not supported by probable cause. 
(B) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation 
shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the de-
fendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the 
prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punish 
ment 
DR 7-104 Communicating With One of Adverse Interest. 
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: 
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the 
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer 
in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer repre-
senting such other party or is authorized by law to do so. 
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other 
than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are 
or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests 
of his client 
DR 7-105 Threatening Criminal Prosecution. 
(A) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to pre-
sent criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. 
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct 
(A) A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing 
rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a pro-
ceeding, but he may take appropriate steps 14 good faith to test the va-
lidity of such rule or ruling. 
(B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer sljiall disclose: 
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be 
directly adverse to the position of his client! and which is not disclosed 
by opposing counsel. 
(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients he repre-
sents and of the persons who employed him. 
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity befor^ a tribunal, a lawyer shall 
not: 
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has ho reasonable basis to be-
lieve is relevant to the case or that will nqt be supported by admis-
sible evidence. 
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonably basis to believe is rele-
vant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other 
person. 
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when 
testifying as a witness. 
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the 
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability lof a civil litigant, or as to 
the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analy-
sis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the 
matters stated herein. 
(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of 
the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel 
timely notice of his intent not to comply. 
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to 
a tribunal. 
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any estabj^hed rule of procedure 
or of evidence. 
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity. 
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the I investigation of a crim-
inal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial state-
ment that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means 
of public communication and that does more than state without elabora-
tion: 
(1) Information contained in a public record. 
(2) That the investigation is in progress. 
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the 
offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim. 
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a Suspect or assistance in 
other matters and the information necessary I thereto. 
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers. 
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a 
criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, in-
formation, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest 
until the commencement of the trial, or disposition of without, trial, 
make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of public com-
munication and that relates to: 
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, 
indictments, or other charges of crime) of tbe accused. 
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser 
offense. 
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement 
given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement. 
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the re-
fusal or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests. 
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness. 
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, 
or the merits of the case. 
(C) DR 7-107 (B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from an-
nouncing: 
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the 
accused. 
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary 
to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he 
may present 
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence. 
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime. 
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of 
weapons. 
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and 
the length of the investigation. 
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, 
other than a confession, admission, or statement 
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge. 
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the 
case. 
(10) The ^scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings. 
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him. 
(D) During the selection of a' jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer 
or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal 
matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial state-
ment that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by 
means of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or 
issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere 
with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment 
to public records of the court in the case. 
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal 
matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm 
associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or participate 
in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would 
expect to be disseminated by public communication and that is reason-
ably likely to affect the imposition of sentence. 
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional discip-
linary proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent 
and consistent with other law applicable to such proceedings. 
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its 
investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial 
statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, 
that a reasonable person would expect to be jiisseminated by means of 
public communication and that relates to: 
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction- involved. 
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or 
prospective witness. 
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the re-
fusal or failure of a party to submit to such, j 
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims <jr defenses of a party, ex-
cept as required by law or administrative rule. 
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of 
the action. 
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law 
firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a state-
ment, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that 
a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public 
communication if it is made outside the official! course of the proceeding 
and relates to: 
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved. 
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or 
prospective witness, 
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations 
or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such. 
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an 
interested person. 
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing. 
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from re-
plying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from par-
ticipating in the proceedings of legislative, administrative, or other in-
vestigative bodies. 
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to present his employees and 
associates 'from making an extra-judicial statement that he would be 
prohibited from making under DR 7-107. 
DR 7-108 Communication with or Investigation of [Jurors. 
(A) Before the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not com-
municate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to 
be a member of the venire from which the jury J will be selected for the 
trial of the case. 
(B) During the trial of a case: 
(1) A lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause 
another to communicate with any member of the jury." 
(2) A lawyer who is not connected therewith shall not communicate with 
or cause another to communicate with a juror concerning the case. 
(C) DR 7-108 (A) and (B) do not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with 
veniremen or jurors in the course of official proceedings. 
(D) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with 
which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of 
or make comments to a member of that jury thai are calculated merely 
to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future 
jury service. 
(E) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by financial support or otherwise, 
another to conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of either a 
venireman or a juror. 
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to com-
munications with or investigations of members of a family of a venire-
man or a juror. 
(G) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a 
venireman or juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror, or a 
member of his family, of which the lawyer has knowledge. 
DR 7-109 Contact with Witnesses. 
(A) A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal 
obligation to reveal or produce. 
(B) A lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave 
the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavailable 
as a witness therein. 
(C) A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of com-
pensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or 
the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or ac-
quiesce in the payment of: 
(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying. 
(2) Reasonable compensation to -a witness for his loss of time in attend-
ing or testifying. 
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness. 
DR 7-110 Contact with Officials, 
(A) A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge, official, or 
employee of a tribunal. 
(B) In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause 
another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or 
an official before whom the proceeding is pending, except: 
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause. 
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing 
counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer. 
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse 
party if he is not represented by a lawyer. 
(4) As otherwise authorized by law. 
CANON 8 
A Lawyer Should Assist in 
Improving the Legal System 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
EC 8-1 Changes in human affairs and imperfections in numan institutions make neces-
sary constant efforts to maintain and improve our legal system. This system should 
function in a manner that commands public respect and fosters the use of legal remedies 
to achieve redress of grievances. By reason of education and experience, lawyers are 
especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective 
measures therein. Thus they should participate in proposing and supporting legislation 
and programs to improve the system, without regard to th4 general interests or desires 
of clients or former clients. 
EC 8-2 Rules of law are deficient if they are not just, understandable, and responsive 
to the needs of society. If a lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of 
law, substantive or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should en-
deavor by lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law. He should encourage 
the simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of laws that are outmoded. Like-
wise, legal procedures should be improved whenever experience indicates a change is 
needed. 
EC 8-3 The fair administration of justice requires the availability of competent lawyers. 
Members of the public should be educated to recognize the existence of legal problems 
and the resultant need for legal services, and should be provided methods for intelligent 
selection of counsel. Those persons unable to pay for legal services should be provided 
needed services. Clients and lawyers should not be penalized by undue geographical re-
straints upon representation in legal matters, and the bar should address itself to im-
provements in licensing, reciprocity, and admission procedures consistent with the needs 
of modern commerce. 
EC 8-4 Whenever a lawyer seeks legislative or administrative changes, he should 
identify the capacity in which he appears, whether on behalf of himself, a client, or the 
public. A lawyer may advocate such changes on behalf of a client even though he does 
not agree with them. But when a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he 
should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously believes to be in the public 
interest. 
EC 8-5 Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a pro-
ceeding before a tribunal or legislative body is inconsistent with fair administration of 
justice, and it should never be participated in or condonea by lawyers. Unless con-
strained by his obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client, a lawyer 
should reveal to appropriate authorities any knowledge he may have of such improper 
conduct. 
EC 8-6 Judges and administrative officials having adjudicatory powers ought to be 
persons of integrity, competence, and suitable temperament. Generally, lawyers are 
qualified, by personal observation or investigation, to evaluate the qualifications of 
persons seeking or being considered for such public offices, and for this reason they have 
a special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those who are qualified. It is the 
dury of lawyers to endeavor to prevent political considerations from ourweighing judicial 
fitness in the selection of judges. Lawyers should protest earnestly against the appoint-
ment or election of those who are unsuited for the bench and should strive to have 
elected or appointed thereto only those who are willing to forego pursuits, whether of a 
business, political, or other nature, that may interfere with the free and fair considera-
tion of questions presented for adjudication. Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free 
to defend themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criti-
cism. While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials publicly, he should 
be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty 
criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence 
in our legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other th^ k a desire to improve the 
legal system are not justified. 
EC 8-7 Since lawyers are a vital pan of the legal system, they should be persons of 
integrity, of professional skill and of dedication to the mr^pv^rry^r nf th* «~~— 
Thus a lawyer should aid in establishing, as well as enforcing, standards of conduct ade-
quate to protect the public by insuring that those who practice law are qualified to do so. 
EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is 
highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions 
to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full 
or pan-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional 
interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties. 
EC 8-9 The advancement of our legal system is of vital imponance in maintaining 
the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, 
and should aid in making, needed changes and improvements. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
DR 8-101 Action as a Public Official. 
(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not: 
(1) Use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special ad-
vantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circum-
stances where he knows or it is obvious that such action, is not in the 
public interest 
(2) Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a trib-
unal to act in favor of himself or of a client 
(3) Accept any thing of value from any person when the lawyer knows 
or it is obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing his 
action as a public official. 
DR 8-102 Statements Concerning Judges and Other Adjudicatory Officers. 
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning 
the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial 
office. 
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or 
other adjudicatory officer. 
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client, 
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firni, other than advances for 
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank 
accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and 
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm spall be deposited therein 
except as follows: 
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank dirges may be deposited 
therein. 
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in jpart presently or poten-
tially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the 
portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when 
due unless the right of the lawyer or law linn to receive it is dis-
puted by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be 
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved, 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of Ms funds, securities, or 
other properties. 
(2) Identify and label securities and properties o^  a client promptly upon 
receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safe-
keeping as soon as practicable. 
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other proper-
ties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render 
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them. 
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the 
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer 
which the client is entitled to receive. 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: c 
(1) "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect 
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer 
be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other 
to a client, whether it 
interest. 
(2) "Law firm" includes a professional legal corporation. 
(3) "Person" includes a corporation, an association, a trust, a partner-
ship, and any other organization or legal entity. 
(4) "Professional legal corporation* means a corporation, or an associa-
tion treated as a corporation, authorized by law to practice law for 
profit 
(5) "State" includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other 
federal territories and possessions. 
(6) "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory bodies. 
(7) "A bar association representative of the general bar" includes a bar 
association of specialists as referred to in DR i-105fA) (1) or (4). 
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client. 
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for 
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank 
accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and 
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein 
except as follows: 
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited 
therein. 
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or poten-
tially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the 
portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when 
due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is dis-
puted by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be 
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved, 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or 
other properties. 
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon 
receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safe-
keeping as soon as practicable. 
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other proper-
ties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render 
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them. 
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the 
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer 
which the client is entitled to receive. 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: 
(1> "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect 
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it 
be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest. 
(2) "Law firm" includes a professional legal corporation. 
(3) "Person" includes a corporation, an association, a trust, a partner-
ship, and any other organization or legal entity. 
(4) "Professional legal corporation" means a corporation, or an associa-
tion treated as a corporation, authorized by law to practice law for 
profit 
(5) "State" includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other 
federal territories and possessions. 
(6) "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory bodies. 
(7) "A bar association representative of the general bar" includes a bar 
association of specialists as referred to in DR 2-105(A) (1) or (4). 
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PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer 
of the legal system and a public citizen having 
special responsibility for the quality of justice. 
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs 
various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a 
client with an informed understanding of the 
client's legal rights and obligations and explains 
their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules 
of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer 
seeks a result advantageous to the client but consi-
stent with requirements of honest dealing with 
others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer 
seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an 
advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson 
for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by exa-
mining a client's legal affairs and reporting about 
them to the client or to others. A lawyer's repres-
entation of a client, including representation by 
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of 
the client's political, economic, social or moral 
views or activities. 
In all professional functions a lawyer should be 
competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should 
maintain communication with a client concerning 
the representation. A lawyer should keep in confi-
dence information relating to representation of a 
client except so far as disclosure is required or per-
mitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. 
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requ-
irements of the law, both in professional service to 
clients and in the lawyer's business and personal 
affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures 
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or 
intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate 
respect for the legal system and for those who serve 
it, including judges, other lawyers and public offic-
ials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to 
challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a 
lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. 
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek impro-
vement of the law, the administration of justice and 
the quality of service rendered by the legal profes-
sion. As a member of a learned profession, a 
lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law 
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in 
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal 
education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficie-
ncies in the administration of justice and of the fact 
that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not 
poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and 
should therefore devote professional time and civic 
influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the 
legal profession in pursuing these objectives and 
should help the Bar regulate itself in the public int-
erest. 
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities 
are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
as well as substantive and procedural law. 
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal cons-
cience and the approbation of professional peers. A 
lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of 
skill, to improve the law and the legal profession 
and to exemplify the legal profession's ideal of 
public service. 
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of 
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public 
citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an 
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a 
zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the 
same time assume that justice is being done. So 
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client 
confidences ordinarily serves the public interest 
because people are more likely to seek legal advice, 
and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they 
know their communications will be private. 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting 
responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all diffi-
cult ethical problems arise from conflict between a 
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal 
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remai-
ning an upright person while earning a satisfactory 
living. The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe 
terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the fra-
mework' of these Rules many difficult issues of 
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must 
be resolved through the exercise of sensitive profe-
ssional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules. 
The legal profession is largely self-governing. 
Although other professions also have been granted 
powers of self-government, the legal profession is 
unique in this respect because of the close relation-
ship between the profession and the processes of 
government and law enforcement. This connection 
is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over 
the legal profession is vested largely in the courts. 
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of 
their professional calling, the occasion for govern-
ment regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also 
helps maintain the legal profession's independence 
from government domination. An independent legal 
profession is an important force in preserving gov-
ernment under law, for abuse of legal authority is 
more readily challenged by a profession whose 
members are not dependent on government for the 
right to practice. 
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries 
with it special responsibilities of self-government. 
The profession has a responsibility to assure that its 
regulations are conceived in the public interest and 
not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested 
concerns of the Bar. Every lawyer is responsible for 
observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
A lawyer should also aid in securing their observ-
ance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsi-
bilities compromises the independence of the prof-
ession and the public interest which it serves. 
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of 
society. The fulfillment of this role requires an 
understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our 
legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, 
when properly applied, serve to define that relatio-
nship. 
Proposed Rules of Profes 
SCOPE 
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of 
reason. They should be interpreted with reference to 
the purposes of legal representation and of the law 
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in 
the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper 
conduct for purposes of professional discipline. 
Others, generally cast in the term "may," are per-
missive and define areas under the Rules in which 
the lawyer has professional discretion. No discipli-
nary action should be taken when the lawyer 
chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such 
discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relati-
onships between the lawyer and others. The Rules 
are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and 
partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define 
a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comm-
ents use the term "should." Comments do not add 
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for 
practicing in compliance with the Rules. 
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context 
shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes 
court rules and statutes relating to matters of licen-
sure, laws defining specific obligations .of lawyers 
and substantive and procedural law in general. 
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an 
open society, depends primarily upon understanding 
and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinf-
orcement by peer and public opinion and finally, 
when necessary, upon enforcement through discipl-
inary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, 
exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that 
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human 
activity can be completely defined by legal rules/ 
The Rules simply provide a framework for the 
ethical practice of law. 
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the 
lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of 
substantive law external to these Rules determine 
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most 
of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relat-
ionship attach only after the client has requested the 
lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has 
agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as 
that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may 
attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a 
client-lawyer relationship shall be established. 
Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any 
specific purpose can depend on the circumstances 
and may be a question of fact. 
Under various legal provisions, including constit-
utional, statutory and common law, the responsibi-
lities of government lawyers may include authority 
concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in 
the client in private client-lawyer relationships. 
For example, a lawyer for a government agency may 
have authority on behalf of the government to 
decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from 
an adverse judgment. Such authority in various 
respects is generally vested in the attorney general 
and the state's attorney in state government, and 
their federal counterparts, and the same may be true 
of other government law officers. Also, lawyers 
under the supervision of these officers may be aut-
horized to represent several government agencies in 
intragovernmental legal controversies in circumsta-
nces where a private lawyer could not represent 
multiple private clients. They also may have auth-
ority to represent the "public interest" in circumst-
ional Conduct 
ancesi where a private lawyer would not be author-
ized io do so. These Rules do not abrogate any 
such authority. 
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibi-
tion imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the 
disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that 
disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be 
made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as 
they existed at the time of the conduct in question 
and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often 
has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of 
the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that 
whether or not discipline should be imposed for a 
violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on 
all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and 
seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and 
whether there have been previous violations. Disc-
iplinary action shall be governed by the Procedures 
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and the burden 
of proof shall be on the State Bar to sustain any 
allegation of violation by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause 
of action nor should it create any presumption that 
a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are des-
igned to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide 
a structure for regulating conduct through discipli-
nary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis 
for civil liability. "Furthermore, the purpose of the 
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by 
opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact 
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-
assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the 
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not 
imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding 
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of 
the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should 
be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of 
lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of 
violating such a duty. 
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern 
or affect judicial application of either the attorney-
client or work product privilege. Those privileges 
were developed to promote compliance with law and 
fairness in litigation. In reliance on the attorney-
client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that 
communications within the scope of the privilege 
will be protected against compelled disclosure. The 
attorney-client privilege is that of the client and 
not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional sit-
uations the lawyer under the Rules has a limited 
discretion to disclose a client confidence does not 
vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the 
client has a reasonable expectation that information 
relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed 
and that disclosure of such information may be 
judicially compelled only in accordance with the 
recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and 
work product privileges. 
lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose 
lation under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to 
[nation. Permitting such reexamination 
be incompatible with the general policy of 
promoting compliance with law through assurances 
that communications will be protected against disc-
losure. 
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains 
and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. 
The Preamble and this note on Scope provide 
general orientation. The Comments are intended as 
guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is 
authoritative. Research notes were prepared to 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
compare counterparts in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility (approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected 
references to other authorities. The notes have not 
been adopted, do not constitute part of the Rules, 
and are not intended to affect the application or 
interpretation of the Rules and Comments. 
TERMINOLOGY 
'Belief* or "Believes"' denotes that the person 
involved actually supposed the fact in question to be 
true. A person's belief may be inferred from circ-
umstances. 
• "Consult" or "Consultation" denoics communic-
ation of information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the client to appreciate the significance of the matter 
in question. 
"Firm" or "Law firm" denotes a lawyer or 
lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the 
legal department of a corporation or other organi-
zation and lawyers employed in a legal services 
organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10. 
"Fraud" or "Fraudulent" denotes conduct having 
a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent mis-
representation or failure to apprise another of rele-
vant information. 
"Knowingly," "Known," or "Knows" denotes 
actual knowledge of the fact in question. A 
person's knowledge may be inferred from circums-
tances. 
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and 
a shareholder in a law firm organized as a profess-
ional corporation. 
"Reasonable" or "Reasonably" when used in rel-
ation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of 
a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. 
"Reasonable belief" or "Reasonably believes" 
when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the 
lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. 
"Reasonably should know" when used in refer-
ence to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable 
prudence and competence would ascertain the 
matter in question. 
"Substantial" when used in reference to degree or 
extent denotes a material matter of clear and 
weighty importance. 
CLIENT-LAWYER 
RELATIONSHIP 
RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE 
A LAWYER SHALL PROVIDE COMPETENT 
REPRESENTATION TO A CLIENT. COMPE-
TENT REPRESENTATION REQUIRES THE 
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, THOROUGH-
NESS AND PREPARATION REASONABLY 
NECESSARY FOR THE REPRESENTATION. 
COMMENT: 
Legal Knowledge and Skill 
In determining whether a lawyer employs the 
requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, 
relevant factors include the relative complexity and 
specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's 
general experience, the lawyer's training and expe-
rience in the field in question, the preparation- and 
study the lawyer is able to give the matter and 
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or ass-
ociate or consult with, a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question. In many insta-
nces, the required proficiency is that of a general 
practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law 
may be required in some circumstances. 
A lawyfer need not necessarily have special trai-
ning or prior experience to handle legal problems of 
a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly 
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practiti-
oner with long experience. Some important legal 
skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evalu-
ation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in 
all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental 
legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal 
problems a situation may involve, a skill that nece-
ssarily transcends any particular specialized knowl-
edge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation 
in a wholly novel field through necessary study. 
Competent representation can also be provided 
through the association of a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question. 
In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or 
assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not 
have the skill ordinarily required where referral to 
or consultation or association with another lawyer 
would be impractical. Even in an emergency, 
however, assistance should be limited to that reas-
onably necessary in the circumstances, for ill consi-
dered action under emergency conditions can jeop-
ardize the client's interest. 
A lawyer may accept representation where the 
requisite level of competence can be achieved by 
reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a 
lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepre-
sented person. See also Rule 6.2. 
Thoroughness and Preparation 
Competent handling of a particular matter incl-
udes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and 
legal elements of the problem, and use of methods 
and procedures meeting the standards of competent 
practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. 
The required attention and preparation are determ-
ined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and 
complex transactions ordinarily require more elab-
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orate treatment than matters of lesser consequence. 
Maintaining Competence 
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a 
lawyer should engage in continuing study and edu-
cation. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 6-101(A)(l) provided that a lawyer shall not 
handle a matter "which he knows or should know 
that he is not competent to handle, without associ-
ating himself with a lawyer who is competent to 
handle it." DR 6-101(A)(2) required "preparation 
adequate in the circumstances." Rule 1.1 more fully 
particularizes the elements of competence. Whereas 
DR 6-101(A)(3) prohibited the "[njeglect of a legal 
matter" Rule 1.1 does not contain such a prohibi-
tion. Instead, Rule 1.1 affirmatively requires the 
lawyer to be competent. 
RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF 
REPRESENTATION 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL ABIDE BY A 
CLIENT'S DECISIONS CONCERNING THE 
OBJECTIVES OF REPRESENTATION, SUBJECT 
TO PARAGRAPHS (b), (c), (d), AND SHALL 
CONSULT WITH THE CLIENT AS TO THE 
MEANS BY WHICH THEY ARE TO BE 
PURSUED. A LAWYER SHALL ABIDE BY A 
CLIENT'S DECISION WHETHER TO ACCEPT 
AN OFFER OF SETTLEMENT OF A MATTER. 
IN A CRIMINAL CASE, A LAWYER SHALL 
ABIDE BY THE CLIENT'S DECISION, AFTER 
CONSULTATION WITH THE LAWYER, AS TO 
A PLEA TO BE ENTERED, WHETHER TO 
WAIVE JURY TRIAL AND WHETHER THE 
CLIENT WILL TESTIFY. 
(b) A LAWYER MAY LIMIT THE OBJECT-
IVES OF THE REPRESENTATION IF THE 
CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL A 
CLIENT TO ENGAGE, OR ASSIST A CLIENT, 
IN CONDUCT THAT THE LAWYER KNOWS IS 
CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT, BUT A 
LAWYER MAY DISCUSS THE LEGAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF ANY PROPOSED COURSE OF 
CONDUCT WITH A CLIENT AND MAY 
COUNSEL OR ASSIST A CLIENT TO MAKE A 
GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE 
VALIDITY, SCOPE, MEANING OR APPLICA-
TION OF THE LAW. 
<d) WHEN A LAWYER KNOWS THAT A 
CLIENT EXPECTS ASSISTANCE NOT PERMI-
TTED BY THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW, THE LAWYER 
SHALL CONSULT WITH THE CLIENT REGA-
RDING THE RELEVANT LIMITATIONS ON 
THE LAWYER'S CONDUCT. 
COMMENT: 
Scope of Representation 
Both lawyer and client have authority and respo-
nsibility in the objectives and means of representa-
tion.. The client has ultimate authority to determine 
the purposes to be served by legal representation, 
within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's 
professional obligations. Within those limits, a client 
also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the 
means to be used in pursuing those objectives. At 
the same time, a lawyer is not required to pursue 
objectives or employ means simply because a client 
may^  wish that the lawyer do so. A clear distinction 
between objectives and means sometimes cannot be 
dra^n, and in many cases the client-lawyer relati-
onship partakes of a joint undertaking. In questions 
of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility 
for technical and legal tactical issues, but should 
defer to the client regarding such questions as the 
expense to be incurred and concern for third persons 
who might be adversely affected. Law Jefming the 
lawyer's scope of authority in litigation varies 
among jurisdictions. 
Services Limited in Objectives or Means 
The objectives or scope of services provided by a 
lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client 
or py the terms under which the lawyer's services 
are Jmade available to the client. For example, a 
retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose. 
Representation provided through a legal aid agency 
may be subject to limitations on the types of cases 
the agency handles. When a lawyer has been reta-
ined by an insurer to represent an insured, the rep-
resentation may be limited to matters related to the 
insurance coverage. The terms upon which represe-
ntation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives 
or means. Such limitations may exclude objectives 
or means that the lawyer regards as repugnant or 
imprudent. 
An agreement concerning the scope of represent-
ation must accord vrith the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and other law. Thus, the client may not be 
asked to agree to representation so limited in scope 
as to violate Rule 1.1, or to surrender the right to 
terminate the lawyer's services or the right to settle 
litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue. 
Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions 
A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion 
about the actual consequences that appear likely to 
result from a client's conduct. The fact that a client 
uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or 
fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer a party 
to the course of action. However, a lawyer may not 
knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent 
conduct. There is a critical distinction between pre-
senting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable 
conduct and recommending the means by which a 
crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. 
When the client's course of action has already 
begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility 
is especially delicate. The lawyer *is not permitted to 
reveal the client's wrongdoing, except where perm-
itted by Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer is required to 
avoid furthering the purpose, for example, by sug-
gesting how it might be concealed. A lawyer may 
not continue assisting a client in conduct that the 
lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but then 
discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal 
from the representation, therefore, may be required. 
Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be 
charged with special obligations in dealings with the 
beneficiary. _ 
Paragraph (c) applies whether or not the defra-
uded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a 
lawyer should not participate in a sham transaction; 
for example, a transaction to effectuate criminal or 
fraudulent escape of tax liability. Paragraph (c) does 
not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident 
to a general retainer for legal service to a lawful 
enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (c) recogn-
izes that determining the validity or interpretation of 
a statute or regulation may require a course of 
action involving disobedience of the statute or reg-
i * r 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
ulation or of the interpretation placed upon it bv 
governmental authorities. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) has no counterpart in the Discipli-
nary Rules of the Code. EC 7-7 stated: "In certain 
areas of legal representation not affecting the merits 
of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights 
of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on 
his own. But otherwise the authority to make deci-
sions is exclusively that of the client ..." EC 7-8 
stated that *[i]n the final analysis, however, the ... 
decision whether to forego legally available object-
ives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ulti-
mately for the client ... In the event that the client 
in a nonad judicatory matter insists upon a course of 
conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice 
of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary 
Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employ-
ment/ DR 7-101(A)(l) provided that a lawyer 
'shall not intentionally ... fail to seek the lawful 
objectives of his client through reasonably available 
means permitted by law .... A lawyer does not 
violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by ... avoi-
ding offensive tactics ...." 
. With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-101(B)(l) 
provided that a lawyer may, "where permissible, 
exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to 
assert a right or position of his client / 
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 7-102(AX7) 
provided that a lawyer shall not "counsel or assist 
his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be 
illegal or fraudulent/ DR 7-102(A)(6) provided 
that a lawyer shall not "participate in the creation or 
preservation of evidence when he knows or it is 
obvious that the evidence is false." DR 7-106 
provided that a lawyer shall not "advise his client to 
disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of 
a tribunal ... but he may take appropriate steps in 
good faith to test the validity of such rule or 
ruling." EC 7-5 stated that a lawyer "should never 
encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts 
or counsel his clients on how to violate the law and 
avoid punishment therefor." 
With regard to paragraph (d), DR 2-110(C)(lXc) 
provided that a lawyer may withdraw from repres-
entation if a client "insists" that the lawyer engage 
in "conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under 
the Disciplinary Rules." DR 9-101(C) provided that 
"a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to 
influence improperly ... any tribunal, legislative 
body or public official." 
RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE 
A LAWYER SHALL ACT WITH REASON-
ABLE DILIGENCE AND PROMPTNESS IN 
REPRESENTING A CLIENT. 
COMMENT: 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a 
client despite opposition, obstruction or personal 
inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever 
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate 
* client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of 
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to 
press for every advantage that might be realized for 
a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in 
determining the means by which a matter should be 
pursued. See Rule 1.2. A .lawyer's workload should 
be controlled so that each matter can be handled 
adequately. 
'. Clients resent professional procrastination. A 
client's interests often can be adversely affected by 
the passage of time or the change of conditions; in 
extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a 
statute of limitations, the client's legal position may 
be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are 
not affected in substance, however, unreasonable 
delay can cause a client needless anxiety and unde-
rmine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. 
Unless the relationship is terminated as provided 
in Rule 1.14 a lawyer should carry through to con-
clusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a 
lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, 
the relationship terminates when the matter has been 
resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a sub-
stantial period in a variety of matters, the client 
sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue 
to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer 
gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a 
client-lawyer relationship still exists should be 
clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that 
the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is 
looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer 
has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has 
handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that 
produced a result adverse to the client but has not 
been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an 
appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the 
possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsi-
bility for the matter. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 6-101(A)(3) required that a lawyer not 
"[njeglect a legal matter entrusted to him." EC 6-4 
stated that a lawyer should "give appropriate atte-
ntion to his legal work." Canon 7 stated that "a 
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the 
bounds of the law." DR 7-101(A)(l) provided that 
a lawyer "shall not intentionally ... fail to seek the 
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably 
available means permitted by law and the Discipli-
nary Rules ...." DR 7-101(A)(3) provided that a 
lawyer "•shall not intentionally ... [prejudice or 
damage his client during the course of the professi-
onal relationship...." 
RULE 1.4 COMMUNICATION 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL KEEP A CLIENT 
REASONABLY INFORMED ABOUT THE 
STATUS OF A MATTER AND PROMPTLY 
COMPLY WITH REASONABLE REQUESTS 
FOR INFORMATION. 
(b) A LAWYER SHALL EXPLAIN A MATTER 
TO THE EXTENT REASONABLY NECESSARY 
TO ENABLE THE CLIENT TO MAKE INFO-
RMED DECISIONS REGARDING THE REPRE-
SENTATION. 
COMMENT: 
The client should have sufficient information to 
participate intelligently in decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and the means by 
which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client 
is willing and able to do so. For example, a lawyer 
negotiating on behalf of a client should provide the 
client with facts relevant to the matter, inform the 
client of communications from another party and 
take other reasonable steps that permit the'client to 
make a decision regarding a serious offer from 
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another party. A lawyer who receives from opposing 
counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy 
or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case shall 
promptly inform the client of its substance unless 
prior discussions with the client have left it clear 
that the proposal will be unacceptable. See Rule 
1.2(a). Even when a client delegates authority to the 
lawyer, the client should be kept advised of the 
status of the matter. 
Adequacy of communication depends in part on 
the kind of advice or assistance involved. For 
example, in negotiations where there is time to 
explain a prpposal, the lawyer should review all 
important provisions with the client before procee-
ding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should 
explain the general strategy and prospects of success 
and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics 
that might injure or coerce others. On the other 
hand, a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to 
describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The 
guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill 
reasonable client expectations for information, 
whether written or oral, consistent with the duty to 
act in the client's best interest, and the client's 
overall requirements as to the character of represe-
ntation. 
Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that 
appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and 
responsible adult. However, fully informing the 
client according to this standard may be impractic-
able, for example, where the client is a child or 
suffers from mental disability. When the client is an 
organization or group, it is often impossible or 
inappropriate to inform every one of its members 
about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should 
address communications to the appropriate officials 
of the organization. Where many routine matters 
are involved, a system of limited or occasional rep-
orting may be arranged with the client. Practical 
exigency may also require a lawyer to act for a 
client without prior consultation. 
Withholding Information 
In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified 
in delaying transmission of information when the 
client would be likely to react imprudently to an 
immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might 
withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the 
examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure 
would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold 
information to serve the lawyer's own interest or 
convenience. Rules or court orders governing litig-
ation may provide that information supplied to a 
lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 
3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Rule 1.4 has no direct counterpart in the Discipl-
inary Rules of the Code. DR 6-101 (A)(3) provided 
that a lawyer shall not '[njeglect a legal matter 
entrusted to him.* DR 9-102(B)(1) provided that a 
lawyer shall '[promptly notify a client of the 
receipt of his funds, securities, or other properties." 
EC 7- stated that a lawyer "should exert his best 
efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made 
only after the client has been informed of relevant 
considerations." EC 9-2 stated that "a lawyer 
should fully and promptly inform his client of 
material developments in the matters being handled 
for the client/ 
RULE 1.5 FEES 
(i) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENTER INTO AN 
AGREEMENT FOR, CHARGE, OR COLLECT 
AN ILLEGAL OR CLEARLY EXCESSIVE FEE. 
A FEE IS CLEARLY EXCESSIVE WHEN, 
AFTER A REVIEW OF THE FACTS, A 
LAWYER OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE WOULD 
BE JLEFT WITH A DEFINITE AND FIRM CON-
VICTION THAT THE FEE IS IN EXCESS OF A 
REASONABLE FEE. FACTORS TO BE CONSI-
DERED AS GUIDES IN DETERMINING THE 
REASONABLENESS OF A FEE INCLUDE THE 
FOLLOWING: 
(1) THE TIME AND LABOR REQUIRED, 
THE NOVELTY AND DIFFICULTY OF THE 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED, AND THE SKILL 
REQUISITE TO PERFORM THE LEGAL 
SERVICE PROPERLY; 
(2) THE LIKELIHOOD, IF APPARENT TO 
THE CLIENT, THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF 
THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYMENT WILL 
PRECLUDE OTHER EMPLOYMENT BY THE 
LAWYER* 
[(3) THE FEE CUSTOMARILY CHARGED IN 
THE LOCALITY FOR SIMILAR LEGAL SERV-
ICES; 
(4) THE AMOUNT INVOLVED AND THE 
RESULTS OBTAINED; 
1 (5) THE TIME LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY 
THE CLIENT OR BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES; 
(6) THE NATURE AND LENGTH OF THE 
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
CLIENT; 
(7) THE EXPERIENCE, REPUTATION, 
AND ABILITY OF THE LAWYER OR 
LAWYERS PERFORMING THE SERVICES; 
AND 
(8) WHETHER THE FEE IS FIXED OR 
CONTINGENT. 
(b) WHEN THE LAWYER HAS NOT REGUL-
ARLY REPRESENTED THE CLIENT, THE 
BASIS OR RATE OF THE FEE SHALL BE 
COMMUNICATED TO THE CLIENT, PREFER-
ABLY IN WRITING, BEFORE OR WITHIN A 
REASONABLE TIME AFTER COMMENCING 
THE REPRESENTATION. 
(c) A FEE MAY BE CONTINGENT ON THE 
OUTCOME OF THE MATTER FOR WHICH 
THE SERVICE IS RENDERED, EXCEPT IN A 
MATTER IN WHICH A CONTINGENT FEE IS 
PROHIBITED BY PARAGRAPH (d) OR OTHER 
LAW. A CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT 
SHALL BE IN WRITING AND SHALL STATE 
THE METHOD BY WHICH THE FEE IS TO BE 
DETERMINED, INCLUDING THE PERCEN-
TAGE OR PERCENTAGES THAT SHALL 
ACCRUE TO THE LAWYER IN THE EVENT OF 
SETTLEMENT, TRIAL OR APPEAL, LITIGA-
TION AND OTHER EXPENSES TO BE DEDU-
CTED FROM THE RECOVERY, AND 
WHETHER SUCH EXPENSES ARE TO BE 
DEDUCTED BEFORE OR AFTER THE CONTI-
NGENT FEE IS CALCULATED. UPON CONC-
LUSION OF A CONTINGENT FEE MATTER, 
THE LAWYER SHALL PROVIDE THE CLIENT 
WITH A WRITTEN STATEMENT STATING 
THE OUTCOME OF THE MATTER AND, IF 
THERE IS A RECOVERY, SHOWING THE 
REMITTANCE TO THE CLIENT AND THE 
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METHOD OF ITS DETERMINATION. 
(d) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENTER INTO 
AN ARRANGEMENT FOR, CHARGE, OR 
COLLECT: 
(1) ANY FEE IN A DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
MATTER, THE PAYMENT OR AMOUNT OF 
WHICH IS CONTINGENT UPON THE SECU-
RING OF A DIVORCE OR UPON THE 
AMOUNT OF ALIMONY OR SUPPORT, OR 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IN LIEU THEREOF; 
OR 
(2) A CONTINGENT FEE FOR REPRESEN-
TING A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE. 
(e) A DIVISION OF FEE BETWEEN LAWYERS 
WHO ARE NOT IN THE SAME FIRM MAY BE 
MADE ONLY IF: 
(1) THE DIVISION IS IN PROPORTION TO 
THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY EACH 
LAWYER OR, BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
WITH THE C L I E N T , EACH LAWYER 
ASSUMES JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
REPRESENTATION; 
(2) THE CLIENT IS ADVISED OF AND 
DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PARTICIPATION 
OF ALL LAWYERS INVOLVED; AND 
(3) THE TOTAL FEE IS REASONABLE. 
COMMENT: 
Basis or Rate of Fee 
When the lawyer has regularly represented a 
client, they ordinarily will have evolved an underst-
anding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a 
new client-lawyer relationship, however, an unde-
rstanding as to the fee should be promptly establi-
shed. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that 
underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are 
directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, 
for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly 
charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, 
or to identify the factors that may be taken into 
account in finally fixing the fee. When developments 
occur during the representation that render an 
earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised 
estimate should be provided to the client. A written 
statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility 
of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a 
simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's 
customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or 
rate of the fee is set forth. 
Terms of Payment 
A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, 
but is obligated to return any unearned portion. See 
Rule 1.14(d). A lawyer may accept property in 
payment for services, such as an ownership interest 
in an enterprise, providing this does not involve 
acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of 
action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to 
Rule 1.80). However, a fee paid in property instead 
of money may be subject to special scrutiny because 
it involves questions concerning both the value of 
the services and the lawyer's special knowledge of 
the value of the property. 
An agreement may not be made whose terms 
might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail serv-
ices for the client or perform them in any way con-
trary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer 
should not enter into an agreement whereby services 
are to be provided only up to a stated amount when 
it is foreseeable that more extensive services prob-
ably will be required, unless the situation is adequ-
ately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client 
might have to bargain for further assistance in the 
midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is 
proper to define the extent of services in light of the 
client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a 
fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges 
by using wasteful procedures. When there is doubt 
whether a contingent fee is consistent with the 
client's best interest, the lawyer should offer the 
client alternative bases for the fee and explain their 
implications. Applicable law may impose limitations 
on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percen-
tage. 
Division of Fee 
A division of fee is a single billing to a client 
covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not 
in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates asso-
ciation of more than one lawyer in a matter in 
which neither alone could serve the client as well, 
and most often is used when the fee is contingent 
and the division is between a referring lawyer and a 
trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to 
divide a fee on either the basis of the proportion of 
services they render or by agreement between the 
participating lawyers if all assume responsibility for 
the representation as a whole and the client is 
advised and does not object. It does not require 
disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer 
is to receive. Joint responsibility for the represent-
ation entails the obligations stated in Rule 5A for 
purposes of the matter involved. 
Disputes over Fees 
If a procedure has been established for resolution 
of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation 
procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should 
conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may 
prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's 
fee, for example, in representation of an executor or 
administrator, a class or a person entitled to a rea-
sonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The 
lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer represen-
ting another party concerned with the fee should 
comply with the prescribed procedure. 
CODE COMPARISON 
The factors of a reasonable fee in Rule 1.5(a) are 
substantially identical to those listed in DR 2-
106(B). EC 2-17 states that a lawyer "should not 
charge more than a reasonable fee ...." 
There was no counterpart to paragraph (b) in the 
Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-19 stated 
that it is "usually beneficial to reduce to writing the 
understanding of the parties regarding the fee, par-
ticularly when it is contingent." 
There was also no counterpart to paragraph (c) in 
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-20 pro-
vided that "(cjontingent fee arrangements in civil 
cases have long been commonly accepted ,in the 
United States/ but that "a lawyer generally should 
decline to accept employment on a contingent fee 
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed 
f e e . . . / 
With regard to paragraph (d), DR 2-106(C) 
prohibited "a contingent fee in a criminal case." EC 
2-20 provided that "contingent fee arrangements in 
domestic relation cases are rarely justified." 
With regard to paragraph (e), DR 2-107(A) 
permitted division of fees only if: "(1) The client 
consents to employment of the other lawyer after a 
full disclosure that a division of fees will be made. 
(2) The division is in proportion to the services 
performed and responsibility assumed by each. (3) 
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The total fee does not exceed clearly reasonable 
compensation ...." Paragraph (e) permits division 
without regard to the services rendered by each 
lawyer if they assume joint responsibility for the 
representation. 
RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
INFORMATION 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL INFO-
RMATION RELATING TO REPRESENTATION 
OF A CLIENT EXCEPT AS STATED IN PARA-
GRAPH (b), UNLESS THE CLIENT CONSENTS 
AFTER DISCLOSURE. 
(b) A LAWYER MAY REVEAL SUCH INFO-
RMATION TO THE EXTENT THE LAWYER 
BELIEVES NECESSARY: 
(1) TO PREVENT THE CLIENT FROM 
COMMITTING A CRIMINAL OR FRAUDU-
LENT ACT THAT THE LAWYER BELIEVES IS 
LIKELY TO RESULT IN DEATH OR SUBSTA-
NTIAL BODILY HARM, OR SUBSTANTIAL 
INJURY TO THE FINANCIAL INTEREST OR 
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER; 
(2) TO RECTIFY THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
A CLIENTS CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT 
ACT IN THE COMMISSION OF WHICH THE 
LAWYER'S SERVICES HAD BEEN USED; 
(3) TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM OR DEFENSE 
ON BEHALF OF THE LAWYER IN A CONTR-
OVERSY BETWEEN THE LAWYER AND THE 
CLIENT, OR TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE TO A 
CRIMINAL CHARGE OR CIVIL CLAIM 
AGAINST THE LAWYER BASED UPON 
CONDUCT IN WHICH THE CLIENT WAS 
INVOLVED; OR 
(4) TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW. 
COMMENT: 
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer 
relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidenti-
ality of information relating to the representation. 
The client is thereby encouraged to communicate 
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to emba-
rrassing or legally damaging subject matter. 
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in 
two related bodies of law, the attorney-client pri-
vilege in the law of evidence and the rule of confi-
dentiality established in professional ethics. The 
attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and 
other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called 
as a witness or otherwise required to produce evid-
ence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer 
confidentiality applies in situations other than those 
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through 
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies 
not merely to matters communicated in confidence 
by the client 'but also to all information relating to 
the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer 
may not disclose such information except as autho-
rized or required by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. 
Authorized Disclosure 
A lawyer may disclose information about a client 
when necessary in the proper representation of the 
client. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may dis-
close information by admitting a fact that cannot 
properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a 
disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. 
Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the 
firm's practice, disclose to each other information 
relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has 
instructed that particular information be confined to 
specified lawyers. 
Disclosure Adverse to Client 
The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exc-
eptions. In becoming privy to information about a 
client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends 
serious and perhaps irreparable harm to another 
person. To the extent a lawyer is prohibited from 
making disclosure, the interests of the potential 
victim! arc sacrificed in favor of preserving the 
client s confidences even though the client's 
purpose is wrongful. To the extent a lawyer is req-
uired or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, 
the client may be inhibited from revealing facts 
which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a 
wrongful course of action. A. rule governing disclo-
sure of threatened harm thus involves balancing the 
interests of one group of potential victims against 
those of another. On the assumption that lawyers 
generally fulfill their duty to advise against the 
commission of deliberately wrongful acts, the public 
is better protected if full disclosure by the client is 
encouraged than if it is inhibited. 
Generally speaking, information relating to the 
representation must be kept confidential, as stated 
in paragraph (a). However, where the client is or 
has been engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct 
or the integrity o? the lawyers own conduct is inv-
olved, the principle of confidentiality may have to 
yield, depending on the lawyer's knowledge about 
and relationship to the conduct in question, and the 
seriouiness of that conduct. Several situations must 
be distinguished. 
Fim, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a client 
in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 
1.2(d) As noted in the Comment to that Rule, there 
can be situations where the lawyer may have to 
reveal information relating to the representation in 
order to avoid assisting a client's criminal or frau-
dulent conduct. Paragraph 1.6(b)(4) permits doing 
so. Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 
3.3(a)(4) not to use false or fabricated evidence. 
This duty is essentially a special instance of the duty 
prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client 
in criminal or fraudulent conduct. Rule 1.6(b)(4) 
permits revealing information to the extent necessary 
to comply with Rule 3.3(a). The same is true of 
compliance with Rule 4.1 concerning truthfulness of 
a lawyer's own representations. 
Second, the lawyer may have been innocently 
involved in nast conduct by the client that was cri-
minal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer 
has not violated Rule 1.2(d), because to "counsel or 
assist* criminal or fraudulent conduct requires 
knowing that the conduct is of that character. Even 
if the involvement was innocent, however, the fact 
remains that the lawyer's professional services were 
made me instrument of the client's crime or fraud. 
The lawyer, therefore, has a legitimate interest in 
being able to rectify the consequences of such 
conduct, and has the professional right although not 
a professional duty to rectify the situation. Exerci-
sing that right may require revealing information 
relatink to the representation. Paragraph (b)(2) gives 
the lawyer professional discretion to reveal such 
information to the extent necessary to accomplish 
rectification. 
Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends 
prospective conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. 
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Inaction by the lawyer is not a violation of Rule 
1.2(d), except in the limited circumstances where 
failure to act constitutes assisting the client. See 
Comment to Rule 1.2(d). However, the lawyers 
knowledge of the client's purpose may enable the 
lawyer to prevent commission of the prospective 
crime or fraud. If the prospective crime or fraud is 
likely to result in substantial injury, the lawyer may 
feel a moral obligation to take preventive action. 
When the threatened injury is grave, such as homi-
cide or serious bodily injury, the lawyer may have 
an obligation under tort or criminal law to take 
reasonable preventive measures. Whether the 
lawyer's concern is based on moral or legal consi-
derations, the interest in preventing the harm may 
be more compelling than the interest in preserving 
confidentiality of information relating to the client. 
As stated in paragraph (b)(1), the lawyer has prof-
essional discretion to reveal information in order to 
prevent substantial harm likely to result from a 
client's criminal or fraudulent act. 
It is arguable that the lawyer should have a pro-
fessional obligation to make a disclosure in order to 
prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which the 
lawyer knows is intended by a client. However, it is 
very difficult for a lawyer to "know" when such a 
heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the 
client may have a change of mind. To require disc-
losure when the client intends such an act, at risk of 
disciplinary liability if the assessment of the client's 
purpose turns out to be wrong, would be to impose 
a penal risk that might interfere with the lawyer's 
resolution of an inherently difficult moral dilemma. 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires con-
sideration of such factors as the magnitude, proxi-
mity and likelihood of the contemplated wrong, the 
nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client 
and with those who might be injured by the client, 
the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and 
factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. 
In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's int-
erest should be no greater that the lawyer believes 
necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to 
take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1) 
does not violate this Rule. 
The term "another" in paragraph (b)(1) includes a 
person, organization and government. 
Paragraph (b)(2) does not apply where a lawyer is 
employed after a crime of fraud has been committed 
to represent the client in matters ensuing therefrom. 
Dispute Concerning Lawyer's Conduct 
If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which 
the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of conf-
identiality should not prevent the lawyer from def-
ending himself. Such a charge can arise in a civil, 
criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and 
can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the 
lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a 
third person; for example, a person claiming to have 
been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting tog-
ether. A lawyer entitled to a fee is not prevented by 
the rule of confidentiality from proving the services 
rendered in an action to collect it. 
Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized 
The attorney-client privilege is differently 
defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called 
as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, 
absent waiver by the client, Rule 1.6(a) requires the 
lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct in various 
circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose 
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information relating to the representation. See Rules 
1.13, 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these 
provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted 
by other provisions of law to give information about 
a client. Whether another provision of law supers-
edes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond 
the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should 
exist against such a supersession. 
Use of Information 
A lawyer may not make use of information rela-
ting to the representation in a manner disadvantag-
eous to the client. The duty of confidentiality cont-
inues after the client-lawyer relationship has ter-
minated. See Rule 1.9. 
RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: 
GENERAL RULE 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A 
CLIENT IF THE REPRESENTATION OF THAT 
CLIENT WILL BE DIRECTLY ADVERSE TO 
ANOTHER CLIENT, UNLESS: 
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
EVES THE REPRESENTATION WILL NOT 
ADVERSELY AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE OTHER CLIENT; AND 
(2) EACH CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER 
CONSULTATION. 
(b) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A 
CLIENT IF THE REPRESENTATION OF THAT 
CLIENT MAY BE MATERIALLY LIMITED BY 
THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO 
ANOTHER CLIENT OR TO A THIRD PERSON, 
OR BY THE LAWYER'S OWN INTERESTS, 
UNLESS: 
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
EVES THE REPRESENTATION WILL NOT BE 
ADVERSELY AFFECTED; AND 
(2) EACH CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER 
CONSULTATION. WHEN REPRESENTATION 
OF MULTIPLE CLIENTS IN A SINGLE 
MATTER IS UNDERTAKEN, THE CONSULT-
ATION SHALL INCLUDE EXPLANATION TO 
EACH CLIENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE COMMON REPRESENTATION AND THE 
ADVANTAGES AND RISKS INVOLVED. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT SIMULTANEO-
USLY REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF 
ADVERSE PARTIES IN SEPARATE MATTERS, 
UNLESS: 
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
EVES THE REPRESENTATION OF EACH WILL 
NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED; AND 
(2) EACH CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER 
CONSULTATION. 
COMMENT: 
Loyalty to a Client 
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's 
relationship to a client. An impermissible conflict of 
interest may exist before representation is undert-
aken, in which event the representation should be 
declined. If such a conflict arises after representa-
tion has been undertaken, the lawyer should with-
draw from the representation. See Rule 1.14. Where 
more than one client is involved and the lawyer 
withdraws because a conflict arises after represent-
ation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent 
any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See 
also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer 
relationship exists or, having once been established, 
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is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope. 
As a general proposition, loyalty to a client pro-
hibits undertaking representation directly adverse to 
that client without the client's consent. Paragraph 
(1) expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordi-
narily may not act as advocate against a person the 
lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is 
wholly tmrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous 
representation in unrelated matters of clients whose 
interests are only generally adverse, such as compe-
ting economic enterprises, does not require consent 
of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies only 
when the representation of one client would be dir-
ectly adverse to the other. 
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer 
cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appr-
opriate course of action for the client because of the 
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The 
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would 
otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) 
addresses such situations. A possible conflict does 
not itself preclude the representation. The critical 
questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eve-
ntuate and, if it does, whether it will materially 
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional 
judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose 
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued 
on behalf of the client. Consideration should be 
given to whether the client wishes to accommodate 
the other interest involved. 
Consultation and Consent 
A client may consent to representation notwiths-
tanding a conflict. However, as indicated in parag-
raph (a)(1) with respect to representation directly 
adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(1) with 
respect to material, limitations on representation of a 
client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude 
that the client should not agree to the representation 
under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot 
properly ask for such agreement or provide repres-
entation on the basis of the client's consent. When 
more than one client is involved, the question of 
conflict must be resolved as to each client. More-
over, there may be circumstances where it is impo-
ssible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain 
consent. For example, when the lawyer represents 
different clients in related matters and one of the 
clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary 
to permit the other client to make an informed 
. decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to 
consent. 
Lawyer's Interests 
The lawyer's own interests should not be permi-
tted to have adverse effect on representation of a 
client. For example, a lawyer's need for income 
should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that 
cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable 
fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a 
lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious 
question, it may be difficult or impossible for the 
lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer 
may not allow related business interests to affect 
representation, for example, by referring clients to 
an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed 
interest. 
Conflicts in Litigation 
Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of oppo-
sing parties in litigation. Simultaneous representa-
tion of parties whose interests in litigation may 
conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is 
governed by paragraph (b). An impermissible conf-
lict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in 
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions 
in relation to an opposing party or the fact that 
the™ are substantially different possibilities of sett-
lement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such 
conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. 
The potential for conflict of interest in representing s 
multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave 
that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent 
mori than one codefendant. On the other hand, 
common representation of persons having similar 
interests is proper if the risk of adverse affect is 
minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are 
met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation 
between clients. 
Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate 
against a client the lawyer represents in some other 
matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. 
However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer 
may act as an advocate against a client. For may aci as an auvucaic against a ciicni. rur 
example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with 
diverse operations may accept employment as an 
advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated 
matter if doing so will not adversely affect the 
lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct 
of the suit and if both clients consent upon consul-
tation. By the same token, government lawyers in 
some circumstances may represent government 
employees in proceedings in which a government 
agency is the opposing party. The propriety of 
concurrent representation can depend on the nature 
of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud 
entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for 
a declaratory judgment concerning statutory inter-
pretation. 
A lawyer may represent parties having antagoni-
stic positions on a legal question that has arisen in 
different cases, unless representation of either client 
would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily 
not improper to assert such positions in cases 
penaing in different trial courts, but it may be 
improper to do so in cases pending at the same time 
in an appellate court. 
Interest of Person Paying for Lawyer's Service 
lawyer may be paid from a source other than 
client if the client is informed of that fact and 
consents and the arrangement does not compromise 
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. Sec Rule 
For example, when an insurer and its insured 
conflicting interests in a matter arising from a 
liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is 
required to provide separate counsel for the insured, 
arrangement should assure the separate 
counsel's professional independence. So also, when 
corporation and its directors or employees are 
involved in a controversy in which they have confl-
interests, the corporation may provide funds 
separate legal representation of the directors or 
pjoyees, if the clients consent after consultation 
the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professi-
independence. 
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Other Conflict Situations 
Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litiga-
sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant 
factirs in determining whether there is potential for 
adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of 
fawyer's relationship with the client or clients 
the functions being performed by the 
r, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise 
the likely prejudice to the client from the con-
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flict if it does arise. The question is often one of 
proximity and degree. 
For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple 
parties to a negotiation whose interests are funda-
mentally antagonistic to each other but common 
representation is permissible where the clients are 
generally aligned in interest even though there is 
some difference of interest among them. 
Conflict questions may also arise in estate plan-
ning and estate administration. A lawyer may be 
called upon to prepare wills for several family 
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending 
upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may 
arise. In estate administration the identity of the 
client may be unclear under the law of a particular 
jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fidu-
ciary; under another view the client is the estate or 
trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should 
make clear the relationship to the parties involved. 
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization 
who is also a member of its board of directors 
should determine whether the responsibilities of the 
two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on 
to advise the corporation in matters involving 
actions of the directors. Consideration should be 
given to the frequency with which such situations 
may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the 
effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board 
and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining 
legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. 
If there is material risk that the dual role will com-
promise the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. 
Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party 
Resolving questions of conflict of interest is pri-
marily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking 
the representation. In litigation, a court may raise 
the question when there is reason to infer that the 
lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal 
case, inquiry by the court is generally required when 
a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the 
conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair 
or efficient administration of justice, opposing 
counsel may properly raise the question. Such an 
objection should be viewed with caution, however, 
for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. 
See Scope. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 5-101 (A) provided that "[e]xcept with the 
consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer 
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his 
professional judgment in behalf of the client will be 
or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, 
business, property, or personal interests." DR 5-
105(A) provided that a lawyer "shall decline prefe-
rred employment if the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or 
is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance 
of the proferred employment, or if it would be 
likely to involve him in representing differing inter-
ests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
105(C)/ DR 5-105(C) provided that "a lawyer may 
represent multiple clients if it was obvious that he 
can adequately represent the interest of each and if 
each consents to the representation after full discl-
osure of the possible effect of such representation 
on the exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each/ DR 5-107(B) prov-
ided that a lawyer "shall not permit a person who 
recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal 
services for another to direct or regulate his profe-
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ssional judgment in rendering such services. 
Ruie 1.7 clarifies DR 5-105(A) b> requiring that, 
when the lawyer's other interests are involved, not 
only must the client consent after consultation but 
also that, independent of such consent, the repres-
entation reasonably appears not to be adversely 
affected by the lawyer's other interests. This requi-
rement appears to be the intended meaning of the 
provision in DR 5-105(C) that "it was obvious that 
he can adequately represent" the client, and was 
implicit in EC 5-2, which stated that a lawyer 
"should not accept proferred employment if his 
personal interests or desires will, or there is a reas-
onable probability that they will, affect adversely 
the advice to be given or services to be rendered the 
prospective client." 
RULE 1-8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: 
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENTER INTO A 
BUSINESS TRANSACTION WITH A CLIENT 
OR KNOWINGLY ACQUIRE AN OWNERSHIP, 
POSSESSORY, SECURITY OR OTHER PECUN-
IARY INTEREST ADVERSE TO A CLIENT 
UNLESS: 
(1) THE TRANSACTION AND TERMS ON 
WHICH THE LAWYER ACQUIRES THE INTE-
REST ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE TO THE 
CLIENT AND ARE FULLY DISCLOSED AND 
TRANSMITTED IN WRITING TO THE CLIENT 
IN A MANNER WHICH CAN BE REASONABLY 
UNDERSTOOD BY THE CLIENT; AND 
(2) THE CLIENT IS GIVEN A REASON-
ABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK THE ADVICE 
OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN THE TRAN-
SACTION; AND 
(3) THE CLIENT CONSENTS IN WRITING 
THERETO. 
(b) A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE INFORM-
ATION RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF 
A CLIENT TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE 
CLIENT UNLESS THE CLIENT CONSENTS 
AFTER CONSULTATION. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PREPARE AN 
INSTRUMENT GIVING THE LAWYER OR A 
PERSON RELATED TO THE LAWYER AS 
PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING, OR SPOUSE ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL GIFT FROM A CLIENT, INCL-
UDING A TESTAMENTARY GIFT, EXCEPT . 
WHERE THE CLIENT IS RELATED TO THE 
DONEE. 
(d) PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF REPR-
ESENTATION OF A CLIENT, A LAWYER 
SHALL NOT MAKE OR NEGOTIATE AN 
AGREEMENT GIVING THE LAWYER LITE-
RARY OR MEDIA RIGHTS TO A PORTRAYAL 
OR ACCOUNT BASED IN SUBSTANTIAL PART 
ON INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REP-
RESENTATION. 
(e) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PROVIDE FIN-
ANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO A CLIENT IN CON-
NECTION WITH PENDING OR CONTEMPL-
ATED LITIGATION, EXCEPT THAT: 
(1) A LAWYER MAY ADVANCE COURT 
COSTS AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION THE 
REPAYMENT OF WHICH MAY BE CONTIN-
GENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MATTER; 
AND 
(2) A LAWYER REPRESENTING AN INDI-
GENT CLIENT MAY PAY COURT COSTS AND 
REPORTS 
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EXPENSES OF LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF 
THE CLIENT. 
(0 A LAWYER SHALL NOT ACCEPT COM-
PENSATION FOR REPRESENTING A CLIENT 
FROM ONE OTHER THAN THE CLIENT 
UNLESS: 
(i) THE CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CON-
SULTATION; 
(2) THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE WITH 
THE LAWYER'S INDEPENDENCE OF PROF-
ESSIONAL JUDGMENT OR WITH THE CLIENT-
LAWYER RELATIONSHIP; AND 
(3) INFORMATION RELATING TO REPR-
ESENTATION OF A CLIENT IS PROTECTED 
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 1.6. 
(g) A LAWYER WHO REPRESENTS TWO OR 
MORE CLIENTS SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE IN 
MAKING AN AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT OF 
THE CLAIMS OF OR AGAINST THE CLIENTS, 
OR IN A CRIMINAL CASE AN AGGREGATED 
AGREEMENT AS TO GUILTY OR NOLO CON-
TENDERE PLEAS, UNLESS EACH CLIENT 
CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION, INCLU-
DING DISCLOSURE OF THE EXISTENCE AND 
NATURE OF ALL THE CLAIMS OR PLEAS 
INVOLVED AND OF THE PARTICIPATION OF 
EACH PERSON IN THE SETTLEMENT. 
(h) A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE AN 
AGREEMENT PROSPECTIVELY LIMITING 
THE LAWYER'S LIABILITY TO A CLIENT 
FOR MALPRACTICE UNLESS PERMITTED BY 
LAW AND THE CLIENT IS INDEPENDENTLY 
REPRESENTED IN MAKING THE AGREE-
MENT, OR SETTLE A CLAIM FOR SUCH LIA-
BILITY WITH AN UNREPRESENTED CLIENT 
OR FORMER CLIENT WITHOUT FIRST ADVI-
SING THAT PERSON IN WRITING THAT 
INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION IS APPR-
OPRIATE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
(i) A LAWYER RELATED TO ANOTHER 
LAWYER AS PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING OR 
SPOUSE SHALL NOT REPRESENT A CLIENT 
IN A REPRESENTATION DIRECTLY ADVERSE 
TO A PERSON WHO THE LAWYER KNOWS IS 
REPRESENTED BY THE OTHER LAWYER 
EXCEPT UPON CONSENT BY THE CLIENT 
AFTER CONSULTATION REGARDING THE 
RELATIONSHIP. 
0) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ACQUIRE A 
PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION OR SUBJECT MATTER OF LITIGA-
TION THE LAWYER IS CONDUCTING FOR A 
CLIENT. EXCEPT THAT THE LAWYER MAY: 
(1) ACQUIRE A LIEN GRANTED BY LAW 
TO SECURE THE LAWYER'S FEE OR EXPE-
NSES; AND 
(2) CONTRACT WITH A CLIENT FOR A 
REASONABLE CONTINGENT FEE IN A CIVIL 
CASE. 
COMMENT: 
Transactions Between Client and Lawyer 
As a general principle, all transactions between 
client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to 
the client. In such transactions a review by indepe-
ndent counsel on behalf of the client is often advi-
sable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit info-
rmation relating to the representation to the client's 
disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has 
learned that the client is investing in specific real 
estate may not, without the client's consent, seek to 
acquire nearby property where doing so would 
adversely affect the client's plan for investment. 
Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard 
commercial transactions between the lawyer and the 
client for products or services that the client gener-
ally markets to others, for example, banking or 
brokerage services, medical services, products man-
ufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities 
serv ces. In such transactions, the lawyer has no 
advantage in dealing with the client, and the restri-
ctions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impra-
cticable. 
A J lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the 
transaction meets general standards of fairness. For 
example, a simple gift such as a present given at a 
holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. 
If effectuation of a substantial gift requires prepa-
ring a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, 
howkver, the client should have the detached advice 
that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) 
recognizes an exception where the client is a relative 
of the donee or the gift is not substantial. 
Literary Rights 
An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary 
or media rights concerning the conduct of the repr-
esentation creates a conflict between the interests of 
the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. 
Measures suitable in the representation of the client 
may detract from the publication value of an 
account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does 
not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a tra-
nsaction concerning literary property from agreeing 
that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in 
ownership in the property, if the arrangement con-
forms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j). 
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services 
Rule 1.8(0 requires disclosure of the fact that the 
lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party. 
Such an arrangement must also conform to the 
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality 
and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where 
the client is a class, consent may be obtained on 
behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure. 
Family Relationships Between Lawyers 
Rule 1 .SCO applies to related lawyers who are in 
different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are 
governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disquali-
fication stated in Rule 1.8(i) is personal and is not 
imputed to members of firms with whom the 
lawyers are associated. 
Acquisition of Interest in Litigation 
Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule 
that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a prop-
rietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which 
has its basis in common law champerty and maint-
enance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in 
decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as 
the exception for reasonable contingent fees set 
fortn in Rule 1.5 and the exception for certain 
advances of the costs of litigation set forth in par-
agraph (e). 
This Rule is not intended to apply to customary 
qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and 
memoranda. 
CO^>E COMPARISON 
with regard to Paragraph (a), DR 5-104(A) 
provided that a lawyer "shall not enter into a busi-
ness transaction with a client if they have differing 
interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer 
to exercise his professional judgment therein for the 
Code • Co 
Pro%o. Luh UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 23 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
protection of the client, unless the client has conse-
nted after full disclosure." EC 5-3 stated that a 
lawyer "should not seek to persuade his client to 
permit him to invest in an undertaking of his client 
nor make improper use of his professional relatio-
nship to influence his client to invest in an enterprise 
in which the lawyer is interested." 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 4-101(B)(3) 
provided that a lawyer should not use "a confidence 
or secret of his client for the advantage of himself, 
or of a third person, unless the client consents after 
full disclosure.? 
There was no counterpart to paragraph (c) in the 
Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 5-5 stated that 
a lawyer "should not suggest to his client that a gift 
be made to himself or for his benefit. If a lawyer 
accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susc-
eptible to the charge that he unduly influenced or 
overreached the client. If a client voluntarily offers 
to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept 
the gift, but before doing so, he should urge that 
the client secure disinterested advice from an inde-
pendent, competent person who is cognizant of all 
the circumstances. Other than in exceptional circu-
mstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument 
in which his client desires to name him beneficially 
be prepared by another lawyer selected by the 
client." 
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar to DR 5-
104(B), but refers, to "literary or media" rights, a 
more generally inclusive term than "publication" 
rights. 
Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5-103(B), but 
eliminates the requirement that "the client remains 
ultimately liable for such expenses." 
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in the Code. 
Paragraph (f) is substantially identical to DR 5-
107(A)(1). 
Paragraph (g) is substantially identical to DR 5-
106. 
The first clause of paragraph (h) is similar to DR 
6-102(A). There was no .counterpart in the Code to 
the second clause of paragraph (h). 
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in the Code. 
Paragraph (j) is substantially identical to DR 5-
103(A). 
RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: 
FORMER CLIENT 
A LAWYER WHO HAS FORMERLY REPRE-
SENTED A CLIENT IN A MATTER SHALL NOT 
THEREAFTER: 
(a) REPRESENT ANOTHER PERSON IN THE 
SAME OR A SUBSTANTIALLY FACTUALLY 
RELATED MATTER IN WHICH THAT 
PERSON'S INTERESTS ARE MATERIALLY 
ADVERSE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE 
FORMER CLIENT UNLESS THE FORMER 
CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION; 
OR 
(b) USE INFORMATION RELATING TO THE 
REPRESENTATION TO THE DISADVANTAGE 
OF THE FORMER CLIENT EXCEPT AS RULE 
1.6 WOULD PERMIT WITH RESPECT TO A 
CLIENT OR WHEN THE INFORMATION HAS 
BECOME GENERALLY KNOWN. 
COMMENT: 
After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, 
a lawyer may not represent another client except in 
conformity with this Rule. The principles in Rule 
1.7 determine whether the interests of the present 
and former client are adverse. Thus, a lawyer could 
not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new 
client a contract drafted on behalf of the former 
client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an 
accused person could not properly represent the 
accused in a subsequent civil action against the 
government concerning the same transaction. 
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule 
1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a particular situ-
ation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a 
matter can also be a question of degree. When a 
lawyer has been directly involved in a specific tran-
saction, subsequent representation of other clients 
with materially adverse interests clearly is prohib-
ited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently 
handled a type of problem for a former client is not 
precluded from later representing another client in a 
wholly distinct problem of that type even though the 
subsequent representation involves a position 
adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations 
can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers 
between defense and prosecution functions within 
the same military jurisdiction. The underlying que-
stion is whether the lawyer was so involved in the 
matter that the subsequent representation can be 
justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter 
in question. 
Information acquired by the lawyer in the course 
of representing a client may not subsequently be 
used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. 
However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a 
client doe§ not preclude the lawyer from using gen-
erally known information about the client when 
later representing another client. 
Disqualification from subsequent representation is 
for the protection of clients and can be waived by 
them. A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure 
of the circumstances, including the lawyer's inte-
nded role in behalf of the new client. 
With regard to an opposing party's raising a 
question of conflict of interest, see Comment to 
Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm 
with which a lawyer is associated, see Rule 1.10. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to paragraphs (a) and 
(b) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. The 
problem addressed in paragraph (a) was sometimes 
dealt with under the rubric of Canon 9 of the Code, 
which provided: "A lawyer should avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety." EC 4-6 stated that the 
"obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences 
and secrets of his client continues after the termin-
ation of his employment." 
The provision in paragraph (a) for waiver by the 
former client is similar to DR 5-105(C). 
The exception in the last sentence of paragraph 
(b) permits a lawyer to use information relating to a 
former client that is in the "public domain," a use 
that was also not prohibited by the Code, which 
protected only "confidences and secrets." Since the 
scope of paragraph (a) is much broader than 
"confidences and secrets," it is necessary under the 
Rules to define when a lawyer may make use of 
information about a client after the client-lawyer 
relationship has terminated. 
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RULE 1.10 IMPUTED 
DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL 
RULE 
(a) WHILE LAWYERS ARE ASSOCIATED IN 
A FIRM, NONE OF THEM SHALL KNOWI-
NGLY REPRESENT A CLIENT WHEN ANY 
ONE OF THEM PRACTICING ALONE WOULD 
BE PROHIBITED FROM DOING SO BY RULES 
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 OR 2.2. 
(b) WHEN A LAWYER BECOMES ASSOCI-
ATED WITH A FIRM, THE FIRM MAY NOT 
KNOWINGLY REPRESENT A PERSON IN THE 
SAME OR A SUBSTANTIALLY FACTUALLY 
RELATED MATTER IN WHICH THAT 
LAWYER, OR A FIRM WITH WHICH THE 
LAWYER WAS ASSOCIATED, HAD PREVIO-
USLY REPRESENTED A CLIENT WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE MATERIALLY ADVERSE TO 
THAT PERSON AND ABOUT WHOM THE 
LAWYER HAD ACQUIRED INFORMATION 
PROTECTED BY RULES 1.6 AND 1.9(b) THAT 
IS MATERIAL TO THE MATTER. 
(c) WHEN A LAWYER HAS TERMINATED 
AN ASSOCIATION WITH A FIRM, THE FIRM 
IS NOT PROHIBITED FROM THEREAFTER 
REPRESENTING A PERSON WITH INTERESTS 
MATERIALLY ADVERSE TO THOSE OF A 
CLIENT REPRESENTED BY THE FORMERLY 
ASSOCIATED LAWYER UNLESS: 
(1) THE MATTER IS THE SAME OR SUBS-
TANTIALLY RELATED TO THAT IN WHICH 
THE FORMERLY ASSOCIATED LAWYER 
REPRESENTED THE CLIENT; AND 
(2) ANY LAWYER REMAINING IN THE 
FIRM HAS INFORMATION PROTECTED BY 
RULES 1.6 AND 1.9(b) THAT IS MATERIAL TO 
THE MATTER. 
(d) A DISQUALIFICATION PRESCRIBED BY 
THIS RULE MAY BE WAIVED BY THE AFFE-
CTED CLIENT UNDER THE CONDITIONS 
STATED IN RULE 1.7. 
COMMENT: 
Definition of "Firm" 
For purposes of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the term "firm* includes lawyers in a 
private firm, and lawyers employed in the legal 
department of a corporation or other organization, 
or in a legal services organization. Whether two or 
more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition 
can depend on the specific facts. For example, two 
practitioners who share office space and occasion-
ally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not 
be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they 
present themselves to the public in a way suggesting 
that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, 
they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of 
the Rules. The terms of any formal' agreement 
between associated lawyers are relevant in determi-
ning whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they 
have mutual access to confidential information 
concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is 
relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying 
purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of 
lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of 
the rule that the same lawyer should not represent 
opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be 
so regarded for purposes of the rule that informa-
tion acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. 
With respect to the law department of an organ-
isation there is ordinarily no question that the 
members of the department constitute a firm within 
the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity 
of the client. For example, it may not be clear 
whether the law department of a corporation repr-
esents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as 
well as the corporation by which the members of the 
department are directly employed. A similar ques-
tion can arise concerning an unincorporated associ-
ation and its local affiliates. 
Similar questions can also arise with respect to 
lawyeri in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same 
unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, 
but not necessarily those employed in separate units. 
As in the case of independent practitioners, whether 
the lawyers should be treated as associated with each 
other can depend on the particular rule that is inv-
olved, and on the specific facts of the situation. 
Where the lawyer has joined a private firm after 
having represented the government, the situation is 
governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b); where a lawyer 
represents the government after having served 
private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 
1.11(c)(1). The individual lawyer involved is bound 
by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7, and 
1.9. 
Different provisions are thus made for movement 
of a lawyer from one private firm to another and 
for movement of a lawyer between a private firm 
and the government. The government is entitled to 
protection of its client confidences, and therefore to 
the protections provided in Rules 1.6, 1.9, and 1.11. 
However, if the more extensive disqualification in 
Rule 
lawyers, the potential effect on the government 
would 
with all private citizens and organizations, and thus 
has a 
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1.10 were applied to former government 
be unduly burdensome. The government deals 
much wider circle of adverse legal interests 
than does any private law firm. In these circumsta-
nces, the government's recruitment of lawyers 
would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10 were 
applied to the government. On balance, therefore, 
the government is better served in the long run by 
the protections stated in Rule 1.11. 
Principles of Imputed Disqualification 
rule of imputed disqualification stated in 
grjaph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty 
client as it applies to lawyers who practice in 
firm. Such situations can be considered from 
premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one 
for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to 
client, or from the premises that each lawyer is 
cariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed 
lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. 
Paragraph (a) operates only among lawyers curre-
associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves 
one firm to another, the situation is governed 
paragraphs (b) and (c). 
ntly 
from 
by 
Lawyers Moving Between Firms 
When lawyers have been associated in a firm but 
then end their association, however, the problem is 
more complicated. The fiction that the law firm is 
the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly rea-
listic. There are several competing considerations. 
First, the client previously represented must be rea-
sonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the 
client lis not compromised. Second, the rule of dis-
qualification should not be as broadly cast as to 
preclude other persons from having reasonable 
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choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule of disquali-
fication should not unreasonably hamper lawyers 
from forming new associations and taking on new 
clients after having left a previous association. In 
this connection, it should be recognized that today 
many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some 
degree limit their practice to one field or another, 
and that many move from one association to 
another several times in their careers. If the concept 
of imputed disqualification were defined with unq-
ualified rigor, the result would be radical curtail-
ment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from 
one practice setting to another and of the opportu-
nity of clients to change counsel.' 
Reconciliation of these competing principles in the 
past has been attempted under two rubrics. One 
approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualif-
ication. For example, it has been held that a partner 
in a law firm is conclusively presumed to have 
access to all confidences concerning all clients of the 
firm. Under this analysis, if a lawyer has been a 
partner in one law firm and then becomes a partner 
in another law firm, there is a presumption that all 
confidences known by a partner in the first firm are 
known to all partners in the second firm. This pre-
sumption might properly be applied in some circu-
mstances, especially where the client has been exte-
nsively represented, but may be unrealistic where the 
client was represented only for limited purposes. 
Furthermore, such a rigid rule exaggerates the diff-
erence between a partner and an associate in modern 
law firms. 
The other rubric formerly used for dealing with 
vicarious disqualification is the appearance of imp-
ropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a 
twofold problem. First, the appearance of improp-
riety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer 
relationship that might make a former client 
anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualific-
ation would become little more than a question of 
subjective judgment by the former client. Second, 
since "impropriety" is undefined, the term 
"appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. 
It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of 
imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolved 
either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing alone 
or by the very general concept of appearance of 
impropriety. 
A rule based on a functional analysis is more 
appropriate for determining the question of vicar-
ious disqualification. Two functions are involved: 
preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions 
adverse to a client. 
Confidentiality 
Preserving confidentiality is a question of access 
to information. Access to information, in turn, is 
essentially a question of fact in particular circumst-
ances, aided by inferences, deductions or working 
presumptions that reasonably may be made about 
the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer 
may have general access to files of all clients of a 
law firm and may regularly participate in discussions 
of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a 
lawyer in fact is privy to ail information about all 
the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may 
have access to the files of only a limited number of 
clients and participate in discussion of the affairs of 
no other clients; in the absence of information to 
the contrary, it should be inferred that such a 
lawyer in fact is privy to information about the 
clients actually served but not those of other clients. 
Application of paragraphs (b) and (c) depends on 
a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry, 
the burden of proof should rest upon the firm 
whose disqualification is sought. 
Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the 
firm only when the lawyer involved has actual 
knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(b). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm 
acquired no knowledge of information relating to a 
particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later 
joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually 
nor the second firm is disqualified from representing 
another client in the same or a related matter even 
though the interests of the two clients conflict. 
Independent of the question of disqualification of 
a firm, a lawyer changing professional association 
has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of 
information about a client formerly represented. See 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9. 
Adverse Positions 
The second aspect of loyalty to client is the 
lawyer's obligation to decline subsequent represen-
tations involving positions adverse to a former client 
arising in substantially related matters. This obliga-
tion requires abstention from adverse representation 
by the individual lawyer involved, but does not 
properly entail abstention of other lawyers through 
imputed disqualification. Hence, this aspect of the 
problem is governed by Rule 1.9(a). Thus, if a 
lawyer left one firm for another, the new affiliation 
would not preclude the firms involved from conti-
nuing to represent clients with adverse interests in 
the same or related matters, so long as the condit-
ions of Rule 1.10(b) and (c) concerning confidenti-
ality have been met. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 5-105(D) provided that "[i]f a lawyer is 
required to decline or to withdraw from employment 
under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, 
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, 
may accept or continue such employment." 
RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE 
EMPLOYMENT 
(a) EXCEPT AS LAW MAY OTHERWISE 
EXPRESSLY PERMIT, A LAWYER SHALL NOT 
REPRESENT A PRIVATE CLIENT IN CONNE-
CTION WITH A MATTER IN WHICH THE 
LAWYER PARTICIPATED PERSONALLY AND 
SUBSTANTIALLY AS A PUBLIC OFFICER OR 
EMPLOYEE, UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE 
GOVERNMENT AGENCY CONSENTS AFTER 
CONSULTATION. NO LAWYER IN A FIRM 
WITH WHICH THAT LAWYER IS ASSOCI-
ATED MAY KNOWINGLY UNDERTAKE OR 
CONTINUE REPRESENTATION IN SUCH A 
MATTER UNLESS: 
(1) THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER IS SCR-
EENED FROM ANY PARTICIPATION IN THE 
MATTER AND IS APPORTIONED NO PART OF 
THE FEE THEREFROM; AND 
(2) WRITTEN NOTICE IS PROMPTLY 
GIVEN TO THE APPROPRIATE GOVERN-
MENT AGENCY TO ENABLE IT TO ASCER-
TAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS 
OF THIS RULE. 
(b) EXCEPT AS LAW MAY OTHERWISE 
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EXPRESSLY PERMIT, A LAWYER HAVING 
INFORMATION THAT THE LAWYER KNOWS 
IS CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INFORM-
ATION ABOUT A PERSON ACQUIRED WHEN 
THE LAWYER WAS A PUBLIC OFFICER OR 
EMPLOYEE, MAY NOT REPRESENT A 
PRIVATE CLIENT WHOSE INTERESTS ARE 
ADVERSE TO THAT PERSON IN A MATTER 
IN WHICH THE INFORMATION COULD BE 
USED TO THE MATERIAL DISADVANTAGE 
OF THAT PERSON, UNLESS THE APPROPR-
IATE GOVERNMENT CLIENT CONSENTS 
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE LAWYER. 
A FIRM WITH WHICH THAT LAWYER IS 
ASSOCIATED MAY UNDERTAKE OR CONT-
INUE REPRESENTATION IN THE MATTER 
ONLY IF THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER IS 
SCREENED FROM ANY PARTICIPATION IN 
THE MATTER AND IS APPORTIONED NO 
PART OF THE FEE THEREFROM. 
(c) EXCEPT AS LAW MAY OTHERWISE 
EXPRESSLY PERMIT, A LAWYER SERVING 
AS A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE 
SHALL NOT: 
(1) PARTICIPATE IN A MATTER IN 
WHICH THE LAWYER PARTICIPATED PER-
SONALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY WHILE IN 
PRIVATE PRACTICE OR NONGOVERNME-
NTAL EMPLOYMENT, UNLESS UNDER APP-
LICABLE LAW NO ONE IS, OR BY LAWFUL 
DELEGATION MAY BE, AUTHORIZED TO 
ACT IN THE LAWYER'S STEAD IN THE 
MATTER; OR 
(2) NEGOTIATE FOR PRIVATE EMPLOY-
MENT WITH ANY PERSON WHO IS INVO-
LVED AS A PARTY OR AS ATTORNEY FOR A 
PARTY IN A MATTER IN WHICH THE 
LAWYER IS PARTICIPATING PERSONALLY 
AND SUBSTANTIALLY, UNLESS THE APPR-
OPRIATE GOVERNMENT CLIENT CONSENTS 
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE LAWYER. 
(d) AS USED IN THIS RULE, THE TERM 
"MATTERMNCLUDES: 
(1) ANY JUDICIAL OR OTHER PROCEE-
DING, APPLICATION, REQUEST FOR A 
RULING OR OTHER DETERMINATION, CON-
TRACT, CLAIM, CONTROVERSY, INVESTIG-
ATION, CHARGE, ACCUSATION, ARREST OR 
OTHER PARTICULAR MATTER INVOLVING A 
SPECIFIC PARTY OR PARTIES; AND 
(2) ANY OTHER MATTER COVERED BY 
THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES OF THE 
APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY. 
(c) AS USED IN THIS RULE, THE TERM 
"CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INFORMA-
TION" MEANS INFORMATION WHICH HAS 
BEEN OBTAINED UNDER GOVERNMENTAL 
AUTHORITY AND WHICH, AT THE TIME 
THIS RULE IS APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENT 
IS PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM DISCLOSING 
TO THE PUBLIC OR HAS A LEGAL PRIVI-
LEGE NOT TO DISCLOSE, AND WHICH IS 
NOT OTHERWISE AVAILABLE TO THE 
PUBLIC. 
COMMENT: 
This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting 
public office for the advantage of a private client. It 
is the counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to 
lawyers moving from one firm to another. 
A lawyer representing a government agency, 
whether employed or specifically retained by the 
government, is subject to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, including the prohibition against represe-
nting adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the 
protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In 
additon, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and 
to statutes and government regulations regarding 
conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations 
may circumscribe the extent to which the govern-
ment agency may give consent under this Rule. 
Where the successive clients are a pubiic agency 
and a private client, the risk exists that power or 
discretion vested in a public authority might be used 
for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer 
should not be in a position where benefit to a 
private client might affect performance of the 
lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public 
authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to 
the private client by reason of access to confidential 
government information about the client's adversary 
obtainable only through the lawyer's government 
servicje. However, the rules governing lawyers should 
not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of emplo-
yment to and from the government. The government 
has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as 
well as to maintain high ethical standards. The 
provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to 
prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too 
severe a deterrent against entering public service. 
When the client is an agency of one government, 
that agency should be treated as a private client for 
purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter repr-
esents an agency of another government, as when a 
lawyer represents a city and subsequently is empl-
oyed by a federal agency. 
Paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer 
from receiving a salary or partnership share establ-
ished by prior independent agreement. They prohibit 
direcjly relating the attorney's compensation to the 
fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. 
Paragraph (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer 
give notice to the government agency at a time when 
premature disclosure would injure the client; a req-
uirement for premature disclosure might preclude 
engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, 
required to be given as soon as practicable in order 
that the government agency will have a reasonable 
opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is compl-
ying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action 
if it believes the lawyer is not complying. 
Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in 
question has knowledge of the information, which 
means actual knowledge; it does not operate with 
respect to information that merely could be imputed 
to the lawyer. 
Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer 
from jointly representing a private party and a 
government agency when doing so is permitted by 
Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. 
Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in 
the agency with which the lawyer in question has 
become associated. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) is similar to DR 9-101(B), except 
the latter used the terms "in which he had 
substantial responsibility while he was a public 
emplbyee." 
Paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) have no counter-
parts in the Code. 
that 
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RULE 1.12 FORMER JIIDfiE OR 
ARBITRATOR 
(a) EXCEPT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH (d), 
A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT 
ANYONE IN CONNECTION WITH A MATTER 
IN WHICH THE LAWYER PARTICIPATED 
PERSONALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY AS A 
JUDGE OR OTHER ADJUDICATIVE OFFICER, 
ARBITRATOR OR LAW CLERK TO SUCH A 
PERSON, UNLESS ALL PARTIES TO THE 
PROCEEDING CONSENT AFTER DISCLO-
SURE. 
(b) A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGOTIATE 
FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH ANY PERSON WHO 
IS INVOLVED AS A PARTY OR AS ATTORNEY 
FOR A PARTY IN A MATTER IN WHICH THE 
LAWYER IS PARTICIPATING PERSONALLY 
AND SUBSTANTIALLY AS A JUDGE OR 
OTHER ADJUDICATIVE OFFICER, OR ARBI-
TRATOR. A LAWYER SERVING AS A LAW 
CLERK TO A JUDGE, OTHER ADJUDICATIVE 
OFFICER OR ARBITRATOR MAY NEGOTIATE 
FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH A PARTY OR 
ATTORNEY INVOLVED IN A MATTER IN 
WHICH THE CLERK IS PARTICIPATING 
PERSONALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY, BUT 
ONLY AFTER THE LAWYER HAS NOTIFIED 
THE JUDGE, OTHER ADJUDICATIVE 
OFFICER OR ARBITRATOR. 
(c) IF A LAWYER IS DISQUALIFIED BY 
PARAGRAPH (a), NO LAWYER IN A FIRM 
WITH WHICH THAT LAWYER IS ASSOCI-
ATED MAY KNOWINGLY UNDERTAKE OR 
JCONTINUE REPRESENTATION IN THE 
MATTER UNLESS: 
(1) THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER IS SCR-
EENED FROM ANY PARTICIPATION IN THE 
MATTER AND IS APPORTIONED NO PART OF 
THE FEE THEREFROM; AND 
(2) WRITTEN NOTICE IS PROMPTLY 
GIVEN TO THE APPROPRIATE TRIBUNAL TO 
ENABLE IT TO ASCERTAIN COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RULE. 
(d) AN ARBITRATOR SELECTED AS A 
PARTISAN OF A PARTY IN A MULTI-
MEMBER ARBITRATION PANEL IS NOT 
PROHIBITED FROM SUBSEQUENTLY REPR-
ESENTING THAT PARTY. 
COMMENT: 
This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term 
"personally and substantially" signifies that a judge 
who was a member of a multimember court, and 
thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not 
prohibited from representing a client in a matter 
pending in the court, but in which the former judge 
did not participate. So also the fact that a former 
judge exercised administrative responsibility in a 
court does not prevent the former judge from acting 
as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previ-
ously exercised remote or incidental administrative 
responsibility that did not affect the merits. 
Compare the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term 
"adjudicative officer" includes such officials as 
judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, 
hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and 
also lawyers who serve as pan-time judges. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR 9-
101(A), which provided that a lawyer "shall noi 
accept private employment in a matter upon th< 
merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity/ 
Paragraph (a) differs, however, in that it is broader 
in scope and states more specifically the persons to 
whom it applies. There was no counterpart in the 
Code to paragraphs (b), (c), or (d). 
With regard to arbitrators, EC 5-20 stated that 
"a lawyer (who) has undertaken to act as an impa-
rtial arbitrator or mediator, ... should not thereafter 
represent in the dispute any of the parties involved." 
DR 9-101 (A) did not permit a waiver of the disq-
ualification applied to former judges by consent of 
the parties. However, DR 5-105(C) was similar in 
effect and could be construed to permit waiver. 
RULE 1.13 SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL HOLD PROPERTY OF 
CLIENTS OR THIRD PERSONS THAT IS IN A 
LAWYER'S POSSESSION IN CONNECTION 
WITH A REPRESENTATION SEPARATE FROM 
THE LAWYER'S OWN PROPERTY. FUNDS 
SHALL BE KEPT IN A SEPARATE ACCOUNT 
MAINTAINED IN THE STATE WHERE THE 
LAWYER'S OFFICE IS SITUATED, OR ELSE-
WHERE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE 
CLIENT OR THIRD PERSON. OTHER PROP-
ERTY SHALL BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND 
APPROPRIATELY SAFEGUARDED. COMP-
LETE RECORDS OF SUCH ACCOUNT FUNDS 
AND OTHER PROPERTY SHALL BE KEPT 
THE LAWYER AND SHALL BE PRESERVED 
FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AFTER TER-
MINATION OF THE REPRESENTATION.. 
(b) UPON RECEIVING FUNDS OR OTHER 
PROPERTY IN WHICH A CLIENT OR THIRD 
PERSON HAS AN INTEREST, A LAWYER 
SHALL PROMPTLY NOTIFY THE CLIENT OR 
THIRD PERSON. EXCEPT AS STATED IN THIS 
RULE OR OTHERWISE PERMITTED BY LAW 
OR BY AGREEMENT WITH THE CLIENT, A 
LAWYER SHALL PROMPTLY DELIVER TO 
THE CLIENT OR THIRD PERSON ANY FUNDS 
OR OTHER PROPERTY THAT THE CLIENT 
OR THIRD PERSON IS ENTITLED TO 
RECEIVE AND, UPON REQUEST BY THE 
CLIENT OR THIRD PERSON, SHALL PROM-
PTLY RENDER A FULL ACCOUNTING REG-
ARDING SUCH PROPERTY. 
(c) WHEN IN THE COURSE OF REPRESEN-
TATION A LAWYER IS IN POSSESSION OF 
PROPERTY IN WHICH BOTH THE LAWYER 
AND ANOTHER PERSON CLAIM INTERESTS, 
THE PROPERTY SHALL BE KEPT SEPARATE 
BY THE LAWYER UNTIL THERE IS AN ACC-
OUNTING AND SEVERANCE OF THEIR INT-
ERESTS. IF A DISPUTE ARISES CONCERNING 
THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS, THE 
PORTION IN DISPUTE SHALL BE KEPT SEP-
ARATE BY THE LAWYER UNTIL THE 
DISPUTE IS RESOLVED. 
COMMENT: 
A lawyer should hold property of others with the 
care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities 
should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when 
some other form of safekeeping is warranted by 
special circumstances. All property which is the 
property of clients or third persons should be kept 
separate from the lawyer's business and personal 
property and, if monies, in one or more trust acco-
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"op unts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted 
when administering estate monies or acting in 
similar fiduciary capacities. 
Lawyers often receive funds from third parties 
from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is 
risk that the client may divert the funds without 
paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit 
the portion from which the fee is to be paid. 
However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a 
client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The 
disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust 
and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt 
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The 
undisputed portion of the funds shall he promptly 
distributed. 
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may 
have just claims against funds or other property in a 
lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under 
applicable law to protect such third-party claims 
against wrongful interference by the client and acc-
ordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the 
client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally 
assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and 
the third party. 
The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are 
independent of those arising from activity other 
than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer 
who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the 
applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the 
lawyer does not render legal services in the transac-
tion. 
A "client's security fund" provides a means 
through the collective efforts of the Bar to reimb-
urse persons who have lost money or property as a 
result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such 
a fund has been established, a lawyer should parti-
cipate. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 9-102(A) 
provided that "funds of clients" are to be kept in an 
identifiable bank account in the state in which the 
lawyer's office is situated. DR 9-102(B)(2) prov-
ided that a lawyer shall "identify and label securities 
and properties of a client ... and place them in ... 
safekeeping ...." DR 9-102(B)(3) required that a 
lawyer "maintain complete records of all funds, 
securities, and other properties of a client ...." Rule 
1.13 (a) extends these requirements to property of a 
third person that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with the representation. 
Paragraph (b) is substantially similar to DR 9-
102(B)(1), (3) and (4). 
Paragraph (c) is similar to DR 9-102(A)(2), 
except that the requirement regarding disputes 
applies to property concerning which an interest is 
claimed by a third person as well as by a client. 
RULE 1.14 DECLINING OR 
TERMINATING REPRESENTATION 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A 
CLIENT OR, WHERE REPRESENTATION HAS 
COMMENCED, SHALL WITHDRAW FROM 
THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT IF: 
(1) THE REPRESENTATION WILL RESULT 
IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESS-
IONAL CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW; 
(2) THE LAWYER'S PHYSICAL OR 
MENTAL CONDITION MATERIALLY IMPAIRS 
THE LAWYER'S ABILITY TO REPRESENT 
THE CLIENT; OR 
THE LAWYER IS DISCHARGED. 
(b) A LAWYER MAY WITHDRAW FROM 
REPRESENTING A CLIENT IF WITHDRAWAL 
CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT MATE-
RIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE INTERESTS 
OF THE CLIENT, OR IF: 
(1) THE CLIENT PERSISTS IN A COURSE 
OF ACTION INVOLVING THE LAWYER'S 
SERVICES THAT THE LAWYER REASONABLY 
BELIEVES IS CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT; 
(2) THE CLIENT HAS USED THE 
LAWYER'S SERVICES TO PERPETRATE A 
CRIME OR FRAUD; 
(3) A CLIENT INSISTS UPON PURSUING 
AN OBJECTIVE THAT THE LAWYER CONSI-
DERS REPUGNANT OR IMPRUDENT; 
(4) THE CLIENT FAILS SUBSTANTIALLY 
TO FULFILL AN OBLIGATION TO THE 
LAWYER REGARDING THE LAWYER'S SER-
VICES AND HAS BEEN GIVEN REASONABLE 
WARNING THAT THE LAWYER WILL WITH-
DRAW UNLESS THE OBLIGATION IS FULFI-
LLED; 
(5) THE REPRESENTATION WILL RESULT 
IN AN UNREASONABLE FINANCIAL BURDEN 
ON THE LAWYER OR HAS BEEN RENDERED 
UNREASONABLY DIFFICULT BY THE 
CLIENT; OR 
(6) OTHER GOOD CAUSE FOR WITHDR-
AWAL EXISTS. 
(c) THIS RULE IS NOT VIOLATED BY A 
LAWYER WHO CONTINUES REPRESENTA-
TION WHEN ORDERED TO DO SO BY A TRI-
BUNAL, NOTWITHSTANDING GOOD CAUSE 
FOR TERMINATING THE REPRESENTATION. 
(d) UPON TERMINATION OF REPRESENT-
ATION, A LAWYER SHALL TAKE STEPS TO 
THE EXTENT REASONABLY PRACTICABLE 
TO PROTECT A CLIENT'S INTERESTS, SUCH 
AS GIVING REASONABLE NOTICE TO THE 
CLIENT, ALLOWING TIME FOR EMPLOY-
MENT OF OTHER COUNSEL, SURRENDERING 
PAPERS AND PROPERTY TO WHICH THE 
CLIENT IS ENTITLED AND REFUNDING ANY 
ADVANCE PAYMENT OF FEE THAT HAS NOT 
BEEN EARNED. THE LAWYER MAY RETAIN 
PAPERS RELATING TO THE CLIENT TO THE 
EXTENT PERMITTED BY OTHER LAW. 
COMMENT: 
A lawyer should not accept representation in a 
matter unless it can be performed competently, 
promptly, without improper conflict of interest and 
to completion. 
Mandatory Withdrawal 
A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw 
from representation if the client demands that the 
lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates 
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The 
lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply 
because the client suggests such a course of conduct; 
a client may make such a suggestion in the hope 
that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professi-
onal obligation. 
When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a 
client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of 
the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Diffic-
ulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on 
the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unp-
rofessional conduct. The court may wish an expla-
nation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be 
bound to keep confidential the facts that would 
Code • Co 
Provo Utah UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 29 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's state-' 
ment that professional considerations require term-
ination of the representation ordinarily should be 
accepted as sufficient. 
Discharge 
A client has the right to discharge a lawyer at any 
time, with or without cause, subject to liability for 
payment for the lawyer's services. Where future 
dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it 
may be advisable to prepare a written statement 
reciting the circumstances. 
Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel 
may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to 
do so should be given a full explanation of the 
consequences. These consequences may include a 
decision by the appointing authority that appoint-
ment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requ-
iring the client to represent himself. 
Optional Withdrawal 
A lawyer may withdraw from representation in 
some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to 
withdraw if it can be accomplished without material 
adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal 
is also justified if the client persists in a course of 
action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal 
or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be 
associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does 
not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the 
lawyer's services were misused in the past even if 
that would materially prejudice the client. The 
lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on 
a repugnant or imprudent objective. 
A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to 
abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the 
representation, such as an agreement concerning fees 
or court costs or an agreement limiting the object-
ives of the representation. 
Assisting the Client Upon Withdrawal 
Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by 
the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to 
mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer 
may retain papers as security for a fee only to the 
extent permitted by law. 
Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may 
under certain unusual circumstances have a legal 
obligation to the organization after withdrawing or 
being discharged by the organization's highest aut-
hority is beyond the scope of these Rules. 
Compliance with Applicable Court Rule Regarding 
Withdrawal 
When a lawyer is representing a client in a matter 
before the courts, and the lawyer seeks to withdraw 
from the matter under these rules, the lawyer should 
consult applicable court rules regarding procedures 
for withdrawal. I 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-109(A) 
provided that a lawyer "shall not accept employment 
... if he knows or it is obvious that [the prospective 
client] wishes to ... [bjring a legal action ... or oth-
erwise have steps taken for him, merely for the 
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any 
person . . / Nor may a lawyer accept employment if 
he is aware that the prospective client wishes to 
"[p]resent a claim or defense ... that is not warra-
nted under existing law, unless it can be supported 
by good faith argument for an extension, modific-
ation, or reversal of existing law.* DR 2-110(B) 
provided that a lawyer 'shall withdraw from empl-
oyment ...if: 
"(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is 
bringing the legal action ... or is otherwise having 
steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of har-
assing or maliciously injuring any person. 
"(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued 
employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary 
Rule. 
"(3) His mental or physical condition renders it 
unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the 
employment effectively. 
"(4) He is discharged by his client. 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2-110(C) 
permitted withdrawal regardless of the effect on the 
client if: 
"(1) His client: (a) Insists upon presenting a claim 
or defense that is not warranted under existing law 
and cannot be supported by good faith argument 
for an extension, modification, or reversal of exis-
ting law; (b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal 
course of conduct; (c) Insists that the lawyer pursue 
a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohib-
ited under the Disciplinary Rules; (d) By other 
conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the 
lawyer to carry out his employment effectively; (e) 
Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, 
that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to 
the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not 
prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules; (0 Delibe-
rately disregards an agreement or obligation to the 
lawyer as to expenses and fees. 
*(2) His continued employment is likely to result 
in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule. 
"(3) fris inability to work with co-counsel indi-
cates that the best interests of the client likely will 
be served by withdrawal. 
"(4) His mental or physical condition renders it 
difficult for him to carry out the employment effe-
ctively. 
"(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to 
termination of his employment. 
"(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding 
pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find 
the existence of other good cause for withdrawal." 
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2-110(A)(1) 
provided: "If permission for withdrawal from 
employment is required by the laws of the tribunal, 
the lawyer shall not withdraw ... without its permi-
ssion." 
The provisions of paragraph (d) are substantially 
identical to DR 2-110(A)(2) and (3). 
COUNSELOR 
RULE 2.1 ADVISOR 
IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT, A LAWYER 
SHALL EXERCISE INDEPENDENT PROFESSI-
ONAL JUDGMENT AND RENDER CANDID 
ADVICE. IN RENDERING ADVICE, A LAWYER 
MAY REFER NOT ONLY TO LAW BUT TO 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS MORAL, 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FACTORS, THAT MAY BE RELEVANT TO THE 
CLIENT'S SITUATION. 
COMMENT: 
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Scope of Advice 
A client is entitled to straightforward advice exp-
ressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice 
often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that 
a client may be disinclined to confront. In presen-
ting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the 
client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable 
a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer 
should not be deterred from giving candid advice by 
the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to 
the client. 
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of 
little value to a client, especially where practical 
considerations, such as costs or effects on other 
people, are predominant. Purely technical legal 
advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is 
proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and 
ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a 
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and 
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal 
questions and may decisively influence how the law 
will be applied. 
A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer 
for purely technical advice. When such a request is 
made by a client experienced in legal matters, the 
lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a 
request is made by#a client inexperienced in legal 
matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as 
advisor may include indicating that more may be 
involved than strictly legal considerations. 
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions 
may also be in the domain of another profession. 
Family matters can involve problems within the 
professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psy-
chology or social work; business matters can involve 
problems within the competence of the accounting 
profession or of financial specialists. Where consu-
ltation with a professional in another field is itself 
something a competent lawyer would recommend, 
the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At 
the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often 
consists of recommending a course of action in the 
face of conflicting recommendations of experts. 
Offering Advice 
In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice 
until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer 
knows that a client proposes a course of action that 
is likely to result in substantial adverse legal conse-
quences to the client, duty to the client under Rule 
1.4 may require that the lawyer act if the client's 
course of action is related to the representation. A 
lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investiga-
tion of a client's affairs or to give advice that the 
client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may 
initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to 
be in the client's interest. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in 
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. DR 5-107(B) 
provided that a lawyer "shall not permit a person 
who recommends, employs, or pays him to render 
legal services for another to direct or regulate his 
professional judgment in rendering such legal serv-
ices." EC 7-8 stated that "[ajdvice of a lawyer to 
his client need not be confined to purely legal con-
siderations ... In assisting his client to reach a 
proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to 
point out those factors which may lead to a decision 
that is morally just as well as legally permissible ... 
In the final analysis, however, ... the decision 
whether to forego legally available objectives or 
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately 
for the client...." 
RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY 
(a) A LAWYER MAY ACT AS INTERMED-
IARY BETWEEN CLIENTS IF: 
(1} THE LAWYER CONSULTS WITH EACH 
CLIENT CONCERNING THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE COMMON REPRESENTATION, INCL-
UDING THE ADVANTAGES AND RISKS INV-
OLVEp, AND THE EFFECT OF THE ATTO-
RNEYjCLIENT PRIVILEGES, AND OBTAINS 
EACH CLIENT'S CONSENT TO THE COMMON 
REPRESENTATION; AND 
(2) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
THAT THE MATTER CAN BE RESO-
ON TERMS COMPATIBLE WITH THE 
CLIENT'S BEST INTEREST, THAT EACH 
CLIENT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE ADEQUA-
TELY! INFORMED DECISIONS IN THE 
MATTER AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE RISK 
OF MATERIAL PREJUDICE TO THE INTER-
ESTS OF ANY OF THE CLIENTS IF THE CON-
TEMPLATED RESOLUTION IS UNSUCCES-
SFUL; AND 
EVES 
LVED 
(3) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
EVES THAT THE COMMON REPRESENTA-
TION CAN BE UNDERTAKEN IMPARTIALLY 
AND WITHOUT IMPROPER EFFECT ON 
OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES THE LAWYER 
HAS TO ANY OF THE CLIENTS; AND 
(4J ALL REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 1.7 
AND 1.8 ARE MET. 
(b) WHILE ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY, 
THE LAWYER SHALL CONSULT WITH EACH 
CLIENT CONCERNING THE DECISIONS TO BE 
MADE AND THE CONSIDERATIONS RELE-
VANT IN MAKING THEM. SO THAT EACH 
CLIENT CAN MAKE ADEQUATELY INFO-
RMED DECISIONS. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW AS 
INTERMEDIARY IF ANY OF THE CLIENTS SO 
REQUESTS, OR IF ANY OF THE CONDITIONS 
STATED IN PARAGRAPH (a) IS NO LONGER 
SATISFIED. UPON WITHDRAWAL, THE 
LAWYER SHALL NOT CONTINUE TO REPR-
ESENT ANY OF THE CLIENTS IN THE 
MATTER THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE 
INTERMEDIATION. 
COMMENT: 
A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule 
when the lawyer represents two or more parties with 
potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in 
defining the relationship is whether the parties share 
responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common 
representation may be inferred from other circums-
tances. Because confusion can arise as to the 
lawyer s role where each party is not separately 
represented, it is important that the lawyer make 
clear the relationship. 
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as 
arbitrator or mediator between or among parties 
who are not clients of the lawyer, even where the 
lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of 
the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer 
may bi subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as 
the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial 
Disputps prepared by a joint Committee of the 
Amerkan Bar Association and the American Arbi-
tration Association. 
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A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to esta-
blish or adjust a relationship between clients on an 
amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for 
example, in helping to organize a business in which 
two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out 
the financial reorganization of an enterprise in 
which two or more clients have an interest, arran-
ging a property distribution in settlement of an 
estate or mediating a dispute between clients. The 
lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting inter-
ests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The 
, alternative can be that each party may have to 
obtain separate representation, with the possibility 
in some situations of incurring additional cost, 
complication or even litigation. Given these and 
other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that 
the lawyer act as intermediary. 
In considering whether to act as intermediary 
between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if 
the intermediation fails the result can be additional 
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some 
situations the risk of failure is so great that interm-
ediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer 
cannot undertake common representation of clients 
between whom contentious litigation is imminent or 
who contemplate contentious negotiations. More 
generally, if the relationship between the parties has 
already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility 
that the clients* interests can be adjusted by inter-
mediation ordinarily is not very good. 
The appropriateness of intermediation can depend 
on its form. Forms of intermediation range from 
informal arbitration, where each client's case is 
presented by the respective client and the lawyer 
decides the outcome, to mediation, to common 
representation where the clients' interests are subs-
tantially though not entirely compatible. One form 
may be appropriate in circumstances where another 
would not. Other relevant factors are whether the 
lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a 
continuing basis and whether the situation involves 
creating a relationship between the parties or term-
inating one. 
Confidentiality and Privilege 
A particularly important factor in determining the 
appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on 
client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege. In a common representation, the 
lawyer is still required both to keep each client 
adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality 
of information relating to the representation. See 
Rutes 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirem-
ents while acting as intermediary requires a delicate 
balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the 
common representation is improper. With regard to 
the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is 
that as between commonly represented clients the 
privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed 
that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the 
privilege will not protect any such communications, 
and the clients should be so advised. 
Since the lawyer is required to be impartial 
between commonly represented clients, intermedia-
tion is improper when that impartiality cannot be 
maintained. For example, a lawyer who has repres-
ented one of the clients for a long period and in a 
variety of matters might have difficulty being imp-
artial between that client and one to whom the 
lawyer has only recently been introduced. 
Consultation 
In acting as intermediary between clients, the 
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lawyer is required to consult with the clients on the 
implications of doing so, and proceed only upon 
consent based on such a consultation. The consult-
ation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not 
that of partisanship normally expected in other cir-
cumstances. 
Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle 
expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is interme-
diary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater 
responsibility for decisions than when each client is 
independently represented. 
Withdrawal 
Common representation does not diminish the 
rights of each client in the client-lawyer relation-
ship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent repre-
sentation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated 
in Rule 1.14, and the protection of Rule I. concer-
ning obligations to a former client. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in 
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 5-20 stated 
that a "lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial 
arbitrator or mediator in matters which involve 
present or former clients. He may serve in cither 
capacity if he first discloses such present or former 
relationships." DR 5-105(B) provided that a lawyer 
"shall not continue multiple employment if the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely 
affected by his representation of another client, or if 
it would be likely to involve him in representation of 
differing interests, except to the extent permitted 
under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5-105(C) provided that 
"a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is 
obvious that he can adequately represent the inter-
ests of each and if each consents to the representa-
tion after full disclosure of the possible effect of 
such representation on the exercise of his indepen-
dent professional judgment on behalf of each." 
RULE 2,3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY 
THIRD PERSONS 
(a) A LAWYER MAY UNDERTAKE AN EVA-
LUATION OF A MATTER AFFECTING A 
CLIENT FOR THE USE OF SOMEONE OTHER 
THAN THE CLIENT IF: 
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
EVES THAT MAKING THE EVALUATION IS 
COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF 
THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
CLIENT; AND 
(2) THE CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CON-
SULTATION. 
(b) EXCEPT AS DISCLOSURE IS REQUIRED 
IN CONNECTION WITH A REPORT OF AN 
EVALUATION, INFORMATION RELATING TO 
THE EVALUATION IS OTHERWISE PROTE-
CTED BY RULE 1.6. 
COMMENT: 
Definition 
An evaluation may be performed at the client's 
direction but for the primary purpose of establishing 
information for the benefit of third parties; for 
example, an opinion concerning the title of property 
rendered at the behest of a vendor for the inform-
ation of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of 
a borrower for the information of a prospective 
lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be 
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required by a government agency; for example, an 
opinion concerning the legality of the securities 
registered for sale under the securities laws. In other 
instances, the evaluation may be required by a third 
person, such as a purchaser of a business. 
Lawyers for the government may be called upon 
to give a formal opinion on the legality of contem-
plated government agency action. In making such an 
evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest 
of the government as the client but for the purpose 
of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized 
activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from 
confidential legal advice given agency officials. The 
critical question is whether the opinion is to be 
made public. 
A legal evaluation should be distinguished from 
an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer 
does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For 
example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to 
analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a 
client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, 
an investigation into a person's affairs by a gover-
nment lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the 
government, is not an evaluation as that term is 
used in this Rule. The question is whether the 
lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are 
being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that 
person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client 
and preservation of confidences apply, which is not 
the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. 
For this reason, it is essential to identify the person 
by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be 
made clear not only to the person under examina-
tion, but also to others to whom the results are to 
be made available. 
Duty to Third Person 
When the evaluation is intended for the inform-
ation or use of a third person, a legal duty to that 
person may or may not arise. That legal question is 
beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such 
an evaluation involves a departure from the normal 
client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the 
situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as 
a matter of professional judgment that making the 
evaluation is compatible with other functions und-
ertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the 
lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client 
against charges of fraud, it would normally be inc-
ompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to 
perform an evaluation for others concerning the 
same or a related transaction. Assuming no such 
impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should 
advise the client of the implications of the evalua-
tion, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to 
third persons and the duty to disseminate the find-
ings. 
Access to and Disclosure of Information 
The quality of an evaluation depends on the 
freedom and extent of the investigation upon which 
it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have what-
ever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a 
matter of professional judgment. Under some circ-
umstances, however, the terms of the evaluation 
may be limited. For example, certain issues or 
sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope 
of search may be limited by time constraints or the 
noncooperation of persons having relevant inform-
ation. Any such limitations which are material to 
the evaluation should be described in the report. If 
after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the 
client refuses to comply with the terms upon which 
it was understood the evaluation was to have been 
made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by 
law, hiving reference to the terms of the client's 
agreement and the surrounding circumstances. 
Financial Auditors' Requests for Information 
Wheji a question concerning the legal situation of 
a client arises at the instance of the client's financial 
auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, 
the lawyer's response may be made in accordance 
with procedures recognized in the legal profession. 
Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar 
Association Statement of Policy Regarding 
Lawyers* Responses to Auditors* Requests for 
Information, adopted in 1975. • 
CODE COMPARISON 
Therp was no counterpart to this Rule in the 
Code. 
ADVOCATE 
RULti 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS 
AND CONTENTIONS 
LAWYER SHALL NOT BRING OR DEFEND 
OR ASSERT OR CONTRO-
L S ISSUE THEREIN, UNLESS THERE IS 
BASIS FOR DOING SO THAT IS NOT FRIV-
WHICH INCLUDES A GOOD FAITH 
ARGUMENT FOR AN EXTENSION, MODIFIC-
ATION OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW. A 
LAWYER FOR THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIM-
PROCEEDING, OR THE RESPONDENT 
PROCEEDING THAT COULD RESULT IN 
MAY NEVERTHELESS SO 
DEFEND THE PROCEEDING AS TO REQUIRE 
THAT EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CASE BE 
ESTABLISHED. 
COMMENT: 
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filing of an action or defense or similar 
taken for a client is not frivolous merely 
the facts have not first been fully substant-
becausc the lawyer expects to develop vital 
only by discovery. Such action is not friv-
^ven though the lawyer believes that the 
position ultimately will not prevail. The 
frivolous, however, if the client desires to 
action taken primarily for the purpose of 
or maliciously injuring a person or if the 
is unable either to make a good faith argu-
the merits of the action taken or to support 
taken by a good faith argument for an 
, modification or reversrl of existing law. 
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-102(A)(1) provided that a lawyer may not 
suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, 
trial, or take other action on behalf of his 
when he knows or when it is obvious that 
Code • Co 
Pro*o. Utah UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 33 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
such action would serve merely to harass or malici-
ously injure another/ Rule 3.1 is to the same 
general effect as DR 7-102(A)(1), wkh three qual-
ifications. First, the test of improper conduct is 
changed from "merely to harass or maliciously 
injure another" to the requirements that there be a 
basis for the litigation measure involved that is "not 
frivolous." This includes the concept stated in DR 7-
102(A)(2) that a lawyer may advance a claim or 
defense unwarranted by existing law if "it can be 
supported by good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law." Second, 
the test in Rule 3.1 is an objective test, whereas DR 
7-102(A)(1) applied only if the lawyer "knows or 
when it is obvious" that the litigation is frivolous. 
Third, Rule 3.1 has an exception that in a criminal 
case, or a case in which incarceration of the client 
may result (for example, certain juvenile proceed-
ings), the lawyer may put the prosecution to its 
proof even if there is no nonfrivolous basis for 
defense. 
RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION 
A LAWYER SHALL MAKE REASONABLE 
EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE LITIGATION CONSI-
STENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE 
CLIENT. 
COMMENT: 
Dilatory practices bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Delay should not be indulged 
merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for 
the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's 
attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 7-101(A)(l) stated that a lawyer does not 
violate his duty to represent a client zealously "by 
being punctual in fulfilling all professional commi-
tments." DR 7-102(A)(l) provided that a lawyer 
"shall not ... file a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense [or] delay a trial ... when he knows or when 
it is obvious that such action would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure another." 
RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE 
TRIBUNAL 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY: 
(1) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF 
MATERIAL FACT OR LAW TO A TRIBUNAL; 
(2) FAIL TO DISCLOSE A MATERIAL 
FACT TO A TRIBUNAL WHEN DISCLOSURE 
1$ NECESSARY TO AVOID ASSISTING A CRI-
MINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACT BY THE 
CLIENT; 
(3) FAIL TO DISCLOSE TO THE TRIBUNAL 
LEGAL AUTHORITY IN THE CONTROLLING 
JURISDICTION KNOWN TO THE LAWYER TO 
BE DIRECTLY ADVERSE TO THE POSITION 
OF THE CLIENT AND NOT DISCLOSED BY 
OPPOSING COUNSEL; OR 
(4) OFFER EVIDENCE THAT THE 
LAWYER KNOWS TO BE FALSE. IF A 
LAWYER HAS OFFERED MATERIAL EVID-
ENCE AND COMES TO KNOW OF ITS 
FALSITY, THE LAWYER SHALL TAKE REAS-
ONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES. 
(b) THE DUTIES STATED IN PARAGRAPH 
(a) CONTINUE TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE 
PROCEEDING, AND APPLY EVEN IF COMP-
LIANCE REQUIRES DISCLOSURE OF INFOR-
MATION OTHERWISE PROTECTED BY RULE 
1.6. 
(c) A LAWYER MAY REFUSE TO OFFER 
EVIDENCE THAT THE LAWYER REASON-
ABLY BELIEVES IS FALSE. 
(d) IN AN EX PARTE PROCEEDING, A 
LAWYER SHALL INFORM THE TRIBUNAL OF 
ALL MATERIAL FACTS KNOWN TO THE 
LAWYER WHICH WILL ENABLE THE TRIB-
UNAL TO -MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION, 
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTS ARE 
ADVERSE. 
COMMENT: 
The advocate's task is to present the client's case 
with persuasive force. Performance of that duty 
while maintaining confidences of the client is qual-
ified by the advocate's duty of candor to the trib-
unal. However, an advocate does not vouch for the 
evidence submitted in a cause; the tribunal is resp-
onsible for. assessing its probative value. 
Representations by a Lawyer 
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and 
other documents prepared for litigation, but is 
usually not required to have personal knowledge of 
matters asserted therein, for litigation documents 
ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by 
someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions 
by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an 
assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own 
knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a 
statement in open court, may properly be made only 
when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or bel-
ieves it to be true on the basis of reasonably diligent 
inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to 
make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 
1.2(c) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the 
client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. 
Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(c), see the 
Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to 
Rule 8.4(b). 
Misleading Legal Argument 
Legal argument based on a knowingly false repr-
esentation of law constitutes dishonesty toward a 
tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disint-
erested exposition of the law, but must recognize the 
existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, 
as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty 
to disclose directly adverse authority in the contro-
lling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the 
opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal 
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the 
legal premises properly applicable to the case. 
False Evidence 
When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is 
provided by a person who is not the client, the 
lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the 
client's wishes. 
When false evidence is offered by the client, 
however, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's 
duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and 
the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining 
that material evidence is false, the lawyer should 
seek to persuade the client that the evidence should 
not be offered or, if it has been offered, that its 
false character should immediately be disclosed. If 
the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take 
reasonable remedial measures. 
Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the 
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rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to 
rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the 
existence of the client's deception to the court or to 
the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave 
consequences to the client, including not only a 
sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and 
perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alterna-
tive is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the 
court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process 
which the adversary system is designed to imple-
ment. See Rule 1.2(c). Furthermore, unless it is 
clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the 
duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the 
client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal 
the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep 
silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the 
lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. 
Perjury by a Criminal Defendant 
Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has 
the same duty of disclosure has been intensely 
debated. While it is agreed that the lawyer should 
seek to persuade the client to refrain from perjur-
ious testimony, there has been dispute concerning 
the lawyer's duty when that persuasion fails. If the 
confrontation with the client occurs before trial, the 
lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal before 
trial may not be possible, however, either because 
trial is imminent, or because the confrontation with 
the client does not take place until the trial itself, or 
because no other counsel is available. 
The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in a 
criminal case where the accused insists on testifying 
when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perju-
rious. The lawyer's effort to rectify the situation 
can increase the likelihood of the client's being 
convicted as well as opening the possibility of pro-
secution for perjury. On the other hand, if the 
lawyer does not exercise control over the proof, the 
lawyer participates, although in a merely passive 
way, in deception of the court. 
Three resolutions of this dilemma have been 
proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by 
a narrative without guidance through the lawyer's 
questioning. This compromises both contending 
principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to 
disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an 
implicit disclosure of information imparted to 
counsel. Another suggested resolution, of relatively 
recent origin, is that the advocate be entirely 
excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the 
perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent sol-
ution but makes the advocate a knowing instrument 
of perjury. 
The other resolution of the dilemma is that the 
lawyer must reveal the client's perjury if necessary 
to rectify the situation. A criminal accused has a 
right to the assistance of an advocate, a right to 
testify and a right of confidential communication 
with counsel. However, an accused should not have 
a right to assistance of counsel in committing 
perjury. Furthermore, an advocate has an obliga-
tion, not only in professional ethics but under the 
law as well, to avoid implication in the commission 
of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See 
Rule 1.2(c). 
Remedial Measures 
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been 
offered, the advocate's proper course ordinarily is 
to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that 
fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that 
will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not 
remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate 
should make disclosure to the court. It is for the 
court then to determine what should be done-
making a statement about the matter to the trier of 
fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing. If the. 
false testimony was that of the client, the client may 
controvert the lawyer's version of their communic-. 
ation when the lawyer discloses the situation to the 
court. If there is an issue whether the client has 
committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent the 
client in resolution of the issue, and a mistrial may 
be unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in 
this way attempt to produce a series of mistrials and 
thus escape prosecution. However, a second such 
encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse 
of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the 
right to further representation. 
Constitutional Requirements 
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time limit on the obligation to rectify 
of false evidence has to be establi-
conclusion of the proceeding is a reason-
point for the termination of the oblig-
presentation 
The 
to Offer Proof Believed to be False 
Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to 
offer testimony or other proof that the 
Mieves is untrustworthy. Offering such 
reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability 
discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus 
lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. In 
cases, however, a lawyer may, in some 
ctions, be denied this authority by constituti-
requirements governing the right to counsel. 
may 
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Ex Parte Proceedings 
Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsi-
bility of presenting one side of the matters that a 
tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the 
conflicting position is expected to be presented by 
the opposing party. However, in an ex parte proce-
eding, such as an application for a temporary rest-
raining order, there is no balance of presentation by 
opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte pro-
ceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just 
result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to 
accord the absent party just consideration. The 
lawyer for the represented party has the correlative 
duty to make disclosures of material facts known to 
the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes 
are necessary to an informed decision. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (aXO is substantially identical to DR 7-
102(AK5)L which provided that a lawyer shall not 
"knowingly make a false statement of law or fact." 
Paragraph (a)(2) is implicit in DR 7-102(A)(3), 
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which provided that a "lawyer shall not ... knowi-
ngly fail to disclose that which he is required by law 
to reveal." 
Paragraph (a)(3) is substantially identical to DR 7-
i06(B)(l). 
With regard to paragraph (a)(4), the first sentence 
of this subparagraph is similar to DR 7- 102(A)(4), 
which provided that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
use" perjured testimony or false evidence. The 
second sentence of paragraph (a)(4) resolves an 
ambiguity in the Code concerning the action requ-
ired of a lawyer when he discovers that he has 
offered perjured testimony or false evidence. DR 7-
102(A)(4), quoted above, did not expressly deal with. 
this situation, but the prohibition against "use" of 
false evidence can be construed to preclude carrying 
through with a case based on such evidence when 
that fact has become known during the trial. DR 7-
102(B)(1), also noted in connection with Rule 1.6, 
provided that a lawyer "who receives information 
clearly establishing that ... his client has ... perpet-
rated a fraud upon ... a tribunal shall [if the client 
does not rectify the situation] ... reveal the fraud to 
the... tribunal ..." Since use of perjured testimony 
or false evidence is usually regarded as "fraud" 
upon the court, DR 7-102(B)(l) apparently requ-
ired disclosure by the lawyer in such circumstances. 
However, Utah has amended DR 7-102(B)(1) in 
conformity with an ABA-recommended amend-
ment to provide that the duty of disclosure does not 
apply when the "information is protected a$ a priv-
ileged communication." This qualification may be 
empty, for the rule of attorney-client privilege has 
been construed to exclude communications that 
further a crime, including a crime of perjury. On 
this interpretation of DR 7-102(B)(1), the lawyer 
has a duty to disclose the perjury. 
Paragraph (c) confers discretion on the lawyer to 
refuse to offer evidence that he "reasonably beli-
eves" is false. This gives the lawyer more latitude 
than DR 7-102(A)(4), which prohibited the lawyer 
from offering evidence the lawyer "knows" is false. 
There was no "countermart in the Code to parag-
raph (d). 
RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING 
PARTY AND COUNSEL 
A LAWYER SHALL NOT: 
(a) UNLAWFULLY OBSTRUCT ANOTHER 
PARTY'S ACCESS TO EVIDENCE OR UNLA-
WFULLY ALTER, DESTROY OR CONCEAL A 
DOCUMENT OR OTHER MATERIAL HAVING 
POTENTIAL EVIDENTIARY VALUE. A 
LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL OR ASSIST 
ANOTHER PERSON TO DO ANY SUCH ACT; 
(b) FALSIFY EVIDENCE, COUNSEL OR 
ASSIST A WITNESS TO TESTIFY FALSELY, OR 
OFFER AN INDUCEMENT TO A WITNESS 
THAT IS PROHIBITED BY LAW; 
(c) KNOWINGLY DISOBEY AN OBLIGATION 
UNDER THE RULES OF A TRIBUNAL EXCEPT 
FOR AN OPEN REFUSAL BASED ON AN ASS-
ERTION THAT NO VALID OBLIGATION 
EXISTS* 
(d) IN PRETRIAL PROCEDURE, MAKE A 
FRIVOLOUS DISCOVERY REQUEST OR FAIL 
TO MAKE REASONABLY DILIGENT EFFORT 
TO COMPLY WITH A LEGALLY PROPER 
DISCOVERY REQUEST BY AN OPPOSING 
PARTY; 
(e) IN TRIAL, ALLUDE TO ANY MATTER 
THAT THE LAWYER DOES NOT REASON-
ABLY BELIEVE IS RELEVANT OR THAT WILL 
NOT BE SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE EVID-
ENCE, ASSERT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
FACTS IN ISSUE EXCEPT WHEN TESTIFYING 
AS A WITNESS, OR STATE A PERSONAL 
OPINION AS TO THE JUSTNESS OF A CAUSE, 
THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS, THE 
CULPABILITY OF A CIVIL LITIGANT OR THE 
GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF AN ACCUSED; OR 
(0 REQUEST A PERSON OTHER THAN A 
CLIENT TO REFRAIN FROM VOLUNTARILY 
GIVING RELEVANT INFORMATION TO 
ANOTHER PARTY UNLESS: 
(1) THE PERSON IS A RELATIVE OR AN 
EMPLOYEE OR OTHER AGENT OF A CLIENT; 
AND 
(2) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELI-
EVES THAT THE PERSON'S INTERESTS WILL 
NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY REFRA-
INING FROM GIVING SUCH INFORMATION. 
COMMENT: 
The procedure of the adversary system contemp-
lates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled 
competitively by the contending parties. Fair com-
petition in the adversary system is secured by proh-
ibitions against destruction or concealment of evid-
ence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive 
tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. 
Documents and other items of evidence are often 
essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to 
evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing 
party, including the government, to obtain evidence 
through discovery or subpoena is an important 
procedural right. The exercise of that right can be 
frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed 
or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions 
makes it an offense to destroy material for the 
purpose of impairing its availability in a pending 
proceeding or one whose commencement can be 
foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a cri-
minal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary 
material generally, including computerized inform-
ation. 
With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper 
to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an 
expert witness on terms permitted by law. The 
common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is 
improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for 
testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert 
witness a contingent fee. 
Paragraph (0 permits a lawyer to advise emplo-
yees of a client to refrain from giving information 
to another party, for the employees may identify 
their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 
4.2. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 7-102(A) 
provided that a lawyer 'shall not suppress any evi-
dence that he or his client has a legal obligation to 
reveal." DR 7-109(B) provided that a lawyer "shall 
not advise or cause a person to secrete himself ... 
for the purpose of making him unavailable as a 
witness ....* DR 7-106(C)(7) provided that a lawyer 
shall not ' [intentionally or habitually violate any 
established rule of procedure or of evidence." 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-102(A)(6) 
provided that *a lawyer shall not participate in the 
creation or preservation of evidence when he knows 
or it is obvious that the evidence is false.* DR 7-
36 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code • Co Prove Utah 
, 109(C) provided that a lawyer "shall not pay, offer 
to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensa-
tion to a witness contingent upon the content of his 
testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer 
may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the payment 
of: (1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in 
attending or testifying; (2) Reasonable compensation 
to a witness for his foss of time in attending or tes-
tifying; [or] (3) A reasonable fee for the professional 
services of an expert witness." EC 7-28 stated that 
witnesses "should always testify truthfully and 
should be free from any financial inducements that 
might tempt them to do otherwise." 
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR 7-
106(A), which provided that a lawyer "shall not 
disregard ... a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling 
of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, 
but he may take appropriate steps in good faith to 
test the validity of such rule or ruling. 
Paragraph (d) has no counterpart in the Code. 
Paragraph (e) substantially incorporates DR 7-
106(C)(1), (2), (3) and (4). DR 7-106(C)(2) prosc-
ribed asking a question "intended to degrade a 
witness or other person," a matter dealt with in Rule 
4.4. DR 7-106(C)(5), providing that a lawyer shall 
not "[f]ail to comply with known local customs of 
courtesy or practice," was too vague to be a rule of 
conduct enforceable as law. 
With regard to paragraph (0. DR 7-104(A)(2) 
provided that a lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a 
person who is not represented ... other than the 
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such 
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being 
in conflict with the interests of his client." 
RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND 
DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL 
A LAWYER SHALL NOT: 
(a) SEEK TO INFLUENCE A JUDGE, JUROR, 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR OR OTHER OFFICIAL 
BY MEANS PROHIBITED BY LAW; OR 
(b) COMMUNICATE EX PARTE WITH A 
JUROR OR PROSPECTIVE JUROR BEFORE 
THE DISCHARGE OF THE JURY EXCEPT AS 
PERMITTED BY LAW; OR 
(c) IN AN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING, 
COMMUNICATE, OR CAUSE ANOTHER TO 
COMMUNICATE, AS TO THE MERITS OF THE 
CAUSE WITH A JUDGE OR OTHER OFFICIAL 
BEFORE WHOM A MATTER IS PENDING, 
EXCEPT: 
(1) IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROC-
EEDINGS fN THE CAUSE; 
(2) IN WRITING IF THE LAWYER PROM-
PTLY DELIVERS A COPY OF THE WRITING 
TO OPPOSING COUNSEL OR TO THE 
ADVERSE PARTY IF SUCH PARTY IS NOT 
REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER; 
(3) ORALLY UPON ADEQUATE NOTICE 
TO OPPOSING COUNSEL OR ' TO THE 
ADVERSE PARTY IF SUCH PARTY IS NOT 
REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER; OR 
(4) AS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY 
LAW* OR 
(d)'ENGAGE IN CONDUCT INTENDED TO 
DISRUPT A TRIBUNAL. 
COMMENT: 
Many forms of improper influence upon a trib-
unal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are 
specified in the Code of Judicial Conduct, with 
which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is 
required to avoid contributing to a violation of such 
prov sions. 
The advocate's function is to present evidence 
and argument so that the cause may be decided 
according to law. Refraining from abusive or obst-
reperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's 
right to speak on behalf of fttigants. A (awyer may 
stand firm against abuse by a judge but should 
avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justi-
fication for similar dereliction by an advocate. An 
advocate can present the cause, protect the record 
for subsequent review and preserve professional 
integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than 
by belligerence or theatrics. 
CODE COMPARISON 
with regard to paragraphs (a) and (b), DR 7-
108(A) provided that "[bjefore the trial of a case a 
lawyer ... shall not communicate with ... anyone he 
knows to be a member of the venire . . . / DR 7-
108(B) provided that during the trial of a case a 
lawyer "shall not communicate with ... any member 
ofthpjury." 
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR 
7-flO(B). 
W th regard to paragraph (d), DR 7-106(C)(6) 
provided that a lawyer shall not engage in 
"undignified or discourteous conduct which is deg-
rading to a tribunal/ 
R L L £ 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE OR 
CAUSE ANOTHER TO MAKE AN EXTRAJUD-
ICIAL STATEMENT THAT A REASONABLE 
PERSON WOULD EXPECT TO BE DISSEMIN-
ATED BY MEANS OF PUBLIC COMMUNICA-
TION IF THE LAWYER KNOWS OR REASON-
ABLY SHOULD KNOW THAT IT WILL HAVE 
A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF MATERI-
ALLY INFLUENCING AN ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDING. | 
(b) A STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN PAR-
AGRAPH (a) ORDINARILY IS LIKELY TO 
HAVfE SUCH AN EFFECT WHEN IT REFERS 
TO A CIVIL MATTER TRIABLE TO A JURY, A 
CRIMINAL MATTER, OR ANY OTHER PROC-
EEDING THAT COULD RESULT IN INCARC-
ERATION, AND THE STATEMENT RELATES 
TO: 
(1) THE CHARACTER, CREDIBILITY, 
REPUTATION OR CRIMINAL RECORD OF A 
PARTY, SVSPECT IS A CRIMINAL INVESTI-
GATION OR WITNESS, OR THE IDENTITY OF 
A WITNESS, OR THE EXPECTED TESTIMONY 
OF A PARTY OR WITNESS; 
(2) IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR PROCEE-
DING THAT COULD RESULT IN INCARCER-
ATION, THE POSSIBILITY OF A PLEA OF 
GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE OR THE EXIST-
ENCE OR CONTENTS OF ANY CONFESSION, 
ADMISSION, OR STATEMENT GIVEN BY A 
DEFENDANT OR SUSPECT OR THAT 
PERSON'S REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO MAKE 
A STATEMENT; 
13) THE PERFORMANCE OR RESULTS OF 
ANY EXAMINATION OR TEST OR THE 
REFUSAL OR FAILURE OF A PERSON TO 
SUBMIT TO AN EXAMINATION OR TEST, OR 
THE IDENTITY OR NATURE OF PHYSICAL 
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EVIDENCE EXPECTED TO BE PRESENTED; 
(4) ANY OPINION AS TO THE GUILT OR 
INNOCENCE OF A DEFENDANT OR SUSPECT 
IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR PROCEEDING 
THAT COULD RESULT IN INCARCERATION; 
(5) INFORMATION THE LAWYER KNOWS 
OR REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW IS LIKELY 
TO BE INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN A 
TRIAL AND WOULD IF DISCLOSED CREATE 
A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF PREJUDICING AN 
IMPARTIAL TRIAL; OR 
(6) THE FACT THAT A DEFENDANT HAS 
BEEN CHARGED WITH A CRIME, UNLESS 
THERE IS INCLUDED THEREIN A STATE-
MENT EXPLAINING THAT THE CHARGE IS 
MERELY AN ACCUSATION AND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS PRESUMED INNOCENT 
UNTIL AND UNLESS PROVEN GUILTY. 
(c) SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PAR-
AGRAPHS (a) and (b), A LAWYER INVOLVED 
IN THE INVESTIGATION OR LITIGATION OF 
A MATTER MAY STATE WITHOUT ELABOR-
ATION: 
(1) THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE 
CLAIM OR DEFENSE; 
(2) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A 
PUBLIC RECORD; 
(3) THAT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 
MATTER IS IN PROGRESS, INCLUDING THE 
GENERAL SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION, 
THE OFFENSE OR CLAIM OR DEFENSE INV-
OLVED AND, EXCEPT WHEN PROHIBITED 
BY LAW, THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS 
INVOLVED; " 
(4) THE SCHEDULING OR RESULT OF 
ANY STEP IN LITIGATION; 
(5) A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN 
OBTAINING EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION 
NECESSARY THERETO; 
(6) A WARNING OF DANGER CONCER-
NING THE BEHAVIOR OF A PERSON INVO-
LVED, WHEN-THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE 
THAT THERE EXISTS THE LIKELIHOOD OF 
SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO AN INDIVIDUAL OR 
TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST; AND 
(7) IN A CRIMINAL CASE: 
(i) THE IDENTITY, AGE, RESIDENCE, 
OCCUPATION AND FAMILY STATUS OF THE 
ACCUSED; 
(ii) IF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN 
APPREHENDED, INFORMATION NECESSARY 
TO AID IN APPREHENSION OF THAT 
PERSON; 
(iii) THE FACT, TIME AND PLACE OF 
ARREST; AND 
(iv) THE IDENTITY OF INVESTIGATING 
AND ARRESTING OFFICERS OR AGENCIES 
AND THE LENGTH OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
COMMENT: 
It is difficult to strike a balance between protec-
ting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the 
right of free expression. Preserving the right to a 
fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the 
information that may be disseminated about a party 
prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is 
involved. If there were no such limits, the result 
would be the practical nullification of the protective 
effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the 
exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, 
there are vital social interests served by the free 
dissemination of information about events having 
legal consequences and about legal proceedings 
themselves. The public has a right to know about 
threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring 
its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the 
conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in 
matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the 
subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct 
significance in debate and deliberation over quest-
ions of public policy. 
No body of rules can simultaneously satisfy all 
interests of fair trial and all those of free expression. 
The formula in this Rule is based upon the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the ABA Standards 
Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, as amended in 
1978. 
Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern 
proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and 
mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other 
types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance 
with such Rules. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Rule 3.6 is similar to DR 7-107, except as 
follows: First, Rule 3.6 adopts the general criteria of 
"substantial likelihood of materially influencing an 
adjudicative proceeding" to describe impermissible 
conduct. Second, Rule 3.6 transforms the particulars 
in DR 7-107 into an illustrative compilation that 
gives fair notice of conduct ordinarily posing unac-
ceptable dangers to the fair administration of 
justice. Finally, Rule 3.6 omits DR 7-107(C)(7), 
which provided that a lawyer may reveal *[a]t the 
time of seizure, a description of the physical evid-
ence seized, other than a confession, admission or 
statement." Such revelations may be substantially 
prejudicial and are frequently the subject of pretrial 
suppression motions, which, if successful, may be 
circumvented by prior disclosure to the press. 
RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ACT AS ADVO-
CATE AT A TRIAL IN WHICH THE LAWYER 
IS LIKELY TO BE A NECESSARY WITNESS 
EXCEPT WHERE: 
(1) THE TESTIMONY RELATES TO AN 
UNCONTESTED ISSUE; 
(2) THE TESTIMONY RELATES TO THE 
NATURE AND VALUE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
RENDERED IN THE CASE; OR 
(3) DISQUALIFICATION OF THE LAWYER 
WOULD WORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP ON 
THE CLIENT. 
(b) A LAWYER MAY ACT AS ADVOCATE IN 
THE TRIAL IN WHICH ANOTHER LAWYER 
IN THE LAWYERS FIRM IS LIKELY TO BE 
CALLED AS A WITNESS UNLESS PRECLUDED 
FROM DOING SO BY RULE 1.7 OR RULE 1.9. 
COMMENT: 
Combining the roles of advocate and witness can 
prejudice the opposing party and can involve a 
conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. 
The opposing party has proper objection where 
the combination of roles may prejudice that party's 
rights in the litigation. A witness is required to 
testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an 
advocate is expected to explain and comment on 
evidence given by others. It may not be clear 
whether a statement by an advocate-witness should 
be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. 
Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony 
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will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role 
are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes 
that where the testimony concerns the extent and 
value of legal services rendered in the action in 
which the testimony is offered, permitting the 
lawyer to testify avoids the need for a second trial 
with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in 
such a situation, the judge has first hand knowledge 
of the matter in issue; hence, there is less depend-
ence on the adversary process to test the credibility 
of the testimony. 
Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) 
recognizes that a balancing is required between the 
interests of the client and those of the opposing 
party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer 
prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the 
importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's tes-
timony, and the probability that the lawyer's testi-
mony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even 
if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining 
whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due 
regard must be given to the effect of disqualification 
on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both 
parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer 
would probably be a witness. The principle of 
imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10 has no 
application to this aspect of the problem. 
Whether the combination of roles involves an 
improper conflict of interest with respect to the 
client is determined by Rule 1.7 or 1.9. For 
example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict 
between the testimony of the client and that of the 
lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the repr-
esentation is improper. The problem can arise 
whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf 
of the client or is called by the opposing party. 
Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is 
primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. 
See Comment to Rule 1.7. If a lawyer who is a 
member of a firm may not act as both advocate and 
witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10 
disqualifies the firm also. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 5-102(A) prohibited a lawyer, or the 
lawyer's firm, from serving as advocate if the 
lawyer "learned or it is obvious that he or a lawyer 
in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf 
of his client." DR 5-102(B) provided that a lawyer, 
and the lawyer's firm, may continue representation 
if the "lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a 
lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other 
than on behalf of his client ... until it is apparent 
that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his 
client." DR 5-101(B) permitted a lawyer to testify 
while representing a client: "(1) If the testimony will 
relate solely to an uncontested matterr (2) If the 
testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality 
and there is no reason to believe that substantial 
evidence will be offered in opposition to the testi-
mony; (3) If the testimony will relate solely to the 
nature and value of legal services rendered in the 
case by the lawyer or his firm to the client; (4) As to 
any matter if refusal would work a substantial har-
dship on the client because of the distinctive value 
of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular 
case." 
The exception stated in paragraph (a)(1) consoli-
dates provisions of DR 5-101<BMl) and (2). Testi-
mony relating to formality, referred to in DR 5-
101(B)(2), in effect defined the phrase "uncontested 
issue," and was redundant. 
RULp 3.8 SPECIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF A 
PROSECUTOR 
TH£ PROSECUTOR IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
SHALL: 
(A) REFRAIN FROM PROSECUTING A 
CHARGE THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWS IS 
NOT $UPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE; 
(B) MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO 
ASSURE THAT THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN 
'ADVISED OF THE RIGHT TO, AND THE 
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING, COUNSEL 
AND HAS BEEN GIVEN REASONABLE OPPO-
RTUNITY TO OBTAIN COUNSEL; 
(C) NOT SEEK TO OBTAIN FROM AN UNR-
EPRESENTED ACCUSED A WAIVER OF IMP-
ORTANT PRETRIAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS THE 
RIGHF TO A PRELIMINARY HEARING; 
(D) MAKE TIMELY DISCLOSURE TO THE 
DEFENSE OF ALL EVIDENCE OR INFORMA-
TION KNOWN TO THE PROSECUTOR THAT 
TENDS TO NEGATE THE GUILT OF THE 
ACCUSED OR MITIGATES THE OFFENSE, 
AND, IN CONNECTION WITH SENTENCING, 
DISCLOSE TO THE DEFENSE ALL UNPRIVI-
LEGED MITIGATING INFORMATION KNOWN 
TO THE PROSECUTOR, EXCEPT WHEN THE 
PROSECUTOR IS RELIEVED OF THIS RESPO-
NSIBILITY BY A PROTECTIVE ORDER OF 
THETJRIBUNAL;AND 
(E) EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO 
PREVENT INVESTIGATORS, LAW ENFORCE-
MENT PERSONNEL, EMPLOYEES OR OTHER 
PERSONS ASSISTING OR ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE PROSECUTOR IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
FROM MAKING AN EXTRAJUDICIAL STAT-
EMENT THAT, THE PROSECUTOR WOULD BE 
PROHIBITED FROM MAKING UNDER RULE 
3.6. 
COMMENT: 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister 
of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This 
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to 
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice 
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is requ-
ired to go in this direction is a matter of debate and 
varies in different jurisdictions. See Rule 3.3(d), 
governing ex parte proceedings, among which grand 
jury proceedings are included. Applicable law may 
require other measures by the prosecutor and 
knowing disregard of those obligations or systematic 
abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a 
violation of Rule 8.4. 
Paragraph (c) does not apply to an accused app-
earing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor 
does it forbid the lawful questioning of a suspect 
who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and 
silence. 
The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a 
prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order 
from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the 
defensei could result in substantial harm to an indi-
vidual 4r to the public interest. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 1- 103(A) provided that a 'public prosecutor 
... shal} not institute ... criminal charges when he 
knows or it is obvious that the charges are not 
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supported by probable cause/ DR 7-103(B) prov-
ided that "[a] public prosecutor ... shall make timely 
disclosure ... of the existence of evidence, known to 
the prosecutor ... that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or 
reduce the punishment.* 
RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN 
NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
A LAWYER REPRESENTING A CLIENT 
BEFORE A LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRA-
TIVE TRIBUNAL IN A NONADJUDICATIVE' 
PROCEEDING SHALL DISCLOSE THAT THE 
APPEARANCE IS IN A REPRESENTATIVE 
CAPACITY AND SHALL CONFORM TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF RULES 3.3(a) THROUGH (c), 
3.4(a) THROUGH (c), and 3.5. 
COMMENT: 
In representation before bodies such as legislat-
ures, municipal councils, and executive and admin-
istrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-
making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate 
issues and advance argument in the matters under 
consideration. The decision-making body, like a 
court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the 
submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before 
such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly 
dure. 
Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before 
nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. 
The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject 
lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who 
are not lawyers. However, legislatures and admini-
strative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to 
deal with them as they deal with courts. 
This Rule does not apply to representation of a 
client in negotiation or other bilateral transaction 
with a governmental agency; representation in such 
a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4. 
CODE COMPARISON 
EC 7-15 stated that a lawyer "appearing before 
an administrative agency, regardless of the nature of 
the proceeding it is conducting, has the continuing 
duty to advance the cause of his client within the 
bounds of the law." EC 7-16 stated that "[w]hen a 
lawyer appears in connection with proposed legisl-
ation, he ... should comply with applicable laws and 
legislative rules." EC 8-5 stated that "fraudulent, 
deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a partici-
paivi \TI % pioctt&ttg btioit a ... teg&taivtt bo<ty ... 
should never be participated in ... by lawyers." DR 
7-106(B)(l) provided that "[i)n presenting a matter 
to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose ... [u)niess 
privileged or irrelevant, the identity of the clients he 
represents and of the persons who employed him." 
ai v^unuuci 
TRANSACTIONS WITH 
PERSONS OTHER THAN 
CLIENTS 
RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN 
STATEMENTS TO OTHERS 
IN THE COURSE OF REPRESENTING A 
CLIENT A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWI-
NGLY: 
(a) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATE-
RIAL FACT OR LAW TO A THIRD PERSON; 
OR 
(b) FAIL TO DISCLOSE A MATERIAL FACT 
TO A THIRD PERSON WHEN DISCLOSURE IS 
NECESSARY TO AVOID ASSISTING A CRIM-
INAL OR FRAUDULENT ACT BY A CLIENT, 
UNLESS DISCLOSURE IS PROHIBITED BY 
RULE 1.6. 
COMMENT: 
Misrepresentation 
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing 
with others on a client's behalf, but generally has 
no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of 
relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the 
lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of 
another person that the lawyer knows is false. Mis-
representations can also occur by failure to act. 
Statements of Fact 
This rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a 
particular statement should be regarded as one of 
fact can depend on circumstances. Under generally 
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of 
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of 
niaterial fact. Estimates of price or value placed on 
the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions 
ai to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this 
category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed 
principal except where nondisclosure of the principal 
would constitute fraud. 
Fraud by Client 
Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may 
require a lawyer to disclose certain information to 
avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's 
crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure 
coaxed by this. paxa&ta.yK U, however > yibscct to tte 
obligations created by Rule 1.6. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR 7-
102(A)(5), which stated that *[i]n his representation 
of a client, a lawyer shall not ... [kjnowingly make a 
false statement of law or fact." 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-102(A)(3) 
provided that a lawyer shall not *[c]onceal or kno-
wingly fail to disclose that which he is required by 
law to reveal/ 
RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH 
PERSON REPRESENTED BY 
COUNSEL 
IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT, A LAWYER 
SHALL NOT COMMUNICATE ABOUT THE 
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SUBJECT OF THE REPRESENTATION WITH A 
PARTY THE LAWYER KNOWS TO BE REPR-
ESENTED BY ANOTHER LAWYER IN THE 
MATTER, UNLESS THE LAWYER HAS THE 
CONSENT OF THE OTHER LAWYER OR IS 
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO DO SO. 
COMMENT: 
This Rule does not prohibit communication witn a 
party, or an employee or agent of a party, concer-
ning matters outside the representation. For 
example, the existence of a controversy between a 
government agency and a private party, or between 
two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for 
either from communicating with nonlawyer repres-
entatives of the other regarding a separate matter. 
Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly 
with each other and a lawyer having independent 
justification for communicating with the other party 
is permitted to do so. Communications authorized 
by law include, for example, the right of a party to 
a controversy with a government agency to speak 
with government officials about the matter. 
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits 
communications by a lawyer for one party concer-
ning the matter in representation with persons 
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the 
organization, and with any other person whose act 
or omission in connection with that matter may he 
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or 
criminal liability or whose statement may constitute 
an admission on the part of the organization. If an 
agent or employee of the organization is represented 
in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent 
by that counsel to a communication will be suffic-
ient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(0. 
This Rule also covers any person, whether or not 
a party to a formal proceeding, who is represented 
by counsel concerning the matter in question. 
CODE COMPARISON 
This Rule is substantially identical to DR 7-
104<AX1). 
RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH 
UNREPRESENTED PERSON 
(a) DURING THE COURSE OF A LAWYER'S 
REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT, THE 
LAWYER SHALL NOT GIVE ADVICE TO AN 
UNREPRESENTED PERSON OTHER THAN 
THE ADVICE TO OBTAIN COUNSEL. 
(b) IN DEALING ON BEHALF OF A~CLIENT 
WITH A PERSON WHO IS NOT REPRESENTED 
BY COUNSEL, A LAWYER SHALL NOT STATE 
OR IMPLY THAT THE LAWYER IS DISINTE-
RESTED. WHEN THE LAWYER KNOWS OR 
REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW THAT THE 
UNREPRESENTED PERSON MISUNDERST-
ANDS THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN THE 
MATTER, THE LAWYER SHALL MAKE REA-
SONABLE EFFORTS TO CORRECT THE MIS-
UNDERSTANDING. 
COMMENT: 
An unrepresented person, particularly one not 
experienced in dealing with legal matters, might 
assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is 
a disinterested authority on the law even when the 
lawyer represents a client. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in 
the Code. DR 7-104(A)(2) provided that a lawyer 
shall not *[g]ive advice to a person who is not rep-
resented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure 
counsel..." 
RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF 
TfflRD PERSONS 
IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT, A LAWYER 
SHALL NOT USE MEANS THAT HAVE NO 
SUBSTANTIAL PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO 
EMBARRASS, DELAY, OR BURDEN A THIRD 
PERSON, OR USE METHODS OF OBTAINING 
EVIIDENCE THAT VIOLATE THE LEGAL 
RIGHTS OF SUCH A PERSON. 
COMMENT: 
Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to 
subordinate the interests of others to those of the 
client, but that responsibility does not imply that a 
lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It 
is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they 
include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining 
evidence from third persons. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Dk 7-106(C)(2) provided that a lawyer shall not 
"[a]sk any question that he has no reasonable basis 
to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended 
to degrade a witness or other person/ DR 7-
102(^X0 provided that a lawyer shall not "take ... 
actioh on behalf of his client when he knows or 
when it is obvious that such action would serve 
merely to harass or maliciously injure another." DR 
7-108(D) provided that "[ajfter discharge of the 
jury ... the lawyer shall not ask questions or make 
comments to a member of that jury that are calcu-
lated merely to harass or embarrass the juror ..." 
DR 7-108(E) provided that a lawyer "shall not 
conduct ... a vexatious or harassing investigation of 
either| a venireman or a juror." 
LAW FIRMS AND 
ASSOCIATIONS 
RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OR A 
PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY 
LAWYER 
A PARTNER IN A LAW FIRM SHALL 
E REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE 
THAt THE FIRM HAS IN EFFECT MEASURES 
GIVING REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT 
ALL LAWYERS IN THE FIRM CONFORM TO 
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
(b) A LAWYER HAVING DIRECT SUPERVI-
SORY AUTHORITY OVER ANOTHER LAWYER 
SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO 
ENSURE THAT THE OTHER LAWYER CONF-
ORMS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR (ANOTHER LAWYER'S VIOLATION OF 
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IF: 
. (1) THE LAWYER ORDERS OR, WITH 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT, 
RATIFIES THE CONDUCT INVOLVED; OR 
0 THE LAWYER IS A PARTNER IN THE 
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LAW FIRM IN WHICH THE OTHER LAWYER 
PRACTICES, OR HAS DIRECT SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY OVER THE OTHER LAWYER, 
AND KNOWS OF THE CONDUCT AT A TIME 
WHEN ITS CONSEQUENCES CAN BE 
AVOIDED OR MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO 
TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL ACTION. 
COMMENT: 
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have 
supervisory authority over the professional work of 
a firm or legal department of a government agency. 
This includes members of a partnership and the 
shareholders in a law firm organized as a professi-
onal corporation; lawyers having supervisory auth-
ority in the law department of an enterprise or 
government agency; and lawyers who have interm-
ediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. 
The measures required to fulfill the responsibility 
prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on 
the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. 
In a small firm, informal supervision and occasional 
admonition ordinarily might be sufficient. In a large 
firm, or in practice situations in which intensely 
difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more 
elaborate procedures may be necessary. Some firms, 
for example, have a procedure whereby junior 
lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical 
piobkms d\ttc\iv to & designated stnios partotT OT 
special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether 
large or small, may also -rely on continuing legal 
education in professional ethics. In any event, the 
ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the 
conduct of all its members and a lawyer having 
authority over the work of another may not assume 
that the subordinate lawyer will inevitably conform 
to the Rules. 
Paragraph (c)(1) expresses a general principle of 
responsibility for acts of- another. See also Rule 
8.4(a). 
Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a lawyer 
having direct supervisory authority over perform-
ance of specific legal work by another lawyer. 
Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in 
particular circumstances is a question of fact. Part-
ners of a private firm have at least indirect respon-
sibility for all work being done by the firm, while a 
partner in charge of a particular matter ordinarily 
has direct authority over other firm lawyers engaged 
in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a 
partner would depend on t^he immediacy of the 
panati's iiwoNtnvttvt and the seriousness of the 
misconduct. The supervisor is required to intervene 
to prevent avoidable consequences of miscondua if 
the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. 
Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subord-
inate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party 
in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subor-
dinate has a duty to correct the resulting misappre-
hension. 
Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supe-
rvision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on 
the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it 
does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because 
there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of 
the violation. 
Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer 
does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct 
of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a 
lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another 
lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the 
scope of these Rules. 
COPE COMPARISON 
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in 
the Code. DR 1-103(A) provided that a lawyer 
"possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of 
DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to ... auth-
ority empowered to investigate or act upon such 
violation." 
RULE 5-2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A 
SUBORDINATE LAWYER 
(a) A LAWYER IS BOUND BY THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT NOTWITHSTAN-
DING THAT THE LAWYER ACTED AT THE 
DIRECTION OF ANOTHER PERSON. 
(D) A SUBORDINATE LAWYER DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT IF THAT LAWYER ACTS IN ACC-
ORPANCE WITH A SUPERVISORY LAWYER'S 
REASONABLE RESOLUTION OF A QUESTION 
OF PROFESSIONAL DUTY. 
COMMENT: 
Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility 
for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at 
the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be rele-
vant in determining whether a lawyer had the kno-
wledge required to render conduct a violation of the 
Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivo-
lous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the 
subordinate would not be guilty of a professional 
violation unless the subordinate knew of the docu-
ment's frivolous character. 
When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate rela-
tionship encounter a matter involving professional 
judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may 
assume responsibility for making the judgment. 
Otherwise a consistent course of action or position 
could not be taken. If the question can reasonably 
be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers 
is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling 
it. If the question is reasonably arguable, someone 
has to decide upon the course of action. That aut-
hority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a 
subordinate may be guided accordingly. For 
example, if a question arises whether the interests of 
two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's 
reasonable resolution of the question should protect 
the subordinate professionally if the resolution is 
subsequently challenged. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the 
Code. 
RULE 5.3 RESPONSIBILITIES 
REGARDING NONLAWYER 
ASSISTANTS 
WITH RESPECT TO A NONLAWYER EMP-
LOYED OR RETAINED BY OR ASSOCIATED 
WITH A LAWYER: 
(a) A PARTNER IN A LAW FIRM SHALL 
MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE 
THAT THE FIRM HAS IN EFFECT MEASURES 
GIVING REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT 
THE PERSON'S CONDUCT IS COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
THE LAWYER; 
(b) A LAWYER HAVING DIRECT SUPERVI-
SORY AUTHORITY OVER THE NONLAWYER 
rroposed Kules of Frofessional Conduct 
SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO 
ENSURE THAT THE PERSON'S CONDUCT IS 
COMPATIBLE WITH THE PROFESSIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER; AND 
' (c) A LAWYER SHALL RE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR CONDUCT OF SUCH A PERSON THAT 
WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IF ENGAGED IN 
BY A LAWYER IF: 
(1) THE LAWYER ORDERS OR, WITH 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT, 
RATIFIES THE CONDUCT INVOLVED; OR 
(2) THE LAWYER IS A PARTNER IN THE 
LAW FIRM IN WHICH THE PERSON IS EMP-
LOYED, OR HAS DIRECT SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY OVER THE PERSON, AND 
KNOWS OF THE CONDUCT AT A TIME WHEN 
ITS CONSEQUENCES CAN BE AVOIDED OR 
MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO TAKE REASON-
ABLE REMEDIAL ACTION. 
COMMENT: 
Lawyers generally employ assistants in their pra-
ctice, including secretaries, investigators, law student 
interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, 
whether employees or independent contractors, act 
for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's profess-
ional services. A lawyer should give such assistants 
appropriate instruction and supervision concerning 
the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly 
regarding the obligation not to disclose information 
relating to representation of the client, and should 
be responsible for their work product. The measures 
employed in supervising nonlawyers should take 
account of the fact that they do not have legal tra-
ining and are not subject to professional discipline. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in 
the Code. DR 4-101(D) provided that a lawyer 
"shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his empl-
oyees, associates, and others whose services are 
utilized by him.from disclosing or using confidences 
or secrets of a client ... * DR 7-107(J) provided 
that "[a] lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to 
prevent his employees and associates from making 
an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohib-
ited from making under DR 7-107." 
RULE 5.4 PROFESSIONAL 
INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER 
(a) A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM SHALL NOT 
SHARE LEGAL FEES WITH A NONLAWYER, 
EXCEPT THAT: 
(1) AN AGREEMENT BY A LAWYER WITH 
THE LAWYER'S FIRM, PARTNER, OR ASSO-
CIATE MAY PROVIDE FOR THE PAYMENT 
OF MONEY, OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD 
OF TIME AFTER THE LAWYER'S DEATH, TO 
THE LAWYER'S ESTATE OR TO ONE OR 
MORE SPECIFIED PERSONS; 
(2) A LAWYER WHO UNDERTAKES TO 
COMPLETE UNFINISHED LEGAL BUSINESS 
OF A DECEASED LAWYER MAY PAY TO THE 
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LAWYER THAT 
PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL COMPENSA-
TION WHICH FAIRLY REPRESENTS THE 
SERVICES RENDERED BY THE DECEASED 
LAWYER;AND 
(3) A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM MAY 
INCLUDE NONLAWYER EMPLOYEES IN A ! 
COMPENSATION 
EVE1> 
OR RETIREMENT PLAN, 
THOUGH THE PLAN IS BASED IN 
jLE OR IN PART ON. A PROFIT-
ING ARRANGEMENT.- - ? • • • 
LAWYER SHALL NOT FORM A PAR-
iHIP WITH A NONLAWYER IF ANY OF 
ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
CONSIST OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PERMIT A 
PERSON WHO RECOMMENDS, EMPLOYS, OR 
PAYS THE LAWYER TO RENDER LEGAL 
SERVICES FOR ANOTHER TO DIRECT OR 
REGULATE THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL 
JUDGMENT IN RENDERING SUCH LEGAL 
SERVICES. 
(d) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PRACTICE 
WITH OR IN THE FORM OF A PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION AUTHOR-
X> PRACTICE LAW FOR A PROFIT, IF: 
A NONLAWYER OWNS ANY INTEREST 
ilN, EXCEPT THAT A FIDUCIARY 
•SENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF A 
•R MAY HOLD THE STOCK OR INTE-
REST OF THE LAWYER FOR A REASONABLE 
TIME DURING ADMINISTRATION; 
(2) A NONLAWYER IS A CORPORATE 
"OR OR OFFICER THEREOF; OR 
A NONLAWYER HAS THE RIGHT TO 
OR CONTROL THE PROFESSIONAL 
•NT OF A LAWYER. 
LAWYER MAY PRACTICE IN A NON-
PROFIT CORPORATION WHICH IS ESTABLI-
SHED 
The 
TO SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
PROVIDED THAT THE NONLAWYER DIREC-
TORS AND OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORA-
TION DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE INDE-
PENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT OF 
THE LAWYER. 
COMMENT: 
provisions of this Rule express traditional 
limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to 
protect the lawyer's professional independence of 
judgment. Where someone other than the client pays 
the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employ-
ment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not 
modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As 
stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should 
not interfere with the lawyer's professional judg-
ment. I 
The Rule is intended to prevent lay interference 
with the attorney/client relationship in non-profit 
public interest law firms. Typically, these organiza-
tions are structured so that a lay board of directors 
decides to undertake or fund a case or category of 
cases on behalf of a third party. The organization 
thus becomes the payor or provider of legal services 
for others. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) is substantially identical to UK 3-
102(A). 
Paragraph (b) is substantially identical to DR 3-
103(A). 
Paragraph (c) is substantially identical to DR 5-
107(B). . . . • • . . . . -
Paragraph (d) is substantially identical to DR 5-
107(C). 
Paragraph (e) bad no countermart in the Code. 
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RULE 5.5 UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE OF LAW 
-A LAWYER SHALL NOT: 
(a) PRACTICE LAW IN A JURISDICTION 
WHERE DOING SO VIOLATES THE REGULA-
TION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THAT 
JURISDICTION; OR 
(b) ASSIST ANY PERSON IN THE PERFOR-
MANCE OF ACTIVITY THAT CONSTITUTES 
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. 
COMMENT: 
The definition of the practice of law is established 
by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. 
Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law 
to members of the Bar protects the public against 
rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. 
Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from 
employing the services of paraprofessionals and 
delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer 
supervises the delegated work and retains responsi-
bility for their work. See Rule 5.3. Likewise, it does 
not prohibit lawyers from providing professional 
advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose emplo-
yment requires knowledge of law; for example, 
claims adjusters, employees of financial or comme-
rcial institutions, social workers, accountants and 
persons employed in government agencies. In addi-
tion, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to 
proceed pro se. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 3-101(B) of 
the Code provided that "[a] lawyer shall not practice 
law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in 
violation of regulations of the profession in that 
jurisdiction/ 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 3-101(A) of 
the Code provided that '[a] lawyer shall not aid a 
nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law/ 
RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT 
TO PRACTICE 
A LAWYER SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE IN 
OFFERING OR MAKING: 
(a) A PARTNERSHIP OR EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT THAT RESTRICTS THE RIGHTS 
OF A LAWYER TO PRACTICE AFTER TERM-
INATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP, EXCEPT 
AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING BENEFITS 
UPON RETIREMENT; OR 
(b) AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH A RESTRI-
CTION ON THE LAWYER'S RIGHT TO PRA-
CTICE IS PART OF THE SETTLEMENT OF A 
C O N T R O V E R S Y BETWEEN P R I V A T E 
PARTIES. 
COMMENT: 
An agreement restricting the right of partners or 
associates to practice after leaving a firm not only 
limits their professional autonomy but also limits 
the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Parag-
raph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restr-
ictions incident to provisions concerning retirement 
benefits for service with the firm. 
Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing 
not to represent other persons in connection with 
settling a claim on behalf of a client. 
CODE COMPARISON 
This Rule is substantially similar to DR 2-108. 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
RULE 6.1 PRO BONO PUBLICO 
SERVICE 
A LAWYER SHOULD RENDER PUBLIC 
INTEREST LEGAL SERVICE. A LAWYER MAY 
DISCHARGE THIS RESPONSIBILITY BY PRO-
VIDING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AT NO 
FEE OR A REDUCED FEE TO PERSONS OF 
LIMITED MEANS OR TO PUBLIC SERVICE OR 
CHARITABLE GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS, 
BY SERVICE IN ACTIVITIES FOR IMPROVING 
THE LAW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND BY FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATIONS THAT 
PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES TO PERSONS OF 
LIMITED MEANS. 
COMMENT: 
The ABA House of Delegates has formally ack-
nowledged 'the basic responsibility of each lawyer 
engaged in the practice of law to provide public 
interest legal services" without fee, or at a substan-
tially reduced fee, in one or more of the following 
areas*: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights 
law, charitable organization representation and the 
administration of justice. This Rule expresses that 
policy but is not intended to be enforced through 
disciplinary process. 
The rights and responsibilities of individuals and 
organizations in the Umted States are increasingly 
defined in legal terms. As a consequence, legal ass-
istance in coping with the web of statutes, rules and 
regulations is imperative for persons of modest and 
limited means, as well as for the relatively well-to-
do. 
The basic responsibility for providing legal serv-
ices for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon 
the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in 
the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the 
most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. 
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence 
or professional workload, should find time to part-
icipate in or otherwise support the provision of legal 
services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free 
legal service to those unable to pay reasonable fees 
continues to be an obligation of each lawyer as well 
as the profession generally, but the efforts of indi-
vidual lawyers are often not enough to meet the 
need. Thus, it has been necessary for the profession 
and government to institute additional programs to 
provide legal services. Accordingly, legal aid offices, 
lawyer referral services and other related programs 
have been developed, and others will be developed 
by the profession and government. Every lawyer 
should support all proper efforts to meet this need 
for legal services. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart of this rule in the Dis-
ciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-25 stated that 
the 'basic responsibility for providing legal services 
for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the 
individual lawyer .... Every lawyer, regardless of 
professional prominence or professional workload, 
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should find time to participate in serving the disad-
vantaged/ EC 8-9 stated that *[t]he advancement 
of our legal system is of vital importance in maint-
aining the rule of law ... [and] lawyers should enc-
ourage, and should aid in making, needed changes 
and improvements/ EC 8-3 stated that *[t]hose 
persons unable to pay for legal services should be 
provided needed services/ 
RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING 
APPOINTMENTS 
A LAWYER SHALL NOT SEEK TO AVOID 
APPOINTMENT BY A TRIBUNAL TO REPRE-
SENT A PERSON EXCEPT FOR GOOD CAUSE, 
SUCH AS: 
(a) REPRESENTING THE CLIENT IS LIKELY 
TO RESULT IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR OTHER 
LAW; 
(b) REPRESENTING THE CLIENT IS LIKELY 
TO RESULT IN AN UNREASONABLE FINAN-
CIAL BURDEN ON THE LAWYER; OR 
(c) THE CLIENT OR THE CAUSE IS SO 
REPUGNANT TO THE LAWYER AS TO BE 
LIKELY TO IMPAIR THE CLIENT-LAWYER 
RELATIONSHIP OR THE LAWYER'S ABILITY 
TO REPRESENT THE CLIENT. 
COMMENT: 
A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a 
client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as 
repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, 
however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility 
to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See 
Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer fulfills this respons-
ibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular 
matters or indigent oriunpopular clients. A lawyer 
may also be subject to appointment by a court to 
serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford 
legal services. 
Appointed Counsel 
For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an 
appointment to represent a person who cannot 
afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpop-
ular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not 
handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if 
undertaking the representation would result in an 
improper conflict of interest, for example, when the 
client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as 
to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship 
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A 
lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if 
acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for 
example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice 
so great as to be unjust. 
An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to 
the client as retained counsel, including the obliga-
tions of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to 
the same limitations on the client-lawyer relation-
ship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting 
the client in violation of the Rules. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the 
Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-29 stated 
that when a lawyer is "appointed by a court or 
requested by a bar association to undertake repres-
entation x>f a person unable to obtain counsel, 
whether for financial or other reasons, he should 
not seek to be excused from undertaking the repre-
sentation except for compelling reasons. Compelling 
reasons do not include such factors as the repugn 
ance of the subject matter of the proceeding, th< 
identity or position of a person involved in the case 
the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a cri 
minal proceeding is guilty, or the belief of th< 
lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case/ EC 2 
30 stated that "a lawyer should decline employmenl 
if the intensity of his personal feelings, as distingu-
ished from a community attitude, may impair his 
effective representation of a prospective client/ 
RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL 
SERVICES ORGANIZATION 
4 LAWYER MAY SERVE AS A DIRECTOR, 
OFFICER OR MEMBER OF A LEGAL SERV-
ICES ORGANIZATION, APART FROM THE 
LAW FIRM IN WHICH THE LAWYER PRAC-
TICES, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE 
ORGANIZATION SERVES PERSONS HAVING 
INTERESTS ADVERSE TO A CLIENT OF THE 
LAWYER. THE LAWYER SHALL NOT KNO-
WINGLY PARTICIPATE IN A DECISION OR 
ACTION OF THE ORGANIZATION: 
(i) IF PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION 
WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE 
LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS TO A CLIENT 
UNDER RULE 1.7; OR 
(b) WHERE THE DECISION COULD HAVE A 
MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE REP-
RESENTATION OF A CLIENT OF THE ORGA-
NIZATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE ADVERSE 
TO A CLIENT OF THE LAWYER, OR ON THE 
REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT OF THE 
LAWYER OR THE LAWYER'S FIRM. 
COMMENT: 
Lawyers should be encouraged to support and 
participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer 
who is an officer or a member of such an organiz-
ation does not thereby have a client-lawyer relati-
onship with persons served by the organization. 
However, there is potential conflict between the 
interests of such persons and the interests of the 
lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict 
disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a 
legaJ services organization, the profession's involv-
ement in such organizations would be severely cur-
tailed. 
It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reas-
sure a client of the organization that the represent-
<q will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of 
aber of the board. Established, written policies 
respect can enhance the credibility of such 
ices. 
atioi 
a m< 
in t 
ass 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the 
Code. 
RUtE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES 
AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS 
A LAWYER MAY SERVE AS A DIRECTOR, 
OFFICER OR MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZA-
TION INVOLVED IN REFORM OF THE LAW 
OR ITS ADMINISTRATION NOTWITHSTAN-
DING^ THAT THE REFORM MAY AFFECT THE 
INTERESTS OF A CLIENT OF THE LAWYER. 
WHEN THE LAWYER KNOWS THAT THE 
INTERESTS OF A CLIENT MAY BE MATERI-
ALLY BENEFITTED BY A DECISION IN 
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WHICH THE LAWYER PARTICIPATES, THE 
LAWYER SHALL DISCLOSE THAT FACT BUT 
NEED NOT IDENTIFY THE CLIENT. 
COMMENT: 
Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law 
reform generally do not have a client-lawyer rela-
tionship with the organization. Otherwise, it might 
follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar 
association law reform program that might indire-
ctly affect a client. For example, a lawyer speciali-
zing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as dis-
qualified from participating in drafting revisions of 
rules governing that subject. In determining the 
nature and scope of participation in such activities, 
a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients 
under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is 
professionally obligated to protect the integrity of 
the program by making an appropriate disclosure 
within the organization when the lawyer knows a 
private client might be materially benefitted. 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the 
Code. 
INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL 
SERVICES 
RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS 
CONCERNING A LAWYER'S 
SERVICES 
A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE A FALSE OR 
MISLEADING COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE 
LAWYER OR THE LAWYER'S SERVICES. A 
COMMUNICATION IS FALSE OR MISLEADING 
IF IT: 
(a) CONTAINS A MATERIAL MISREPRESE-
NTATION OF FACT OR LAW, OR OMITS A 
FACT NECESSARY TO MAKE THE STATE-
MENT CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE NOT 
MATERIALLY MISLEADING; 
(b) IS LIKELY TO CREATE AN UNJUSTIFIED 
EXPECTATION ABOUT RESULTS THE 
LAWYER CAN ACHIEVE, OR STATES OR 
IMPLIES THAT THE LAWYER CAN ACHIEVE 
RESULTS BY MEANS THAT VIOLATE THE 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR 
OTHER LAW; OR 
(c) COMPARES THE LAWYER'S SERVICES 
WITH OTHER LAWYERS' SERVICES, UNLESS 
THE COMPARISON CAN BE FACTUALLY 
SUBSTANTIATED. 
COMMENT: 
This Rule governs all communications about a 
lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by 
Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known 
a lawyer's services, statements about them should 
be truthful. The prohibition in paragraph (b) of 
statements that may create 'unjustified expectat-
ions* would ordinarily preclude advertisements 
about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as 
the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's 
record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and adverti-
sements containing client endorsements. Such info-
rmation may create the unjustified expectation that 
similar results can be obtained for others without 
reference to the specific factual and legal circumst-
ances. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 2-101 provided that *[aj lawyer shall not ... 
use ... any form of public communication contai-
ning a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim/ DR 2-
101(B) provided that a lawyer "may publish or 
broadcast ... the following information ... in the 
geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides 
or maintains offices or in which a significant part of 
the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the inf-
ormation complies with DR 2-101 (A), and is pre-
sented in a dignified manner . . . / DR 2-101(B) 
then specified twenty-five categories of informa-
tion that may be disseminated. DR 2-101(C) pro-
vided that *[a]ny person desiring to expand the 
information authorized for disclosure in DR 2-
101(B), or to provide for its dissemination through 
other forums may apply to [the agency having juri-
sdiction under state law] ..., The relief granted in 
response to any such application shall be promulg-
ated as an amendment to DR 2-101(B), universally 
applicable to all lawyers/ 
RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING 
(a) SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 7.1, A LAWYER MAY ADVERTISE SER-
VICES THROUGH PUBLIC MEDIA, SUCH AS A 
TELEPHONE DIRECTORY, LEGAL DIREC-
TORY, NEWSPAPER OR OTHER PERIODICAL, 
OUTDOOR, RADIO OR TELEVISION, OR 
THROUGH WRITTEN COMMUNICATION NOT 
INVOLVING SOLICITATION AS DEFINED IN 
RULE 7.3. 
(b) A COPY OR RECORDING OF AN ADVE-
RTISEMENT OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATION 
SHALL BE KEPT FOR TWO YEARS AFTER ITS 
LAST DISSEMINATION ALONG WITH A 
RECORD OF WHEN AND WHERE IT WAS 
USED. 
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT GIVE ANYT-
HING OF VALUE TO A PERSON FOR RECO-
MMENDING THE LAWYER'S SERVICES, 
EXCEPT THAT A LAWYER MAY PAY THE 
REASONABLE COST OF ADVERTISING OR 
WRITTEN COMMUNICATION PERMITTED BY 
THIS RULE AND MAY PAY THE USUAL 
CHARGES OF A N O T - F O R - P R O F I T 
LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE OR OTHER 
LEGAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION. 
(d) ANY COMMUNICATION MADE PURS-
UANT TO THIS RULE SHALL INCLUDE THE 
NAME OF AT LEAST ONE LAWYER RESPO-
NSIBLE FOR ITS CONTENT. 
COMMENT: 
To assist the public in obtaining Jegal services, 
lawyers should be allowed to make known their 
services not only through reputation but also 
through organized information campaigns in the 
form of advertising. Advertising Evolves an active 
quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a 
lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the 
public's need to know about legal services can be 
fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is 
particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate 
means who have not made extensive use of legal 
services. The interest in expanding public informa-
tion about legal services ought to prevail over con-
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
siderations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by 
lawyers entails the risk of practices that are mislea-
ding or overreaching. 
This Rule permits public dissemination of infor-
mation concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, 
address and telephone number; the kinds of services 
the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the 
lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for 
specific services and payment and credit arrangem-
ents; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of 
references and, with their consent,, names of clients 
regularly represented; and other information that 
might invite the attention of those seeking legal 
assistance. 
Questions of* effectiveness and taste in advertising 
are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. 
Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions 
against television advertising, against advertising 
going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or 
against "undignified" advertising. Television is now 
one of the most powerful media for getting infor-
mation to the public, particularly persons of low 
and moderate income; prohibiting television adver-
tising, therefore, would impede the flow of infor-
mation about legal services to many sectors of the 
public. Limiting the information that may be adve-
rtised has a similar effect and assumes that the Bar 
can accurately forecast the kind of information that 
the public would regard as relevant. 
Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.1 prohibits commu-
nications authorized by law, such as notice to 
members of a class in class action litigation. 
Record of Advertising 
Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the 
content and use of advertising be kept in order to 
facilitate enforcement of this Rule. It does not 
require that advertising be subject to review prior to 
dissemination. Such a requirement would be burd-
ensome and expensive relative to its possible bene-
fits, and may be of doubtful constitutionality. 
Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer 
A lawyer is allowed to pay for advertising perm-
itted by this Rule, but otherwise is not permitted to 
pay another person for channeling professional 
work. This restriction does not prevent an organiz-
ation or person other than the lawyer from advert-
ising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, 
a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may 
pay to advertise .legal services provided under its 
auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in not-
for-profit lawyer referral programs and. pay the 
usual fees charged by such programs. Paragraph (c) 
does not prohibit paying regular compensation to an 
assistant, such as a secretary, to prepare communi-
cations permitted by this Rule. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-101(B) 
provided that a lawyer "may publish or broadcast, 
subject to DR 2-103, ... in print media ... or tele-
vision or radio ...." With regard to paragraph (b), 
DR 2-101(D) provided that if the advertisement is 
'communicated to the public over television or 
radio, ... a recording of the actual transmission shall 
be retained by the lawyer/ 
RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH 
PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS 
A LAWYER MAY NOT SOLICIT PROFESSI-
ONAL EMPLOYMENT FROM A PROSPECTIVE 
ENT WITH WHOM THE LAWYER HAS NO 
1ILY OR PRIOR PROFESSIONAL RELATI-
$HIP, BY MAIL, IN-PERSON OR OTHER-
WHEN A SIGNIFICANT MOTIVE FOR 
LAWYER'S DOING SO IS THE 
BR'S PECUNIARY GAIN. THE TERM 
-ICIT" INCLUDES CONTACT IN PERSON, 
ELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH, BY LETTER 
)THER WRITING, OR BY OTHER COMM-
OTION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC REC-
ENT, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE LETTERS 
ADDRESSED OR ADVERTISING CIRCULARS 
DISTRIBUTED GENERALLY TO PERSONS NOT 
KNOWN TO NEED LEGAL SERVICES OF THE 
KIND PROVIDED BY THE LAWYER IN A 
PARTICULAR MATTER, BUT WHO ARE SO 
SITUATED THAT THEY MIGHT IN GENERAL 
FIND SUCH SERVICES USEFUL. 
COMMENT: 
There is a potential ior aouse mnerem in aireci 
solicitation by a lawyer of prospective clients known 
to need legal service. It subjects the lay person to 
the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a 
direci interpersonal encounter. A prospective client 
often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise 
to the need for legal services, and may have an 
impaired capacity for reason, judgment and prote-
ctive self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking 
the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from 
the lawyer's own interest, which may color the 
advice and representation offered the vulnerable 
prospect. 
Thi situation is therefore fraught with the possi-
bility of undue influence, intimidation, and overre-
aching. This potential for abuse inherent in direct 
solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohi-
bition, particularly since lawyer advertising permi-
tted under Rule 7.2 offers an alternative means of 
communicating necessary information to those who 
may be in need of legal services. 
Advertising makes it possible for a prospective 
client to be informed about the need for legal serv-
ices, and about the qualifications of available 
lawyers and law firms, without subjecting the pros-
pective client to direct personal persuasion that may 
overwhelm the client's judgment. 
The use of general advertising to transmit infor-
mation from lawyer to prospective client, rather 
than direct private contact, will help to assure that 
the information flows cleanly as well as freely. 
Advertising is out in public view, thus subject to 
scrutiny by those who know the lawyer. This info-
rmal review is itself likely to help guard against 
statements and claims that might constitute false or 
misleading communications, in violation of Rule 
7.1. direct, private communications from a lawyer 
to a prospective client are not subject to such third 
party scrutiny and consequently are much more 
likely jo approach (and occasionally cross) the div-
iding line between accurate representations and • 
those that are false and misleading. -
Thwe dangers attend direct solicitation whether in-
person or by mail. Direct mail solicitation cannot be 
effectively regulated by means less drastic than 
outright prohibition. One proposed safeguard is to 
requird that the designation "Advertising* l>e 
stamped on any envelope containing a solicitation 
letter. This would do nothing to assure the accuracy 
and reliability of the contents. Another suggestion is 
that solicitation letters be filed with a state regula-
tory agpncy. This would be ineffective as a practical 
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matter. State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for 
resources to investigate specific complaints, much 
less for those necessary to screen lawyers' mail sol-
icitation material. Even if they could examine such 
materials, agency staff members are unlikely to 
know anything about the lawyer or about the pros-
pective client's underlying problem. Without such 
knowledge they cannot determine whether the 
lawyer's representations are misleading. In any 
event, such review would be after the fact, potenti-
ally Joo late ta avert the undesirable consequences 
of disseminating false and misleading material. 
General mailings not speaking to a specific matter 
do not pose the same danger of abuse as targeted 
mailings, and therefore are not prohibited by this 
Rule. The representations made in such mailings are 
necessarily general rather than tailored, less impor-
tuning than informative. They are addressed to 
recipients unlikely to be specially vulnerable at the 
time, hence who are likely to be more skeptical 
about unsubstantiated claims. General mailings not 
addressed to recipients involved in a specific legal 
matter or incident, therefore, more closely resemble 
permissible advertising rather than prohibited solic-
itation. 
Similarly, this Rule would not prohibit a lawyer 
from contacting representatives of organizations or 
groups that may be interested in establishing a 
group or prepaid legal plan for its members, insu-
reds, beneficiaries or other third parties for the 
purpose of informing such entities of the availability 
of and details concerning the plan or arrangement 
which the lawyer or the lawyer's firm is willing to 
offer. This form of communication is not directed 
to a specific prospective client known to need legal 
services related to a particular matter. Rather, it is 
usually addressed to an individual acting in a fidu-
ciary capacity seeking a supplier of legal services for 
others who may, if they choose, become prospective 
clients of the lawyer. Under these circumstances, the 
activity which the lawyer undertakes in communic-
ating with such representatives and the type of inf-
ormation transmitted to the individual are functio-
nally similar to and serve the same purpose as adv-
ertising permitted under Rule 7.2. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 2-104(A) provided with certain exceptions 
that *[a] lawyer who has given in-person unsolici-
tated advice to a layperson that he should obtain 
counsel or take legal action shall not accept emplo-
yment resulting from that advice . . . / The except-
ions include DR 2-104(A)(l), which provided that 
a lawyer "may accept employment by a close friend, 
relative, former client (if the advice is germane to 
the former employment), or one whom the lawyer 
reasonably believes to be a client/ DR 2-104(A)(2) 
through DR 2-104(AK5) provided other exceptions 
relating, respectively, to employment resulting from 
public educational programs, recommendation by a 
legal assistance organization, public speaking or 
writing and representing members of a class in class 
action litigation. 
RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF 
FIELDS OF PRACTICE 
A LAWYER MAY COMMUNICATE THE 
FACT THAT THE LAWYER WILL ACCEPT 
EMPLOYMENT IN SPECIFIED AREAS OF 
PRACTICE. A LAWYER WHOSE PRACTICE IS 
LIMITED TO SPECIFIED AREAS OF PRAC-
Conduct 
TICE MAY COMMUNICATE THAT FACT. A 
LAWYER SHALL NOT HOLD HIMSELF OUT 
PUBLICLY AS A SPECIALIST AND SHALL 
NOT INDICATE ANY CERTIFICATION OR 
DESIGNATION AS A SPECIALIST, EXCEPT AS 
FOLLOWS: 
(a) A LAWYER ADMITTED TO PRACTICE 
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE MAY USE THE DESIG-
NATION "PATENT ATTORNEY" OR A SUBS-
TANTIALLY SIMILAR DESIGNATION; AND 
(b) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY PLAN 
REGULATING LAWYER SPECIALIZATION 
APPROVED AND PROMULGATED BY THE 
| UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
[ COMMENT: 
See In re: UTAH STATE BAR PETITION FOR 
APPROVAL OF CHANGES IN DISCIPLINARY 
RULES ON ADVERTISING, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 
1982). 
CODE COMPARISON 
Rule 7.4 is substantially identical to DR 2-105. 
RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND 
LETTERHEADS 
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE A FIRM 
NAME, LETTERHEAD OR OTHER PROFESSI-
ONAL DESIGNATION THAT VIOLATES RULE 
7.1. A TRADE NAME MAY BE USED BY A 
LAWYER IN PRIVATE PRACTICE IF IT DOES 
NOT IMPLY A CONNECTION WITH A GOVE-
RNMENT AGENCY OR WITH A PUBLIC OR 
CHARITABLE LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZA-
TION AND IS NOT OTHERWISE IN VIOLA-
TION OF RULE 7.1. 
(b) A LAW FIRM WITH OFFICES IN MORE 
THAN ONE JURISDICTION MAY USE THE 
SAME NAME IN EACH JURISDICTION, BUT 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE LAWYERS IN AN 
OFFICE OF THE FIRM SHALL INDICATE THE 
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THOSE 
NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE IN THE JURI-
SDICTION WHERE THE OFFICE IS LOCATED. 
(c) THE NAME OF A LAWYER HOLDING A 
PUBLIC OFFICE SHALL NOT BE USED IN THE 
NAME OF A LAW FIRM, OR IN COMMUNIC-
ATIONS ON ITS BEHALF, DURING ANY SUB-
STANTIAL PERIOD IN WHICH THE LAWYER 
IS NOT ACTIVELY AND REGULARLY PRAC-
TICING WITH THE FIRM. 
(d) LAWYERS MAY STATE OR IMPLY THAT 
THEY PRACTICE IN A PARTNERSHIP OR 
OTHER ORGANIZATION ONLY WHEN THAT 
IS THE FACT. 
COMMENT: 
A firm may be designated by the names of all or 
some of its members, by the names of deceased 
members where there has been a continuing succes-
sion in the firm's identity or by a trade name such 
as "ABC Legal Clinic/ Although the United States 
Supreme Court has held that legislation may proh-
ibit the use of trade names in professional practice, 
use of such names in law practice is acceptable so 
long as it is not misleading. If a private firm uses a 
trade name that includes a geographical name such 
as "Springfield Legal Clinic/ an express disclaimer 
that it is a public legal aid agency may be required 
to avoid a misleading implication. It may be obse-
rved that any firm name including the name of a 
deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name. 
The use of such names to designate law firms has 
proven a useful means of identification. However, it 
is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not asso-
ciated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm. 
With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing 
office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, 
may not denominate themselves as, for example, 
"Smith and Jones,* for that title suggests partner-
ship in the practice of law. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-102(A) 
provided that "[a] lawyer ... shall not use ... profe-
ssional cards ... letterheads, or similar professional 
notices or devices, [except! ... if they are in dignified 
form . . / DR 2-102(B) provided that "[a] lawyer in 
private practice shall not practice under a trade 
name, a name that is misleading as to the identity of 
the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, 
or a firm name containing names other than those 
of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except 
that ... a firm may use as ... its name the name or 
names of one or more deceased or retired members 
of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing 
line of succession/ 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-102(A) 
provided that "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not use 
or participate in the use of professional cards, pro-
fessional announcement cards, office signs, letterh-
eads, firm name or other professional designation, 
notice or device that violates the provisions of DR 2-
101(A) and (B), this Rule or DR 2-105/ 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2-102(D) 
provided that a partnership "shall not be formed or 
continued between or among lawyers licensed in 
different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the 
members and associates of the firm on its letterhead 
and in other permissible listings make clear the jur-
isdictional limitations on those members and assoc-
iates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed 
jurisdictions; however, the same firm name may be 
used in each jurisdiction/ 
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2-102(B) 
provided that "[a] lawyer who assumes a judicial, 
legislative, or public executive or administrative post 
or office shall not permit his name to remain in the 
name of a law firm ... during any significant period 
in which he is not actively and regularly practicing 
law as a member of the firm.../ 
Paragraph (d) is substantially identical to DR 2-
102(C). 
MAINTAINING THE 
INTEGRITY OF THE 
PROFESSION 
RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND 
DISCIPLINARY MATTERS 
AN APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION TO THE 
BAR, OR A LAWYER IN CONNECTION WITH 
A BAR ADMISSION APPLICATION OR IN 
CONNECTION WITH A DISCIPLINARY 
MATTER, SHALL NOT: 
(a) KNOWINGLY MAKE A FALSE STATE-
MENT OF MATERIAL FACT; OR 
(b) FAIL TO DISCLOSE A FACT NECESSARY 
)RRECT A MISAPPREHENSION KNOWN 
PERSON TO HAVE ARISEN IN THE 
*ER, OR KNOWINGLY FAIL TO 
)ND TO A LAWFUL DEMAND FOR 
^MATION FROM AN ADMISSIONS OR 
BINARY AUTHORITY, EXCEPT THAT 
RULE DOES NOT REQUIRE DISCLO-
I OF INFORMATION OTHERWISE PROT-
• BY RULE 1.6. 
COR 
The duty imposed oy inis Rule extends to persons 
seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. 
Hence] if a person makes a material false statement 
in connection with an application for admission, it 
may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action 
if the person is admitted, and in any event may be 
relevant in a subsequent admission application. The 
duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own 
admission or discipline as well as that of others. 
Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a 
lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or 
omission Jn connection with a disciplinary investig-
ation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also 
requires affirmative clarification of any misunders-' 
tanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary 
authority of which the person involved becomes 
aware. [ 
This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A 
person relying on such a provision in response to a 
question, however, should do so openly and not use 
the right of non-disclosure as a justification for 
failure to comply with this Rule. 
A lawyer representing an applicant for admission 
to the par, or representing a lawyer who is the 
subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is 
governed by the rules applicable to the client-
lawyer relationship. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR lflOl(A) provided that a lawyer is 'subject 
to discipline if he has made a materially false state-
ment in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a 
material fact requested in connection with, his 
application for admission to the bar.' DR 1-101(B) 
provided that a lawyer "shall not further the appli-
cation for admission to the bar of another person 
known by him to be unqualified in respect to char-
acter, education, or other relevant attribute/ With 
respect to paragraph (b), DR 1-102(A)(5) provided 
that a lawyer shall not engage in "conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice." 
RULE B.2 JUDICIAL OFFICIALS 
(a) Al LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE A 
PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT THE LAWYER 
KNOWS TO BE FALSE OR WITH RECKLESS 
DISREGARD AS TO ITS TRUTH OR FALSITY 
CONCERNING THE QUALIFICATIONS OR 
INTEGRITY OF A JUDGE, ADJUDICATORY 
OFFICER, OR OF A CANDIDATE FOR ELEC-
TION OR APPOINTMENT TO JUDICIAL 
OFFICE. 
(b) A LAWYER WHO IS A CANDIDATE FOR 
JUDICIAL OFFICE SHALL COMPLY WITH 
THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. 
COMMENT: 
Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating 
Cnd* • Co »r « v/"«^n w**^ -w% ^ n ^ n 
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the professional or personal fitness of persons being 
considered for election or appointment to judicial 
office. Expressing honest and candid opinions on 
such matters contributes to improving the adminis-
tration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a 
lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in 
the administration of justice. 
When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer 
should be bound by applicable limitations on polit-
ical activity. 
To maintain the fair and independent administr-
ation of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue 
traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unj-
ustly criticized. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 8«102(A) 
provided that a lawyer "shall not knowingly make 
false statements of fact concerning the qualifications 
of a candidate for election or appointment to judi-
cial office/ DR 8-102(B) provided that a lawyer 
"shall not knowingly make false accusations against 
a judge or other adjudicatory officer/ 
Paragraph (b) is substantially identical to DR 8-
103. 
RULE 8.3 REPORTING 
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT 
(a) A LAWYER HAVING KNOWLEDGE THAT 
ANOTHER LAWYER HAS COMMITTED A 
VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSI-
ONAL CONDUCT THAT RAISES A SUBSTAN-
TIAL QUESTION AS TO THAT LAWYER'S 
HONESTY, TRUSTWORTHINESS OR FITNESS 
AS A LAWYER IN OTHER RESPECTS, SHALL 
INFORM THE APPROPRIATE PROFESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY. 
(b) A LAWYER HAVING KNOWLEDGE 
THAT A JUDGE HAS COMMITTED A VIOLA-
TION OF THE APPLICABLE RULES OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT THAT RAISES A SUBSTAN-
TIAL QUESTION AS TO THE JUDGE'S 
FITNESS FOR OFFICE SHALL INFORM THE 
APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY. 
(c) THIS RULE DOES NOT REQUIRE DISCL-
OSURE OF INFORMATION OTHERWISE 
PROTECTED BY RULE 1.6. 
COMMENT: 
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires 
that members of the profession initiate disciplinary 
investigation when they know of a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a 
similar obligation with respect to judicial miscon-
duct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate 
a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary 
investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is 
especially important where the victim is unlikely to 
discover the offense. 
A report about misconduct is not required where 
it would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a 
lawyer should encourage a client to consent to dis-
closure where prosecution would not substantially 
prejudice the client's interests. 
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation 
of the Rules, the failure to report any violation 
would itself be a professional offense. Such a req-
uirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to 
be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting 
obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating 
profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A 
measure of judgment is, theiefore, required in 
complying with "the provisions of this Rule. The 
term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the 
possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of 
which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made 
to the bar disciplinary agency unless some other 
agency, such as a peer review agency, is more app-
ropriate in the circumstances. Similar considerations 
apply to the reporting of judicial misconduct. 
The duty to report professional misconduct does 
not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer 
whose professional conduct is in question. Such a 
situation is governed by the rules applicable to the 
client-lawyer relationship. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 1-103(A) provided that "[a] lawyer posses-
sing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of [a 
Disciplinary Rule) shall report such knowledge to ... 
authority empowered to investigate or act upon such 
violation." 
RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT 
IT IS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT FOR A 
LAWYER TO: 
(a) VIOLATE OR ATTEMPT TO VIOLATE 
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
KNOWINGLY ASSIST OR INDUCE ANOTHER 
TO DO SO, OR DO SO THROUGH THE ACTS 
OF ANOTHER; 
(b) COMMIT A CRIMINAL ACT THAT REF-
LECTS ADVERSELY ON THE LAWYER'S 
HONESTY, TRUSTWORTHINESS OR FITNESS 
AS A LAWYER IN OTHER RESPECTS; 
(c) ENGAGE IN CONDUCT INVOLVING 
DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREP-
RESENTATION; 
(d) ENGAGE IN CONDUCT THAT IS PREJ-
UDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE; 
(e) STATE OR IMPLY AN ABILITY TO INF-
LUENCE IMPROPERLY A GOVERNMENT 
AGENCY OR OFFICIAL; OR 
(f) KNOWINGLY ASSIST A JUDGE OR JUD-
ICIAL OFFICER IN CONDUCT THAT IS A 
VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE RULES OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW. 
COMMENT: 
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on 
fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving 
fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an 
income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses 
carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distin-
ction was drawn in terms of offenses involving 
"moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to 
include offenses concerning some matters of pers-
onal morality, such as adultery and comparable 
offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness 
for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is pers-
onally answerable to the entire criminal law, a 
lawyer should be professionally answerable only for 
offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics 
I relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, 
dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interfcr- ^ 
ence with the administration of justice are in that * 
category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones 
of minor significance when considered separately, 
can indicate indifference to legal obligation. 
A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation 
imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct 
valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(c) 
concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, 
scope, meaning or application of the law apply to 
challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. 
Lawyers holding public office assume legal resp-
onsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A I 
lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an ina- I 
bility to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The I 
same is true of abuse of positions of private trust 
such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, 
agent and officer, director or manager of a corpor- I 
ation or other organization. I 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraphs (a) through (d), DR 1-
102(A) provided that a lawyer shall not: * » J 
*(l) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. I 
"(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through 
actions of another. ' J 
"(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral I 
turpitude. I 
"(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. I 
"(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial .to the 
administration of justice. I 
"(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely I 
reflects on his fitness to practice law. • I 
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR 9- I 
101(C). 
There is no direct counterpart to paragraph (e) in 
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 7-34 stated 
in part that '[a] lawyer ... is never justified in 
making a gift or a loan to a [judicial officer] except 
as permitted by ... the Code of Judicial Conduct/ 
EC 9-1 stated that a lawyer 'should promote I 
public confidence in our [legal] system and in the I 
legal profession.9 I 
RULE 8.5 JURISDICTION 
A LAWYER ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN 
THIS JURISDICTION IS SUBJECT TO THE 
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THIS JURIS-
DICTION ALTHOUGH ENGAGED IN PRAC-
TICE ELSEWHERE. 
COMMENT: 
In modern practice lawyers frequently act outside I 
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which they I 
are licensed to practice, either in another state or I 
outside the United States. In doing so, they remain I 
subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction 
in which they are licensed to practice. If their acti-
vity in another jurisdiction is substantial and conti- I 
nuous, it may constitute practice of law in that 
jurisdiction. See Rule 5.5. 
.If the rules of professional conduct in the two 
jurisdictions differ, principles of conflict of laws I 
may apply. Similar problems arise when a lawyer is I 
licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction. I 
Where a lawyer is licensed to practice law in two I 
jurisdictions which impose conflicting obligations, 
applicable rules of choice of law may govern the I 
situation. A related problem arises with respect to I 
practice before a federal tribunal, where the general I 
authority of the states to regulate the practice of law I 
must be reconciled with such authority as federal I 
tribunals may have to regulate practice before them. I 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the I 
Code. 
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